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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of social pressure on general
aviation (GA) pilots’ weather decision making. Data have shown that GA accidents
associated with visual flight rules (VFR) flight into instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC) are more likely to result in fatalities than other types of GA accidents. This problem
is compounded by the addition of passengers, who have been found to be present onboard
during VFR into IMC accidents more frequently than in other types of GA accidents. The
question is whether passengers influence a pilot’s decision to continue flight into adverse
weather. The extent other individual factors play a role in a pilots’ decision to continue
through adverse weather, including prior experience (i.e., flight hours), basic weather
knowledge, decision-making, risk perception and tolerance, and the ability of the pilot to
assert themselves in the cockpit were explored. To examine these questions, social pressure
by passengers during flight was manipulated to encourage pilots to continue or divert from
adverse weather.
Results conclude that the distance the pilot continued into the weather for positively
motivated pilots (persuaded to continue) increased, and decreased for the pilots who were
negatively motivated (persuaded to divert). The significant findings of persuasion on
distance into the weather were compounded by the lack of awareness of the pilots on the
impact of the passenger on their decision making behavior. Additional findings suggest that
private pilots with instrument ratings are continuing further than either the low time VFR
pilots or the high time commercial and/or ATP pilots.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Ever since the first flight by the Wright Brothers on December 17, 1903, Americans
have been captivated by the thrill of flight. That momentous day sparked a culture that
relishes in the joy of flight, and some direct this passion into a profession, others a hobby.
Of the three main categories of flight, those pilots who choose to make a career of flight
typically fall into either the commercial or military sectors. However, some of these pilots
also make a living while flying under general aviation (GA), which refers to non-military and
non-commercial applications. GA also includes a subsection of pilots who chose to fly for
recreational purposes, as the purposes for pilots flying under GA ranges from crop dusting
to air transport. Therefore, recreational GA pilots make up a subset of general aviation
(GA), which encompasses a wide range of flight activities.
In the early years of flight, pilot fatalities were not uncommon due to the high level
of risk associated with their new pastime. However, improvements in both aircraft and
training methods have afforded a safer flying experience today. The accident rate dropped
to an all time low in the 1980’s, and has remained leveled out ever since (Figure 1; NTSB,
2005). With continued advances in technology, mechanical problems have become less and
less frequent (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996). Figure 1 shows the large decrease in aviation
accidents (per 100,000 flight hours) with a leveling-off of the accident rate in the 1980’s for
both military and general aviation. This is in comparison to the more recent accident rates
for commercial accidents, which occur much less frequently. Figure 2 (Annual Safety
Report, 2005) provides a brief historical overview of commercial aviation accidents showing
passenger fatalities per 100 million hours. Both of these figures show significant
1

improvements in aviation safety since the 1950’s, leaving one main area in need of
improvement.

Figure 1: Overall Accident Rate per 100,000 hours: 1950-2008

Figure 2: Passenger Fatalities: Commercial Aviation Accidents per 100 million miles

Pilot performance in the form of human error contributes to approximately 50% to
90% of aviation crashes (Billings & Reynard, 1984; Diehl, 1989; Hawkins, 1993; Nagel, 1988;
2

Trollip & Jensen, 1991; Yacavone, 1993), and in comparison to mechanical factors,
improvements have occurred at a much slower rate (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996). Human
error related accidents fluctuate based on flight categorization (Li, Baker, Grabowski, &
Rebok, 2001), with human error contributing to 85% of GA accidents but only 38% of
major commercial accidents. If additional gains are to be made to improve the current
accident rate, it is essential to investigate the causes of human error, particularly because of
the catastrophic consequences that can result from this type of high-risk activity.
One subset in aviation that may have the largest impact on the overall accident rate
and aviation safety as a whole is that of GA operations. Both historically and currently, GA
has the highest accident rate for any of the three main types of aviation, and, as previously
mentioned, the highest rate of human error (Figure 1; Li et al, 2001). Commercial aviation
has by far the most impressive record of 0.29 accidents per 100,000 flight hours, followed by
the military with 1.4 accidents. This is in comparison to GA with 7.05 accidents per 100,000
flight hours (1999 rates). Therefore, during any given flight, a GA pilot is over four times
more likely to be involved in a crash than a commercial pilot.
The safety differences seen between GA and other types of aviation may have a lot
to do with the pilot population. GA pilots may be flying for instruction, training, business,
agricultural purposes, or for a number of other reasons, including recreational purposes
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Commercial and military pilots are typically career pilots,
with a minimum of 1500 flight hours required to attain a commercial license. A large
number of GA pilots, particularly the recreational pilots, do not receive the training or log
even a fraction of a commercial pilot’s hours.
One area where this issue of experience and training is especially important is in the
area of weather decision making. During a flight a pilot may encounter any number of
3

different weather conditions. However, these conditions can generally be categorized into
three main types of conditions that pilots can fly under, visual meteorological conditions
(VMC) and instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). VMC represents clear weather
conditions where the pilot controls the aircraft by relying on what can be seen out of the
window. Controlling attitude, navigating, and maintaining separation from obstacles such as
terrain and other aircraft is maintained visually during VMC.
In contrast, IMC represents deteriorated weather conditions where pilots may be
unable to see and avoid obstacles. During IMC, pilots must be able to fly using only their
instrumentation since visual cues are severely limited, if present. The pilot must control the
attitude of the aircraft by monitoring the flight instruments and relies entirely on ATC for
separation of aircraft. The ability to control the plane using only instrumentation is required
to obtain an instrument rating, which allow pilots to fly during both types of weather and
entitles them to additional privileges.
The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) contains a list of regulations that
correspond to each aspect of flight, from the airworthiness of the aircraft to the weather
conditions and airspace restrictions. FARs have two sets of rules corresponding to the two
categories of weather conditions, visual flight rules (VFR) and instrument flight rules (IFR).
VFR involves a set of weather conditions consistent only with visually clear conditions
(VMC). VMC minima, the minimum meteorological requirements for VFR are the
minimum requirements necessary during VFR flight. In contrast, pilots who file for IFR
flights can fly in both VMC and IMC conditions. Interestingly, the vast majority of IFR
flying is done under visually clear conditions. These categorizations, VFR and IFR impose
additional regulations such as requirements on airspace type and class. In the United States
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and Canada, all airspace between 18,000 and 60,000 feet above ground requires aircraft to
operate under IFR regardless of actual weather conditions.
Pilots who have attained their instrument ratings are entitled to fly under IFR, and
commercial and military pilots typically conduct the majority of these flights. In comparison,
much fewer GA pilots are instrument rated. The majority of GA recreational pilots are
qualified to fly only during VMC, often due to having limited flight hours and/or training.
These limitations are often due in part to the expensive nature of flying, which causes many
pilots to have trouble affording the time or money to acquire training for IMC. Without the
necessary training and flight hours, VFR only pilots have limited experience recognizing and
handling deteriorated weather conditions.
VFR only pilots may enter IMC without the permission, rating, and/or experience to
do so for a variety of reasons. This phenomenon is known as VFR into IMC. VFR into
IMC is one of the leading causes for concern in GA, as it represents only 3.5% of GA
accidents but is associated with nearly 20% of all GA fatalities. Fatal VFR into IMC
accidents have an 80% fatality rate, in contrast to the 19% fatality rate associated with other
types of GA accidents (Figure 3; Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, & Shappell, 2008). This
rate has been consistent across many studies and is relatively stable over time (Batt &
O’Hare, 20005; Li & Baker, 1999, 2007; NTSB, 1989, 2005, 2009).

5

Figure 3: Injury severity for VFR-IMC and non-VFR into IMC

Multiple studies that have explored the VFR into IMC problem have found that a
large percentage of GA pilots have entered IMC without the proper training or authorization
(Hunter, 2001; O’Hare & Chalamers, 1999). A survey of approximately 1,300 New Zealand
pilots found that 27.2% the non-instrument rated pilots had entered IMC on at least one
occasion. Similar results were found for pilots in the United States, where approximately
25% of pilots had entered IMC on at least one occasion (Hunter, 2001). What makes these
results even more remarkable is that 17.7% of these surveyed GA pilots had been involved
in at least one accident (not necessarily related to VFR into IMC incidents).
We must therefore ask, do all pilots who fly into adverse weather do so for the same
reasons? Evidence for both a lack of expertise (Batt & O’Hare, 2005; Li & Baker, 1999,
2007; NTSB, 1989, 2005, 2009) and misplaced motivation (Burian, Orasanu, & Hitt, 2000;
Craig, 2001; Detwiler et al, 2008; Hunter, 1995; O’Hare & Smitheram, 1995; O’Hare &
Rasmussen, 1989) have been supported during the research into the cause of VFR into IMC
accidents.
6

In order to investigate the true cause(s) of VFR into IMC accidents, Goh &
Wiegmann (2001b) performed a simulator study to determine if expertise or motivation were
leading to this behavior. Their findings suggest that there are two categories of pilots
involved in VFR into IMC accidents, those who enter weather inadvertently as a result of
misdiagnosing the situation, and those who enter deliberately as a result of misplaced
motivation. The first group of pilots who misdiagnose the situation do not accurately
recognize the deteriorating weather conditions or the associated risk. This is generally
thought to be due to a lack of experience, more specifically, experience relating to the
identification of weather cues. The second group of pilots are those who intentionally
continue into adverse weather conditions due to motivational factors. These pilots can be
influenced to enter IMC due to one of several factors, internal pressure to get home, or “gethome-itis,” and external pressure created by the presence and/or influence of passengers.
This first group, who lacks the ability to discriminate weather conditions, is
consistent with the first part of the definition of judgment by Jensen & Benel (1977), the
intellectual ability, or the capacity to “sense, store, retrieve, and integrate information.” The
authors refer to Van Dam, who terms this a “discriminating ability” (cited in Jensen & Benel,
1977). The second group is consistent with the second part of the definition of pilot
judgment referred to as motivational tendencies. This is the motivation to choose and
execute a suitable course of action within a given time frame, or what Van Dam terms the
“response pattern” of the pilot. The response pattern includes biases or heuristics that
influence the decision making process of the pilot. The response is also influenced by the
manner with which the pilot copes with the risks inherent in the flight situation.
The role of other occupants must also be explored as a factor in VFR into IMC
accidents. Research in related arenas such as social psychology (Asch, 1951, 1955; Milgram,
7

1964, 1974), driving (Arnett, Offer, & Fine, 1997; Baxter, et al, 1990; Doherty, Andre, &
MacGregor, 1998; Preusser, Ferguson, & Williams, 1998; Regan & Mitsopoulos, 2001), and
teams in a commercial aviation cockpit (Chidester & Foushee, 1988; Costley, Johnson, &
Lawson, 1989; Foushee & Manos, 1981; Goguen, Linde, & Murphy, 1986; Kanki, Lozito, &
Foushee, 1989; Ruffell Smith, 1979) have shown that the presence of and the interactions
with other people in social situations can and do affect ones actions. In the GA domain,
passengers may influence pilot decision making. Interestingly, research has found that
passengers are more frequently present in accidents involving VFR into IMC accidents than
during other types of GA accidents (Detwiler et al, 2008; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001a). The
role of passengers in this type of accident must be explore before we can begin to
understand how to prevent these types of accidents. Additionally, both the higher rate of
fatal accidents and higher death toll associated with VFR into IMC makes this problem an
even more pressing concern for study.
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CHAPTER 2: WEATHER

At the most basic level, pilots must understand when they can and cannot fly based
on the weather conditions. The basis of this determination is the broad categories of visual
and instrument conditions (VMC/IMC), which is classified according to ceiling and visibility
minimums. Rather than simply following the rules associated with flying in VMC or IMC,
pilots are required to have an in-depth understanding of weather as it relates to aviation.
Weather is neither stationary nor binary, it is ever changing, and understanding it requires
and relies upon a fundamental knowledge of weather theory. Weather theory describes the
basic concepts that can be used to understand why, when, and how weather phenomena
(cold fronts, storms, etcetera) change and move. The knowledge of how these weather
systems change and move result in the VMC/IMC determination. Weather information can
be obtained in many different formats, potentially affecting its interpretation and use. In
order to understand the pilot’s decision making process, a basic understanding of how the
pilot thinks about weather as it relates to aviation is necessary. This understanding requires a
basic knowledge of weather theory, weather phenomena, weather classification, and the way
pilots obtain weather information.

2.1: Weather Theory
The most basic understanding of weather theory requires understanding certain
fundamental concepts. Weather theory basics begin with the atmosphere, a layer of air that
surrounds the earth and rests on its surface (Flight Standards Service, 2003). There are
several layers of the atmosphere that are defined by the distance in which they extend from
9

the earth and their associated properties. The layer closest to the earth’s surface where the
majority of the weather phenomena and flying (especially general aviation) occurs is the
troposphere. This layer begins at sea level and extends to 20,000 feet over the north and
south poles and up to 48,000 feet over the equator. Differences in the height of the
troposphere between the equator and the poles are a result of a change in weather during the
summer and winter months that leads to uneven heating. This uneven heating can also be
found at different times during the day and results in changes due to the type of surface.
Different surfaces absorb and reflect different amounts of the sun’s radiation. For example,
there are differences in the absorption of heat in plowed fields, forests, and bodies of water
(Figure 4; NASA, 2009). Land areas absorb much more heat than bodies of water but are
still not able to absorb all of the radiated heat during the peak hours of the day. This leads
to the earth absorbing the additional radiation, which is later emitted from the earth’s surface
at night. Water surfaces do not absorb as much heat as land because they reflect some of
the solar radiation. Therefore, temperatures during the day are more stable because less
radiation is being absorbed, resulting in less heat emitted during the night.

Figure 4: Air Current and Heating Effects on Local Circulation
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One additional concept related to the differences between bodies of water and land
is the concept of moisture. Moisture is one of the four key atmospheric properties.
Moisture refers to the presence of some state of water, and can occur in many states (solid,
liquid, gas). The most important concept when dealing with moisture is molecular
saturation, or the maximum amount of moisture that a molecule can hold. If the air is
saturated, it can no longer hold additional water vapor, resulting in excess moisture and
therefore, some form of clouds or precipitation. There are two main ways that saturation
can be measured, relative humidity (RH) and temperature-dew point spread (Lankford,
2001). RH is the percentage of saturation in a molecule. Therefore, if the air is completely
saturated and can hold no additional moisture, RH would equal 100%. If the molecule is
only holding half of its molecular capacity, it would have an RH of 50%. The capacity for
air molecules to hold water vapor increases with temperature, resulting in a decreased RH
and saturation with an increase in temperature. If the same molecule with a RH of 100%
increases its temperature, it will have more available space for additional molecules, resulting
in a decreased RH%. The temperature-dew point spread calculates saturation using the
difference between the temperature and dew point. Temperature is the measure of the
average speed of molecules, and dew point is the temperature at which air becomes saturated
(Lankford, 2001). If the temperature and dew point are equal, precipitation (fog) is almost
guaranteed, but as the difference in these values increase, precipitation becomes more and
more unlikely (very unlikely with a six degree difference between temperature and dew
point).
The movement of air is not only a product of moisture and temperature, but both
the pressure and density of the air, the final two important atmospheric properties. Pressure
is the force of the air, or how many air molecules exist above the point of measurement.
11

Therefore, as you gain altitude and the air above you decreases, so will pressure. These two
properties of air have a direct relationship with one another, but an opposing relationship to
the two previously discussed properties, temperature and moisture. These four properties
have interacting qualities and behave in predictable ways. As pressure and density decrease,
temperature and moisture increase. As molecules warm (temperature increases) the
increased heating leads them to move farther apart from one another (density decreases),
resulting in the ability to hold more molecules (moisture increases) with less pressure on the
surface (pressure decreases), resulting in rising air. In general, warm air tends to rise and has
low density and low pressure, and cooler air tends to descend, with high density and high
pressure.
How air moves leads to the discussion of general circulation theory. This is the
theory that explains the differences in pressure due to the unequal heating of the Earth’s
surfaces. As previously described with the changes in the troposphere due to heating
differences, heating also has similar effects on pressure. The Poles are surrounded by an
area of high pressure (cold air) and the equator by areas of low pressure (warm air). The low
pressure in the equatorial regions allows higher pressure to travel in from the Poles, resulting
in cooling of the air near the equator, making it sink towards the earth as it becomes denser.
These wind patterns occur in each hemisphere approximately three times, and the circulation
pattern is termed Hadley’s cells (Figure 5; http://universe-review.ca/option2.htm). This is
the central formula for air circulation, but there are many more factors that lead to changes
to this basic pattern.

12

Figure 5: Global Circulation Patterns

These changes occur as a result of widespread changes to the atmosphere’s general
air movements by the Coriolis effect, pressure gradient force, or the frictional force. The
Coriolis effect is due to the rotation of the Earth. In the Northern hemisphere, it results in a
deflection of the wind clockwise in a high density area (“high”) and counterclockwise in a
low density area (“low”). This pattern is reversed in the Southern hemisphere. In general,
highs are typically areas of dry, stable, descending air, bringing clear weather, and lows are
areas of moist, unstable air, bringing stormy weather. The second factor is the pressure
gradient force, which is caused by areas of different pressure. Pressure differences results in
wind that typically wants to blow from areas of high pressure to areas of low pressure. A
third factor, frictional force, is the difference between the moving air and the ground that
slows the wind at or near the surface. This force acts opposite to wind direction and
increases with rugged terrain.
These changes in the movement of air can lead to differences in two main types of
motions in the atmosphere, horizontal movement (wind) and vertical movement (currents).
These changes are due to heating differences, density and pressure, resulting in changes to
wind direction and speed. In general, winds flow from areas of high density and pressure to
areas of low density and pressure, and are minimized by the force of friction around objects.
13

Friction tends to increase with terrain changes, and this results in decreased wind speed with
rougher terrain. These changes result in predictable patterns of wind changes around
mountains and mountain passes (venture effect, mountain wave, standing wave), the sea and
surrounding land (sea breeze), and mountains, valleys, and canyons (valley wind, gravity
wind, drainage wind; Figure 4).
This discussion of the movement of air can refer to either small parcels of air (as
previously mentioned) to larger bodies of air with similar weather features. These large
bodies of air are termed air masses. The characteristics of air masses are a function of the
temperature and moisture, which are largely determined by its geographical origin. Air
masses that originate near bodies of water, as indicated by the phrase ‘maritime,’ (maritime
polar and maritime tropical) have a high moisture content, and can be contrasted with those
originating from land, which is termed ‘continental’ (continental polar and continental
tropical) with a lower moisture content. The second half of the phrase for the type of air
mass indicates the temperature from which it is located, with ‘polar’ (continental polar and
maritime polar) indicating a cold air mass, and ‘tropical’ (continental tropical and maritime
tropical) indicating an origin in warmer weather. Each has typical weather characteristics,
with the moisture content of the air masses that originate around water (maritime) being a
key ingredient in hazardous weather flying, while cold weather air masses (polar) have a high
potential for icing, and warm air masses (tropical) have a high potential for thunderstorms
(Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Air Mass Type and Location

As air masses move, they occasionally collide with one another. This is termed a
front, of which there are four basic types; cold front, warm front, stationary front, and
occluded front (AOPA, 2009) (Figure 7; Miller, 2002; Climate & Weather, 2010). During a
cold front, cooler air is pushing warmer air out of the way due to the density of the air. Cold
fronts consist of dense air, which makes the front stay towards the ground, sliding under the
warmer air and forcing less dense air upwards. This upward flowing air results in rapidly
decreasing air, creating clouds and leading to showers and thunderstorms when adequate
moisture is present. While the front is passing, visibility will be poor, temperature and dew
point will drop rapidly, and winds are variable and gusty, often resulting in violent weather.
During a warm front, warm air slides over the cold air, displacing the cooler air. This type of
front is typically less severe than a cold front, but can cause low ceilings and poor visibility.
This is usually accompanied by light to moderate precipitation, most often in the form of
drizzle, rain, sleet, or snow. Warm fronts generally bring low ceilings, rain, and poor
visibility. This is in comparison to cold fronts that bring sudden storms, gusty winds,
turbulence, and even hail or tornadoes, and can move twice as quickly. During a stationary
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front, two air masses meet but both are relatively equal, and neither displaces the other. This
may result in a mixture of the effects caused by of cold fronts and warm fronts. During an
occluded front, a fast moving cold air mass overtakes a slow moving warm air mass, and the
leading edge of each occupies the same location. This results in weather similar to a warm
front as it approaches, followed by weather from a cold front as it passes, resulting in a
potentially severe weather pattern.

Figure 7: Cold Front (Left) and Warm Front (Right)

Although air can move singularly or in large masses, in general, air can be either
stable or unstable. The stability of the air is the tendency for air to be displaced in the
atmosphere. Stable air has a tendency to remain stationary and resist movement, while
unstable air easily rises or falls. The air may become unstable in one of two ways. The air
can be warmer than the surrounding air, causing it to rise (irrespective of saturation). Or, it
can rise as a result of the saturation of the air. Generally, if rising air is colder and less dense
than the surrounding air, it is stable. If the air is warmer and denser than the surrounding
air, it tends to be unstable. Stable air results in generally calm weather, usually with poor
visibility and precipitation. Unstable air results in generally poor weather conditions, often
with turbulence, thunderstorms, and severe precipitation, but with good visibility.
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2.2: Weather Phenomena
The basics of weather theory are important to understanding the weather
phenomena that we are all familiar with in our daily lives but are paramount for an aviator to
fully understand before a decision concerning his or her safety should be made. Pilots come
into contact with common weather phenomena on a daily basis, including precipitation,
thunderstorms, windshear, clouds, and turbulence. All of these may lead to decreased
visibility and affect the safety and outcome of a flight.
Precipitation forms when there is excess moisture in the air and molecules are
already saturated, leading to excess water vapor in the atmosphere being released. This
excess water vapor can be released from clouds in either a solid or liquid form from clouds
as rain, snow, ice (or similar variants) develop. Precipitation is distinguished from other
types of weather phenomena in that the released water vapor must reach the ground.
Different types of precipitation can lead to different changes in visibility. For example, rain
reduces forward visibility, but visibility remains good both downward and on the sides.
Visibility is typically referred to as a measure of the distance at which objects can be seen,
and in aviation is referred to in statute miles (sm), or a typical mile.
Clouds are similar to precipitation in that they both are formed as a result of
saturated air. Clouds are formed from heated water vapor at the surface of the earth rising
and cooling to its dew point, therefore becoming saturated. A number of factors can be an
impetus for the cooling process of rising air, all of which are due to the lifting action of the
saturated air. There are several types of lifting mechanisms by which clouds are formed, and
include orographic lifting, conventional lifting, convergence or frontal lifting, and radiative
cooling. Orographic lifting occurs as a result of air that is forced to rise due to elevated land,
conventional lifting occurs due to the heating of the warmer, lighter air at the ground surface
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interacting with the surrounding cooler air, convergence or conventional lifting occurs at the
point where two air masses meet and interact, and radiative cooling occurs when the cooling
and expulsion of heat from objects results in changes to temperature at different times of the
day (radiative cooling).
Clouds are categorized according to their appearance, how they are formed, and the
height at which their bases form (Lankford, 2001). Based on appearance, the clouds can be
either curly (cirrus), spread out (stratus), or “heaped up” (cumulus), with the addition of a
measure of high height (alto) or the attribute of being rainy (nimbo). The development of
the clouds can be either horizontal (stratiform) or vertical (cumuliform). Stratiform clouds
are associated with a stable air mass and consist of small water droplets. They typically have
poor visibility, a widespread cloud mass, steady precipitation, and rime icing. Cumuliform
clouds develop into rising mounds, domes, and towers, and are associated with an unstable
air mass. They are characterized by good visibility, turbulence, localized cloud masses,
showery precipitation, and clear icing. A third type is neither classified as horizontal or
vertical but by consisting of high clouds (cirroform). Clouds can also be described by the
height at which they form: low clouds (up to 6500 ft.), middle height (6500-20,000 ft.), high
clouds (greater than 20,000 ft.), and clouds with vertical development (bases near surface and
tops of cirrus). Four types of common clouds are presented in table 1 (Lankford, 2001;
NASA, 2009) with a summary of all the previously discussed classifications regarding cloud
type based on its development, appearance, and height, along with typical characteristics.
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Table 1: Cloud Type Description
Cloud Type

Development Visual Appearance Height Additional information
Little to no turbulence, hazardous icing

Stratus

Horizontal

Spread out

Low

conditions if temp is at/below freezing, greatly
reduced visibility if fog/precip present
Shallow layer of unstable air: some turbulence,

Cumulus

Vertical

Heaped up

Low
no significant icing
Unstable air throughout, violent turbulence,

Cumulonimbus

Vertical

Heaped up + high

High
usually icing
No signif icing; turbulence in dense, banded

Cirrus

Curly

High
cirrus, composed of ice crystals; warm frnt sign

The lowest height at which clouds are present is the cloud ceiling. Therefore, if the
first layer of visible clouds is a stratus mass at 5000 feet, the cloud ceiling would be 5000
feet. This cloud mass can also be categorized based on its coverage of the sky. Cloud
coverage is the fraction of the sky that is obscured by clouds. It can be measured by eights
of the sky. If the cloud cover is less than 1/8th covered in clouds, it is termed clear, if 1/8th
to 2/8th of the sky is covered this is referred to as few, 3/8th to 4/8th of the sky is scattered,
5/8th to 7/8th is broken, and 8/8th is overcast. These general terms are frequently used in
pilot briefings.
A weather phenomena resulting from unstable air is turbulence, which can result in
sudden changes in altitude or attitude. The effect of turbulence can be categorized as light,
moderate, severe, or extreme. This ranges from light turbulence indicating slight, erratic
changes in altitude and/or attitude, to extreme turbulence, which leaves the aircraft
structurally damaged, and nearly impossible to control. Turbulence has three main causes.
Mechanical turbulence is caused by topography, or changes in wind due to buildings,
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mountains, or any other man made or natural features. A second type, wind shear, is the
result of winds from different directions making contact with one another to create
movement of the wind in various directions. This type results in sudden, drastic changes in
windspeed over a short time period, and can be quite severe. A third type, convective
turbulence is caused by the lifting action of air, and is often associated with thunderstorms.
Thunderstorms are the result of either a cold front pushing into a warmer air mass
with a lot of moisture (frontal thunderstorm), daytime heating (air mass thunderstorm), or as
a result of a storm inside a solid mass (embedded thunderstorm; AOPA, 2009). In each of
these cases, an initial lifting mechanism is required. This can occur due to a number of
factors: a frontal surface, sloping terrain, or surface heating (Lankford, 2001). This initial
phase is the cumulus stage and is associated with cumulus clouds and large updrafts that may
extend from the surface to several thousand feet (Figure 7a). Another requirement is
unstable air, leading to the formation of the cumulus clouds. The reason for the occurrence
of thunderstorms is the need to reduce the heat in the air. The updrafts that occur during
this first stage results in cool air that was cooled from the rising air, that was previously
warmer than the surrounding air.
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Figure 8: Lifecycle of a Thunderstorm

The second phase in the thunderstorm lifecycle is the mature phase, as characterized
by a difference in the temperature, and an increase in the weight of water drops and ice
particles. The weight of this falling precipitation reduces the upward motion of the air, and
results in an increased downward motion of air, known as a downdraft (Figure 7b). This
stage is the most intense, and is characterized by the visible electrical discharge (lightening),
and the expanding gasses that occur with the lightening (thunder). This stage officially
begins when rain falls, and ends when the supply of warm, humid updrafts to fuel the
thunderstorm is cut off, and the rains stop. The last stage of the lifecycle is the dissipation
stage, characterized by weak downdrafts and stratiform clouds (Figure 7c; Figure 8).

2.3: Weather Classifications
Meteorologists take into account how weather interacts to create ceiling and
visibility, the two main factors used to determine weather classification. Table 2 (Parson,
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2010) describes the weather minimums based on flight type for both ceiling and visibility.
For pilots without an instrument rating, a minimum of marginal VFR (MVFR) is required
for flight. This means that the ceiling must be at a minimum of 1,000 feet with three miles
of visibility. However, flying into MVFR is generally considered ill advised by many pilots,
who personally require VFR minimums to fly. VFR requires a 3,000 foot ceiling and five or
more miles of visibility. IFR and low IFR (LIFR) are only permissible for instrument pilots,
who may fly in weather with a ceiling of less than 1,000 feet and less than three miles of
visibility.

Table 2: Weather Minimums by Flight Type

2.3 Weather Sources
Weather information is available both pre-flight and in-flight. There are four main
types of weather observations, surface, upper air, radar and satellite (Flight Standards
Service, 2003). Surface weather observations are compiled from one of any number of
ground stations, automated weather observing systems (AWOS), and automated surface
observing systems (ASOS). Upper air observations are collected from either pilot reports of
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in-flight weather (PIREPs) or radiosone, the weather observations made from sounding
balloons. Radar observations are of three types, NEXRAD, also known as Doppler radar,
terminal radar, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airport surveillance radar.
Satellite observations are a fourth type of observation, and weather information is received
from two weather stations that orbit over the earth near the equator.
The four types of observations provide different ways to capture weather
information in order to compile a complete weather picture. The surface observations
provide local weather conditions concerning wind, visibility, weather phenomena, dew
point/temperature spread, and altimeter readings. The upper air observations provide
information about what pilots will encounter at an altitude of up to 10,000 feet, including
temperature, humidity, pressure, wind, and weather phenomena, resulting in nearly real time
reports from other pilots. Radar observations provide the pilot with information about
wind, precipitation, and general weather movement. In addition to radar, satellite
observations provide a “big picture” view of weather patterns. These four information
sources can be combined to provide forecasters with a way to describe and predict current
and future weather changes.
Pilots receive weather information both pre-flight and in-flight. Prior to takeoff,
pilots receive this information in the form of a weather briefing. There are three main
briefing formats, an outlook, abbreviated, or standard briefing. Outlook briefings are used
primarily to determine weather condition for a flight from one to several days in advance.
An abbreviated briefing can be helpful to update a previous standard briefing with more
current weather information. A standard briefing (Table 3) is a full briefing that contains any
relevant information about adverse conditions in the area, recommendations concerning
VFR flight, an overview of weather movements, detailed current conditions (ceiling,
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visibility, temperature, winds), en route forecasts based on the flight plan, a destination
forecast, winds and temperature aloft, Notices to Airmen (NOTAM), Air Traffic Control
(ATC) delays, and any other pertinent information.

Table 3: Standard Weather Briefing Components
Standard Weather Briefing:
•
•

Adverse conditions

VFR flight not recommended
•
•

Current conditions

•

En route forecast

•

Destination forecast
•

•
•

Synopsis

Winds aloft

Notices to airmen (NOTAM)
ATC (Air Traffic Control) delays

Weather briefings come in either a printed or graphical format. Printed formats
contain weather information about a specific airport or weather station including METARs,
TAFs, FTs, or SAs. METAR is the Aviation Routine Weather Report, and includes standard
information about current weather conditions at a particular airport. A TAF is the Terminal
Area Forecast, which forecasts or predicts future weather conditions at a specific airport.
FTs or Terminal Forecasts provide a forecast of weather information about a particular
airport (terminal). The SA is a Surface Area report that describes the weather on the surface
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at an airport weather station or other weather facility. These formats generally provide
information concerning ceiling, visibility, and winds.
PIREPs are Pilot Reports that give nearly real time weather reports that include
weather information and any significant weather phenomena from pilots who have just
flown through the area. These reports can be used to augment other weather sources that
might be outdated or incorrect and provide for a more accurate weather picture in a specific
area. NOTAM is the Notice to Airmen that may be added to the end of the SA or given
separately, and include information about updates or changes to the normal procedures at an
airport, with runway changes or closures. RAREPs or Radar Weather Reports are reports
issued by radar stations concerning precipitation and thunderstorms in an area.
Radar is typically used for the separation of aircraft, but can also be used to
determine general weather system trends. Radar works by broadcasting a small pulse of
microwave energy into several directions, which bounces back to the station when it refracts
off an object. This provides information about precipitation, but is limited in that it will only
detect liquid forms of precipitation and therefore will not detect all types of clouds. Radar
information is typically gathered from either an approach tower or a control tower.
Approach towers give weather information immediately for relatively small areas, in
comparison to control towers that provide information for more extended areas, using
WARP (Weather and Radar Processor) to compile information from one or more
NEXRAD (Next Generation Radar) sites. Both Approach and Control towers display
precipitation based on a numbered system that indicates the severity of the precipitation,
from light to extreme (light precipitation is only available at approach towers).
The graphical form of weather information from radar is the radar summary chart,
which provides information about the location and strength of precipitation. Other reports
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that provide information in a graphical format are the Surface Analysis Charts, Weather
Depiction Chart, and the low level significant weather chart. The Surface Analysis chart
provides weather information about atmospheric pressure patterns, frontal movements, and
areas of high and low pressure systems that have already occurred. The Weather Depiction
Chart is a simplified Surface Analysis Chart that contains information on prior frontal
activity and allows the pilot to quickly scan for weather trends. All three of these methods
provide the weather information for current weather trends, which means that once the
weather data is reported, the weather information is already outdated. In comparison, the
low level significant weather chart is the forecasted or predicted weather for a region.
Pilots typically tend to use more than just the weather briefing from the FAA to
prepare for a flight. Many private companies offer computerized services tailored to pilots,
and mainstream weather sources (ie: weather channel) can be useful for creating a full picture
of the weather. These pre-flight weather sources are supplemented by updated in-flight
weather. Weather information should be constantly updated to reflect any changes to
weather systems that may occur once a pilot is in flight. This in-flight information is
available is in several formats, either graphically using one of a number of GPS-type services
(Datalink, handheld GPS devices), or through weather reports that are broadcasted through
radio frequencies (Flight Watch or PIREPs), or through contact with ATC controllers.
The knowledge of weather systems and the interpretation of the sources of weather
information provide a big picture view that assists the pilot in making weather-related
decisions concerning his or her ability to fly. How this information is used is dependent
upon both individual and group factors. These factors lead to a unique interpretation of
weather information, which is then used when determining how to best utilize this
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interpreted information. The combination of weather information and individual and group
factors result in a decision concerning any weather the pilot might experience.
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CHAPTER 3: INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
3.1: Expertise
Expertise is defined as “the skill of an expert, or one who is skillful and wellinformed in some specific field (Parson, 2010).” Optimally, experience is correlated with
certain measures of knowledge or skill and represents the qualifications of the pilot.
Measures of pilot experience have typically focused on certain pilot and flight experience
variables, such as total flight hours, recent flight hours, instrument time, ratings and
certificates. Other pilot-related factors have been explored as well, including demographic
variables such as age or gender, risk-taking measures such as previous accident involvement
(discussed in section 3.5) and countless others. Although the conclusion that these measures
can be used to determine pilot proficiency is a reasonable one, some measures are much
more accurate determinants of expertise than others. Global measures of expertise do not
directly relate to more specific measures of expertise. This means that the time spent in the
aircraft does not directly relate to the pilot’s ability to identify weather cues. More specific
measures, rather than total flight hours, have been found to be more accurate in the
prediction of expertise.

3.1.1: Measures of Experience
Measures of flight experience have been investigated by a number of researchers
who have focused on both flight time and licensure. Flight time can be measured in a
number of ways, as total flight hours, recent flight hours, pilot in command (PIC) hours,
cross country hours, or IFR hours. Measures of licensure include both the number and type
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of ratings and certificates achieved by the pilot. Both have been explored extensively in
aviation studies.
A recent study by Detwiler et al (2008) used GA data gathered by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the FAA to compare VFR into IMC (VFR-IMC)
accidents to non-VFR into IMC accidents. The median flight hours of the accident pilots
showed that all measures of flight hours were lower for VFR-IMC pilots except time as pilot
in command (PIC). This includes fewer total flight hours (731 vs. 758), and fewer simulated
(10 vs. 46) and actual (62.5 vs. 76) instrument time. Recent flight hours, however, showed
little difference for the previous 30 (10 vs. 12) and 90 (23 vs. 29) days. The authors also
found that the VFR into IMC accidents had a significantly higher percentage of pilots with
only a private pilot’s license (69.5% vs. 51.2%), less instrument ratings (33% vs. 45.8%), and
less certificates (two or more: 10.9% vs. 9.3%). In relation to the flight hours, these ratings
and certificate measures are not particularly surprising, given the connection between
instrument time and instrument ratings (Table 4: reference for summary information).
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Table 4: Summary of Expertise Variables
Study, description
Detwiler et al. (2008)
VFR into IMC vs. non
VFR-IMC accidents

Goh & Wiegmann (2001)
VFR into IMC vs. non

Type of study
NTSB/FAA

Sample size

Flight Hours

Ratings/Certificates

N=609 VFR-IMC

Total: 731 vs. 758 hrs.

PPL: 69.5% vs. 51.2%

accident database N=15,825 non-VFR-IMC
1990-2004

NTSB/FAA

Instrument (simulated): 10 vs. 46 hrs. 1: 89.1% vs. 80.7%

N= 409 VFR-IMC

1990 - 1997

w/ stratified sampling method

NTSB (1989)

NTSB/FAA

N= 361 VFR-IMC accidents

accident pilots* or all

Instrument (actual): 62.5 vs. 76 hrs.

2: 9.8% vs. 16.5%

Total: 580 vs. 900 hrs.

PPL/student only:
76% vs. 58%

accident database N=409 non-VFR-IMC chosen

VFR-IMC accidents

VFR into IMC vs. GA

Last 30 (90) days: 10 (23) vs. 12 (29) hrs. IR: 33% vs. 45.8%

IR: 32% vs. 46%
<100 hrs: 9% vs. 14%*

IR: 23% vs. 70%

accident database N= 10,818 GA accident pilots* 100-199 hrs: 17% vs. 9.5%*
1983 - 1987

N= active GA pilots in 1984'

active GA pilots'

Total: 52% had less than 500 hrs.
Instrument time: 57% less than 20 hrs.

*VFR into IMC studies are listed first in the results sections
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These results are generally supported by earlier studies such Goh & Wiegmann
(2001) and the NTSB (1989) report on VFR into IMC accidents. Both of these studies
utilized the same database maintained by the NTSB/FAA but focused on different time
periods. The study by Goh & Wiegmann was quite similar to that of Detwiler et al (2008).
The authors found a similar link between less flight hours for VFR-IMC pilots (580 vs. 900
hrs.), less advanced ratings (PPL or student license only: 76% vs. 58%), and fewer
instrument ratings (32% vs. 46%). The findings from the NTSB report also indicated a
lower rate of instrument ratings as compared to the total GA population (23% vs. 70%).
For GA VFR into IMC accident pilots, the data indicate a low rate of total flight hours (52%
had less than 500 hrs.) and instrument time (57% less than 20 hrs.).
This low rate of total flight hours has been quantified in the overall aviation
population by Hunter (1995a, 1995b) in a survey mailed to a random sample of aviation
pilots. Results from over 6,700 pilots concluded that private pilots flew approximately 30
hours per year (median), which translates to roughly 2.5 hours per month. Similar rates were
found in New Zealand by O’Hare & Chalamers (1995) with 22 hours as the median total
hours per month for private pilots. The authors found that the majority of these pilots flew
very few hours, with a few GA pilots flying quite frequently.
This lack of experience has been linked with an increased tendency of pilots to enter
and continue through deteriorated weather conditions. Studies have found that the less
flight hours a pilot had, the longer and farther the pilot tended to fly into the weather
(O’Hare & Chalamers, 1999). This finding was replicated in Burian et al (2000), who found
pilots in the 25th percentile of experience continued into deteriorated weather further than
pilots in the 75th percentile of experience.
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These results lead us to the conclusion that in comparison to other types of pilots,
GA pilots typically have limited overall and recent flight hours, and less certificates and
ratings. This is particularly true of GA pilots involved in VFR into IMC accidents or
incidents (not including recent flight time, which is common to all GA pilots). This lack of
experience has been linked to an increased likelihood of VFR only pilots entering adverse
weather conditions, leading to the conclusion that these pilots may lack the experience
necessary to identify important weather cues. In addition to these flight experience variables,
other characteristics can be used to indicate exceptional expertise. Certain characteristics of
experts are common across different professions and areas of expertise. These
characteristics can be used to determine the coping mechanisms used by experts and how
performance as differs from (and is usually superior to) those with less experience.

3.1.2: Expert Characteristics
The differences between experts and novices have been explored in a number of
widely varying domains, including physics (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981), chess (de Groot,
1978), auditing (Bedard, 1991; Bonner & Pennington, 1991), medicine (Elstein, Shulman, &
Spraka, 1990), firefighting (Klein, Orasanu, & Calderwood, 1993), sports (Abernathy, 1990),
air traffic control (Redding & Cannon, 1991), and GA pre-flight decision making (Wiggins et
al, 2002). The common thread among experts in different domains is that experts exhibit
certain characteristics that enable superior performance. Although many individual
differences exist between experts, the following can be seen as characteristics or
generalizations about experts that indicate their expertise in a given field.
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One of the first generalizations that can be made about experts is that their
representation of information, both the content and organization, differs from novices. It is
generally believed that experts rely upon an organized body of conceptual and procedural
knowledge that can be accessed rapidly during decision making. Experts organize this
information into categories that are typically semantically or principle-based, while novices
focus more on surface features (Glaser & Chi, 1988). The organization of this information
determines “the quality, completeness, and coherence of the internal representation, which
in turn determines the efficiency of further thinking” (Glaser, 1987, p. 84). This
organization of information is refined over time, due to both chance experiences and
deliberate practice. The repetition and fine-tuning process leads to an enhanced and
improved representation of the information, which, in turn, leads to several benefits.
The first benefit is an improved ability to determine the typicality of the situation.
The individual’s experience with certain tasks allows the expert to understand how the
situation typically plays out, which makes identification of abnormal situations quicker and
easier. When these non-typical situations occur, the expert has the advantage of being able
to look to a wide knowledge base of previously encountered situations. The pattern
matching ability is termed pattern recognition, and provides the expert with the ability to
quickly and efficiently match the situation to previously encountered situations. This allows
the expert to determine what the problem is and how to solve it.
Improvements in knowledge organization have also been linked to improvements in
performance. One by-product of the better organization of knowledge is improved memory
recall, leading to the ability to retrieve information quickly and efficiently. This increased
ability to retrieve information is also associated with a decrease in cognitive effort, in part
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due to the increased automaticity of the task. Automaticity is one characteristic of expertise
originally thought to be a product of pattern recognition and direct access of action (Glaser,
1987). However, this conclusion has been revised, and now proposes that expertise is
instead characterized by actions that are contextually based and intuitive (Fitts & Posner,
1967; Simon & Chase, 1973), which involves planning, reasoning, and anticipation (Benner,
1984; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986).
The improvements in memory recall lead us to question if the differences between
experts and novices involve task-specific competencies or if expertise is the result of
improvements in general functioning. Ericsson & Lehmann (1996) investigated the general
mental competencies of experts and novices, and made three main conclusions based on
their findings. First, measures of basic mental capabilities are not valid predictors of whether
an individual attains an expert level of performance. Second, the area for which the
individual is an expert is typically very domain specific with little transfer to other areas.
Third, any beneficial attributes of the individual are usually acquired during training, and are
not due to superior general functioning. These conclusions lead to a rejection of a general
memory ability, and instead lend to the opinion that expert memory performance is the
result of domain-specific experience. Improved performance is therefore particular to the
type of activity only, due to what is termed skilled memory (Chase & Ericsson, 1982).
The theory of skilled memory proposes that an individual rapidly encodes material in
long-term memory (LTM) by associating it with pre-existing knowledge and patterns instead
of relying on what is typically used in the situation, which is known as working memory
(WM or short term memory). Therefore, the inherent limitation of WM (a limited amount
of information that can be processed at one time) is circumvented by utilizing long-term
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memory (LTM) in some of the tasks that would have originally relied on WM (Kelley, 1964).
This leads to superior functioning that exceeds the functioning typical of WM.
An additional difference between expertise levels is the strategy employed when
solving a problem. Experts typically tend to take more time when they are first given the
problem in order to fully understand the situation and the inherent constraints (Glaser &
Chi, 1988). They use this time to build a mental representation of the task, which is later
used to solve the problem. In contrast, novices are more worried about how to solve the
problem, potentially missing some of the information that they could have gathered had they
fully explored the problem before attempting to solve it.
A similar theme can be found in the differences between experts and novices in their
scan patterns and information gathering. Results from studies examining the scan patterns
of experts and novices (Bellenkes, Wickens, & Kramer, 1997; Kazarskis, Stehwien, Hickox,
Aretz, & Wickens, 2001) have generally concluded that experts typically had shorter dwell
times (time spent looking at instruments) and more total fixations. This leads to the
conclusion that experts were able to determine what information they needed in a specific
situation, and make a rapid assessment of that information during the scan of their flight
instruments. This conclusion is also supported by research on pre-flight information
gathering. One such study investigated a computerized system with weather and flight
information on a number of hierarchically linked screens (Wiggins et al, 2002). Results
showed a more focused pattern of information gathering for expert pilots than for novices.
The experts spent more time on specific screens of interest, in comparison to novices who
spent less time on a larger number of screens. The successively viewed screens also support
the conclusion for a lack of focused search pattern. Experts viewed screens more often that

35

were related to one another (such as two screens depicting weather information), while
novices viewed successively un-related screens (such as weather information followed by
aircraft capabilities).
In relation to piloting skill, all these general characteristics lead to improvements in
the organization of knowledge required during piloting. This does not mean the expert pilot
has superior memory or intelligence, rather it is through their extensive experience that they
have managed to circumnavigate the requirements for working memory, resulting in superior
performance. Their expertise also leads to the ability to recognize when the flight controls
are not at their typical levels, and to identify when differences occur. When problems do
arise, the pilot has a large base of knowledge concerning similar problems and solutions for
those problems they have utilized (both successfully and unsuccessfully) in the past. He or
she is then able to match certain characteristics of the present abnormal situation with other
situations encountered in the past, leading to quicker and more efficient problem solving.
Each of these characteristics for which the expert may possess leads to improvements in the
outcome of any situation.
In addition to the previously mentioned general characteristics, research by Kochan,
Jensen, Chubb & Hunter (1997) and Jensen (1995) added a few notable attributes specific to
the expert pilot. The first is that the pilot is constantly working to improve his or her already
superior skill, due in part to an extreme motivation to learn all that is possible about aviation.
The expert aviator is also able to maintain an extreme focus, but this focus can be switched
when new information requires. The expert is exceptionally aware of all that is going on
around him or her with respect to the flight, such as other aircraft, weather patterns, and any
terrain enroute. This aviator possesses extreme skill in problem solving, is easily able to
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come up with contingency plans, and does so as part of normal flight procedure. The expert
is also an excellent communicator and keenly aware of his or her own limitations and the
limitations of his or her aircraft.
Although the benefits of experience can have a large impact on performance, it is
not always the case. A review on expert decision making found that expert judgments were
typically unrelated to the amount of experience of the decision maker (Chase & Simon,
1973), and highly variable among a group of experts (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Romer,
1993; Shanteau & Stewart, 1992). Instead, as previously mentioned with respect to memory
differences, it is believed that expertise is domain limited and highly specific to particular
aspects of the task. This task-specific experience has been found to be a better predictor of
performance, but only moderately so (Bedard, 1991). When the expertise is not task specific,
or when new tasks are encountered, this can reduce the expert to novice level performance.
Other limitations of experts include excessive confidence, and the ability to push
themselves beyond the optimal stopping point. They may also fail to recall certain features
of a situation and overlook details. It is also possible that due to their reliance on a wide
memory bank of typical problems, they might have trouble adapting to any changes that do
not fit inside one of the previously patterned situations. Any of these potential limitations
may be a detriment to the benefits of a rich body of experience that can be looked to by an
expert. The benefits from experience do not necessarily improve performance in a linear
fashion, as would typically be thought. Therefore, it is important to understand how pilots
develop expertise and how and when performance benefits result.
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3.1.3 Development of Expertise
The differences between experts and novices have been widely studied and have
typically been found to be quite clear. How the novice progresses to an expert has been
theorized to be just as clear cut, and has been explored in a number of models. The
foremost of the models that tracks the development of expertise includes those by Fitts &
Posner (1967), Anderson (1982, 1983), and Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986a). Unlike the
progression in these models, certain types of performance that are infrequently used do not
necessarily follow this linear progression towards expertise. Therefore, to determine the
progression of expertise, the area of interest and the frequency of use of the information
and/or skills should be taken into account. These models provide the basis for determining
how and when certain types of expertise are gained, and the markers of performance for
each level of expertise.
Fitts & Posner (1967) created a three stage model to describe the progression of
expertise. In their first stage, the early or cognitive stage, the individual often develops a
rudimentary approximation of the skill. This stage typically involves the novice attending to
many cues in the environment because they are not yet aware of what cues to focus on.
During this phase, new habits are added to a collection of old habits. The second stage, the
intermediate or associative stage, is marked by the use of these newer habits, which are then
incorporated into patterns of behavior. Errors are gradually reduced through this process of
trial and error. The third and final stage, the autonomous phase, is where the skill becomes
an extension of the individual, and very little thought is required to complete the task. The
individual is now able to complete many tasks at once, because this new automaticity allows
the expert to be involved in other cognitive and/or perceptual processes. This skill
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continues to improve in the form of both increased speed and accuracy for the task, but the
performance benefits level off, and now gradually improve with time.
Anderson’s model of skill acquisition (1982, 1983) posits a three stage model that is
based on the model by Fitts & Posner (1967). The first stage is the declarative stage, where
the individual learns facts about the process, and due to their inexperience, the individual
must rehearse these facts in working memory to be able to utilize them later on. The second
phase is the knowledge compilation phase, where the knowledge of the necessary facts
(declarative information) is transferred to knowledge of the procedures, or the knowledge of
how to use the facts. The last phase, the procedural phase, involves a ‘tuning’ of the
information to ensure that it is applied in the proper situations. This fine-tuning process is
also accompanied by an additional benefit, a speeding up of the processing of information.
In an additional model, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) designed a five stage process for
the development of expertise. The first of the five stages is the novice stage, where the
individual has very minimal, if any, experience in the chosen field. The novice is limited to
very basic rules and facts, and this knowledge is context-free. In the second stage, the
advanced beginner stage, the individual has improved their understanding to include
contextual information. This is due to their experience with real-world situations, and their
knowledge of more advanced rules and facts. The third stage is competence, where the lack
of context becomes problematic in a real-world environment. The individual therefore
learns to see the situation in terms of the most important facts that can be used to determine
goals and plans. The fourth stage is proficiency, where the individual is able to understand
the typicality of the situation. No deliberate decision-making process happens and the
individual recognizes similarities from past events that lead to anticipation and action for the
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present event. The final stage is expertise, which is marked by an intuitive grasp of the
situation. The expert no longer makes conscious decisions, rather the individual’s skill
becomes an extension of their self.
All of these models can be categorized according to three distinct phases. The
beginning phase is characterized by the individual learning facts and information about the
skill they will be acquiring, with the individual being highly error prone during this phase.
The intermediate phase(s) include(s) a re-organization of the information, with an improved
understanding of the relationship between the information and its application. The last
phase consists of an increase in speed and efficiency, with the process becoming more
automatic, with the expert being able to simultaneously perform other tasks.
The problem with these models is that the gradual progression from novice to expert
does not apply to every area where expertise can be attained. In aviation for example,
piloting skill, or the ability to handle the controls of the plane, can be thought of as a gradual
progression. This skill is consistently practiced each time the pilot flies. This is not the case
in other areas of flight where pilots need to gain experience. In the area of weather decision
making, the pilot may not be continually faced with experiences where they can improve
their knowledge and understanding of weather conditions. This may lead one pilot with 300
hours to make the same bad decision that a pilot with only 200 flight hours would make in
the same situation. The pilot with 1,000 hours may have the same amount of experience and
interaction with adverse weather situations as the pilot with 200 hours, providing the same
level of knowledge and expertise for an adverse weather situation.
A special vulnerability in aviation is thought to exist around the 100 to 300 hour
mark (Craig, 2001; Olsen & Rasmussen, 1989; Telfer, 1989). At this point in their flight
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careers, pilots have just attained their pilots’ license and no longer have the experience of a
flight instructor to rely on as they did during training with that instructor in the cockpit. The
pilot is now responsible for their own decisions in the cockpit, but without the relevant
practical experience of more seasoned aviators. This period of trial and error will lead to an
increase in the knowledge base of the pilot but may lead to several opportunities for the pilot
to make an error during the decision process.
In total, this journey from novice to expert has been found in some fields to require
up to ten years. Expertise in areas with gradual progression, such as chess, have been found
to require a minimum of 10 years or more of full-time experience (Ericsson & Lehman,
1996), and this requirement was found to be consistent in a number of other domains, such
as performance in sports, as well as the arts and sciences (Simon & Chase, 1973). Expertise
in aviation has been quantified in a number of studies as 1,000 total flight hours (Wiggins &
O’Hare, 1995; 2003). As previously mentioned, measuring expertise in aviation should be
based on a number of variables, and 1,000 total flight hours may result in expert piloting
skills, but not expert judgment in weather situations. Therefore, many studies have instead
focused on more specific measures of experience to determine weather decision making,
such as cross-country flight hours (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995) or recent flight experience
(Wiegmann, Goh, & O’Hare, 2001).
In the case of weather decision making, exposure to different weather situations can
be a factor in weather decision making. Training that introduces and teaches pilots the
importance of weather cues has provided beneficial results (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003b).
This might be particularly useful to pilots because the success of any training program
requires feedback in order to be effective. Feedback results in cognitive processes that are
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more efficient and eventually automatic (Bloom, 1985; Hayes, 1981). In environments with
poor or nonexistent feedback, learning will be delayed or nonexistent. Therefore, a flight
environment where the pilot is exposed to and taught about different weather conditions will
result in a pilot that is much more prepared when faced with adverse weather than a pilot
who did not have this experience.

3.1.4: Situation Assessment
Situation Assessment can be defined as the process used to achieve, acquire, and
maintain a state of knowledge (situation awareness). Therefore, the process used to acquire
the information about the knowledge is situation awareness, and the actual knowledge that
has been acquired is situation assessment. Goh & Wiegmann (2001b) extended this concept
of situation assessment to aviation to describe the trend of inexperienced GA pilots entering
adverse weather conditions (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001b). They proposed that the
inexperience of the pilots involved in these accidents could be attributed to poor awareness
of the hazards involved in adverse weather situations, an inability to recognize and/or
interpret changes in weather conditions, particularly gradually changing conditions.
According to their theory, the situation assessment hypothesis, pilots risk entering and/or
pressing on into adverse weather because they do not accurately identify the weather
conditions. This is due to a lack of knowledge about weather conditions. Therefore, it can
be stated that if the pilot was aware of the weather conditions, the pilot would not have
entered the adverse weather and would not have been involved in VFR into IMC accidents.
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Evidence to support this theory comes from an experiment by the same authors who
measured pilot’s estimations of weather condition in addition to a number of other factors
(self-appraisal of judgment and skill, frequency of risk taking behavior, confidence) during a
simulated cross country flight (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001b). The authors found that pilots
with more accurate assessments of the visibility conditions chose to divert from the adverse
weather more frequently than those pilots with less accurate assessments of the weather
conditions.
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3.2 Decision Making
Decision making theories can be broken down into different schools of thought that
have evolved over time to become more applicable to both the decision maker and the
decision task. The earliest models of decision making were created to describe the choices
of an idealized decision maker. According to this theory, the decision maker decided on a
choice by selecting one option from a number of alternatives in order to determine the
optimal response (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). This is termed the classical model of
decision making (CDM). Later CDM theories sought to describe why people make less than
optimal decisions due to the use of heuristics and biases.
The second major school of thought is the information processing model of decision
making. This model looks at how information is processed by the human, and seeks to
describe and understand the potential limitations that can occur at each stage. The third is
the naturalistic decision model, which looks at the decision making of an experienced
decision maker in a realistic environment with little time to make a decision. Improvements
of this model from earlier models of decision making describe the decision making process
in the environment which the decision typically takes place.

3.1.1: Classical Decision Theory
Classical Decision Theory refers to the collection of models of uncertainty, risk, and
utility that dictate the optimal choice from many alternate options. The optimal choice is
defined by an underlying model, and choice is determined by an explicit rule (Beach &

44

Lipshitz, 1993). Early decision making theories can be broken down into two main models
that describe decision making, rational (also termed normative models), and descriptive
models. These models either prescribe what an idealized decision maker should do in a
specific circumstance (rational or normative models), or describe what people typically do,
but only in a limited number of decision making situations (descriptive models). The earlier
decision making theories are typically defined by three phases. The first phase involves the
acquisition and perception of information or cues relevant to the decision. Next, the
decision maker generates and selects hypotheses about the meaning of cues in relation to the
current state. Finally, a choice is selected based on the inferred state and the costs and
values of different outcomes.
The earlier rational or normative model revolves around the utility, or overall value
of each choice, and the utility of each choice by the decision maker. There are three main
theories that dominate the rational models. The first is multiattribute theory, which employs
a utility function to describe the many attributes or features of a single object. The two
other rational theories are applicable in a gambling type situation in which the decision
maker has more than one option with an associated probability and importance (expected
value theory) and a situation where the decision maker relies on the subjective probability
and value for each option to make their decision (subjective expected utility theory).
The descriptive decision making models evolved based on a few key characteristics
of how decision makers actually makes a decision, and in doing so violates some of the
principles of rational decision making. The first is that the rational consideration of all
potential outcomes and options is too time consuming for the decision maker. Therefore,
people generally rely on simpler means of selecting an option from a number of choices.
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One way that people tend to do this is to employ satisficing, which is the practice of
choosing the option that is good enough for the current situation, instead of expending
additional energy to determine the best possible option.
In addition to satisficing, people typically employ heuristics or biases, a simplifying
strategy that makes it easier for the decision maker to choose one of many alternatives.
Heuristics and biases are typically very effective at reducing workload, and in the majority of
situations tend to be beneficial, but can also lead to a number of systematic flaws or
problems. The limitations that result from heuristics and biases are specific to certain stages
in decision making. For example, the problems common when receiving and using cues are
different than those found during either the process of hypothesis generation, evaluation,
and selection, or action selection (Wickens, Lee, Liu, Gordon-Becker, 2004).
Limitations that occur during the process of receiving and using cues include the
ability to attend to only a limited number of cues, an exaggeration of the importance of the
first cues and an inattention to later cues, an added importance to cues that are more salient
(bright, loud, flashy, centrally located), an overweighing of unreliable cues, and a difficulty in
processing negative evidence (absence of symptoms). Limitations occurring during
hypothesis generation, evaluation and selection are the ability to generate a limited number
of hypotheses, an increase in hypotheses that have been considered recently or frequently
(available hypotheses selected first), an increase in generation of hypotheses when the
pattern of cues “looks like” (is representative of) an example situation, an overconfidence in
hypotheses that are brought into working memory, an underutilization of cues once a
hypothesis has been generated or chosen (cognitive tunneling), and the use of additional
cues only to confirm hypotheses, even when disconfirming information may be more
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diagnostic. Limitations occurring during action selection include a limitation in the number
of action plans that can be utilized in working memory, additional availability effects in the
selection of outcomes, and the influence of the presentation of information on a person’s
judgment (framing bias). Both judgment, and certain types of framing, such as sunk cost,
will be discussed in more detail in the motivation section. Taken as a whole, these
limitations can be used to understand the human decision making process and can be useful
in understanding behavior in a variety of contexts.

3.1.2 Information Processing Model
The information-processing model was developed by Wickens (1984; 1987) to
describe humans’ decision making process. As can be seen in figure 9 (FAA Human Factors
Web Course), the decision maker first retrieves sensory information (stimuli) from the
environment through the senses. This representation of information is held very briefly in
the short-term sensory store, and then is integrated to form elements that become
meaningful through the process of perception. This information is recognized through a
matching process that utilizes previous memories that are stored in long-term memory,
which interacts with information that is currently being viewed in the environment (working
memory). Once the individual has identified the object, there are two options, they may
either delay the response or make a choice concerning a course of action. If the individual
chooses to delay the response, the memory will be stored temporarily in working memory,
the short term memory for objects and events (a few minutes per example), and is also
referred to as short term memory. If the object is held in working memory, a number of
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potential outcomes may occur. A response may be generated in a relatively short time
frame, the information may be forgotten, or the information may be transferred to long-term
memory. If a response is the chosen course of action, the response is executed, and
information concerning the chosen response is provided to the individual through the use of
feedback. The process of feedback can assist the individual in understanding the impact of
the response, and provides insight that the individual can use again in similar circumstances.
This information about a response to the present situation (and many past situations) make
up the knowledge stored in long term memory.

Figure 9: Wickens’ Model of Human Information Processing

During any of these stages, problems or breakdowns in the decision making process
can occur. For example, early on, certain elements in the environment with attentionseeking properties receive more attention than others elements. Therefore, if there are two
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objects and one has any combination of a number of certain attributes that draw attention to
that object (bright, shiny, loud, etcetera), that object will be more likely to be attended to
than one with less attention grabbing properties. This results in the individual either
completely ignoring the second object, or overvaluing the information received from that
first object. The attention resources category, which represents the limited mental capacity
of the human to attend and coordinate to their actions, can lead to problems as well. The
individual is only able to attend to a limited number of inputs at a given time. If there are
more inputs than the individual can manage, potentially useful information or inputs are lost.
Additional problems can occur due to limitations in working memory. The problems
typically found as a result of working memory are related to its limited capacity, which leads
additional information that cannot be processed to either be forgotten or remembered
incorrectly. Many more problems can occur during this process, see Classic Decision
Theory, 3.1.1.
Each stage in this process is the result of three attributes, the capacity of the stage,
the length of time it can hold information, and how that information is represented in
memory. The capacity of its stage is mediated by the sensory modality. There are many
modalities for which information can be received, it can be visual, auditory, tactile, or
through the sense of smell. It is believed that more information can be processed if it is
received through multiple modalities. Therefore, an individual can process more
information if it is retrieved through both auditory and tactile channels. However, similar
modalities can interfere with the understanding of the information, leading to decrements in
one or both of the inputs. The second attribute, the length of time the information can be
held, is demonstrated through the use of working memory, which represents the time until
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information is forgotten. The final attribute is how the information is coded or represented
in memory. For example, the representation of information in the short term sensory store
can be coded in terms of its physical features.

3.1.3: Naturalistic Decision Making
Decision making research evolved from the early theories characterized by
quantifiable probabilities to decision making in situations involving outcomes with unknown
probabilities. This next phase of decision making is characterized by decisions made in a
complex, dynamic, real world environment filled with uncertainty, termed naturalistic
decision making (NDM). NDM asks how “experienced people, working as individuals or
groups in dynamic, uncertain, and often fast-paced environments, identify and assess their
situation, make decisions and take actions whose consequences are meaningful to them and
to the larger organization in which they operate,” (Zsambok, 1997, p.5). This definition
emphasizes the importance of context, where the decision maker cannot rely solely on
routine activity or thinking.
NDM is characterized by eight characteristics: an ill structured problem, an uncertain
dynamic environment, shifting, ill-defined competing goals, an action/feedback loop, time
stresses, high stakes, multiple players, and organizational goals and norms (Klein, Orasanu,
& Calderwood, 1993). The ill-structured problem requires the decision maker to generate
hypotheses about what is currently happening and develop appropriate options. The
uncertain dynamic environment results in an imperfect environment with incomplete
information that is dynamic and changing. The shifting, ill-defined goals result in many,
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potentially conflicting, goals that may be the result of several purposes. The action/feedback
loop provides many opportunities for self-correction by the decision maker that may occur
during an action sequence, requiring a sequence of events, each with its own feedback
mechanism. Time stresses occur in realistic environments and may result in exhaustion and
loss of concentration on the task at hand. High stakes are typical of situations that occur in
non-laboratory settings where the impact of the decision may have life threatening results.
Multiple players represent a situation that involves more than one person, whether it is in a
team setting or involves the interaction of any person with the decision maker.
Organizational goals and norms represent the values, goals, and rules that are a necessary
part of interacting with any organization.
Earlier publications on NDM (such as Klein et al, 1993) characterize expertise as a
factor secondary to the eight characteristics. Later works on NDM (Zsambok, 1997; Pruitt
et al, 1997) emphasize the role of the decision makers’ experience on the decision making.
More specifically, Zsambok (1997, p.4) stated, “NDM is the way people use their experience
to make decisions in field settings.” Pruitt et al (1997) furthered this viewpoint when they
stated that the primary factor defining NDM studies is expertise. Many (e.g., Lipshitz et al,
2001) believe that experience can be equated to the setting where the decision occurs.
Therefore, the context shapes decisions through the constraints and affordances that the
situation provides. In addition to both context and expertise, NDM is characterized by a
more extensive pre-decision making process. The additional time spent prior to making the
decision is used to completely understand and assess the situation, working forward from
what is currently known rather than focusing on how to achieve a desired end state. This is
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in comparison to a typical CDM situation, where the focus is on assessing potential options
to determine how to achieve a specific goal.

Recognition Primed Decision Making
Although there are many models that fall within the NDM framework, the
‘prototypical’ NDM model is Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPDM) (Lipshitz et al,
2001). In comparison to the more complex, non-routine tasks typically found in NDM, the
RPDM model describes more simple, routine tasks that can be easily matched to previous
situations. RPDM was developed after the authors (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco,
1986; Klein, Calderwood, & Macgregor, 1989) conducted cognitive task analyses (CTA) of
expert commanders in order to understand how firefighters handle time pressure and
uncertainty when making decisions. Contrary to what they expected to find, and most
surprising, was that the firefighters rarely generated more than one option when making
decisions. Rather, they employ satisficing (Simon, 1955), or employing the first option that
generates a ‘good enough’ solution, rather than taking the time to find the best option. The
focus of RPDM is on an experienced decision maker, who has the ability to generate a
reasonably good first option. When the first option generated does not prove to be
adequate for the situation, alternate options are generated and evaluated serially to determine
their applicability and acceptability for the current situation.
The most important (and most recognizable) feature of RPDM is that during this
process of evaluating alternatives, the current situation is ‘matched’ to previous situations
that the decision maker has experienced. These situations and the corresponding decisions
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are stored in memory and each time the decision maker comes across a similar situation
those previous experiences are drawn from memory. This situation assessment phase is just
one part of RPDM. The other half is the mental simulation portion (Klein, 1993) which is
used to evaluate potential courses of action.
There are three separate forms of RPDM, which vary from very simple to more
complex. In the simplest course of action, the decision maker assesses the situation and
executes the initial option identified (Lipshitz, 2001). If no simple match can be found, the
second and third variations are employed, and mental simulation is utilized. The second
variation is a story building strategy used to mentally simulate the events that occur just prior
to the situation (Pennington & Hastie, 1993; Klein & Crandall, 1995; as cited in Lipshitz et
al, 2001). The third variation is termed progressive deepening, where mental simulation is
used to picture the course of action, to see if the strategy has the intended consequences or
any unintended consequences (De Groot, 1965; cited in Lipshitz et al, 2001).
For the majority of the time, recognitional strategies are used (versus the more time
consuming analytical strategies). Klein (1993) summarized the findings of five studies in
separate domains, from firefighting to tank platoon leaders to design engineers. The results
show that this is true for even difficult cases. The more experienced decision makers
showed higher rates of recognitional decisions. For example, in a study comparing novice
and expert fireground commanders, 58% of experts versus 46% of the novices used
recognitional decisions. However, this rate is much lower than experts with over 20 years of
experience who were found to use recognition-based in 80% of decisions. This rate also
varies based on task type. For decision makers in strategic positions, analytical-based
strategies are more frequently used. In general, recognitional decision making occur more
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frequently when the decision maker has more time pressure, is more experienced, and deals
with less stable conditions. In relation to pilot decision making, pilots typically use pattern
matching first, and then if no ‘match’ is available, they then utilize the analytical methods
(Barnett, Stokes, Wickens, et al, 1987). The more experience a pilot has, the larger the body
of knowledge from which to draw, and therefore, more recognitional based decision making
occurs.

3.1.4: Aeronautical Decision Making/Judgment
Aeronautical decision making (ADM) and judgment have been defined differently
over the years, and are generally thought to be related but not identical. ADM encompasses
the decision making process that is utilized by pilots during flight (Harris, 1994). Some
researchers (Lester, Diehl, & Buch, 1985) consider it to be the final stage in pilot judgment
in which the pilot must choose one from a number of potential options. In contrast,
judgment was previously thought of as a relatively stable trait found in the best aviators,
either as an instinctive quality they possessed, or as an ability that was developed and refined
as a result of many years of experience in a variety of flight situations (Buch, 1984). These
conclusions have been disproven, mainly due to a number of successful attempts at
improving pilot judgment in a variety of flight training environments for newly licensed
pilots (Diehl, 1990). As researchers have gained a greater understanding of how to train
judgment, there has also been an increased understanding of pilot judgment.
The earliest well-documented research on pilot judgment was a study conducted by
Jensen & Benel (1977) which sought to investigate the current state of knowledge of
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judgment (in a number of different fields) with the aim to apply that knowledge to aviation.
From their review of the relevant literature, the authors defined judgment as a two part
process consisting first of the ability to discriminate and determine all information relevant
to the task at hand, and the ability to respond with motivation appropriate to the situation.
The first part of this process consists of relatively simple perceptual judgments, such as
determining weather conditions at a particular airport prior to takeoff. The second involves
cognitive judgments in which the pilot determines how to best utilize the previously gathered
information of the first stage during the selection phase. During the second phase when the
pilot is making a pre-flight go/no-go decision, he or she will take into account not only the
weather conditions (perceived during the first stage), but also a number of other factors,
which could potentially include personal values, an emotional response, and social pressures.
Given this definition and explanation of judgment, evidence that supports the
importance of this topic comes from the study by Jensen & Benel (1977). The basis of their
research is the analysis of five years of accident data (1970-74) that revealed 80% of the
accidents were attributable to pilot error. Of that percentage, faulty pilot judgment errors
occurred much more frequently in fatal accidents (52%) than non-fatal accidents (35%).
This research prompted a number of studies focused on faulty decision making and pilot
judgment in order to determine if training could lead to improvements in judgment and
subsequently, performance.
Research by Berlin, Gruber, Holmes, Jensen, Lau, Mills & O’Kane (1982b) added to
this body of knowledge by creating a manual for the student and instructor in order to
determine the effectiveness and practicality of pilot judgment training. These manuals were
later updated, but were mainly focused on the three main parts of the decision making
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process: the pilot, the environment, and the aircraft. In a typical flight situation, the pilot
should be aware of how these three main concepts influence his or her performance in the
cockpit. This includes recent sleep patterns, stress, and physical ailments (the pilot), the
weather fronts and adverse weather conditions in the area (the environment), and the
capabilities of the plane in various situations and conditions (the aircraft).
The manuals were used to demonstrate judgment concepts through situational
exercises, the five hazardous thought patterns of pilots, the modes of pilot error (six ways),
the poor judgment chain, and the use of the judgment profile. Examples of the hazardous
thought patterns that typically lead to accidents were given (anti-authority, external control,
impulsivity, invulnerability, macho), with ways to improve upon these behaviors for a variety
of flight situations. The judgment profile was used to determine the capabilities and
limitations of each pilot taking the test. Additionally, the judgment chain was discussed in
order to demonstrate how errors generally occur in a sequence, and methods the pilot can
use to break the chain.
Berlin, Gruber, Holmes, Jensen, Lau, Mills & O’Kane (1982a), Buch (1984), Telfer &
Ashman (1986), and Diehl & Lester (1987) tested versions of these manuals in a variety of
flight training programs (Diehl, 1990). Results showed significant improvements in correct
decisions for the group of pilots receiving judgment training in all studies. The benefits of
this training varied from a 9% to 46% improvement over the control condition, who
received no judgment training. These results were typically the result of an observational
flight, during which pilot judgment was evaluated. In one such study, an experimenter posed
as a passenger was tasked with determining if the newly-licensed pilot performed any of the
twelve behaviors that constituted “good judgment” (Diehl & Lester, 1987, pg. 6-7). These
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behaviors typically include items that covered pilot activities that occur during all stages of a
VFR flight.
The wide range of improvements between the judgment studies can mainly be
attributed to a number of factors surrounding the flight training and both student and
instructor characteristics. The study that found the largest improvements over a control
group was a highly structured program with extremely motivated students and instructors at
a military flight school, a 46% improvement over a control group. The lowest rate of
improvements, 9%, was found in an unstructured program with less motivated instructors
who received no monetary incentive for performance, with students who were recreational
pilots with no plans to become professional pilots.
Other methods have been used to evaluate pilot decision making, such as
questionnaires utilizing scenarios in which the pilot is asked to choose the best option from a
number of potential outcomes. There have also been various models utilizing acronyms
(e.g., DECIDE, PAVE, S-D-R-V) that have been taught to pilots for use in-flight during
aviation situations or crises. For example, the DECIDE model stands for Detect, Estimate,
Choose, Identify, Do, and Evaluate. The pilots were taught to use this acronym during any
situation requiring “use of their cognitive abilities.” This model was tested during a
simulated flight in which the pilot was presented with three unexpected conditions, failure of
the attitude indicator, carburetor icing, and deterioration of weather conditions. The results
of using the tool was not overly positive, but the author (Jensen, 1988) concluded that it
showed great promise as a tool for teaching judgment to inexperienced pilots. An additional
focus of ADM studies includes the level of expertise of the pilot, and the use of other
models of decision making, such as naturalistic and recognition-primed decision making.
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3.4: Motivation
It is perplexing to learn that intentional VFR into IMC accounts for 76% of all
accidents (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). This high rate of deliberate VFR into IMC encounters
suggests that the vast majority of GA weather accidents are intentional, whether due to the
actions or inactions of the pilot. However, a separate study instead suggests that only 24%
of weather-related encounters are due to motivation, and 52% of the incidents or accidents
are due to a lack of appreciation of the weather (Shappell et al, 2010). The large disparity
between these two studies about the number of accidents attributed to deliberate VFR into
IMC raises questions about the nature of the pilot’s motivation to continue into IMC and
any differences in the two studies that could be affecting the results.
The first study (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001) was based on the analysis of the NTSB
and FAA database. These authors compared VFR into IMC accident data to GA accidents
not caused by VFR into IMC (all other GA accidents). Motivation of the pilots in this study
was determined by the NTSB investigators determination, and their assigned categorization
(continued, inadvertent, attempted, performed, intentional, initiated, encountered, and
unclassified) of the type of VFR into IMC. In these studies “unintentional” VFR into IMC
was represented by the inadvertent and encountered categories and “intentional” VFR into
IMC was classified by all other categories.
As is unfortunately the case, VFR into IMC accidents frequently result in fatalities
(80%), which leaves no survivors or cockpit voice records to provide the needed
information to aid during the accident investigation. This is a common issue for GA
accident investigations due to the smaller, lower-technology airplanes flown in GA (as
compared to commercial aviation for example) that do not come equipped with recording
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equipment, such as the black box. This, and the high fatality rate of VFR into IMC
accidents, makes it extremely challenging, if even possible, to determine the cause(s) of these
accidents. Therefore, data surrounding this type of accident can be missing or incomplete,
not giving a full picture of the occurrences that preceded the crash or the motivation of the
pilot. This results in a severe limitation in the conclusions that can be drawn from captured
information and the generalizability of the results to the greater GA population.
The second study (Shappell et al, 2010) was conducted in order to understand
weather-related GA encounters based on interviews with pilots who had recently had a
weather-related incident or accident. The 25 weather interviews were conducted with pilots
who requested a weather-related flight assist from Air Traffic Control (ATC). These weather
encounters included not only VFR into IMC, but also many other types of weather
encounters such as thunderstorms, icing, turbulence, and marginal VFR (MVFR).
The pilots in this study were contacted after the incident/accident and later
interviewed to determine what factors played a role, and what methods they used to survive
the incident or accident. At the time the pilots were interviewed, they had already gone
through proceedings with the FAA to determine if any actions were to be taken against
them. Therefore, the pilots did not have a legal or procedural reason to modify information
concerning their weather encounter in any way, and all participation was voluntary.
One of the major limitations is the generalizability of the results in this study.
Although information received during interviews is usually as thorough and as accurate as
possible when investigating accidents and incidents, the small sample size, the method of
recruitment, and the requirement for voluntary participation, could have resulted in a sample
of pilots unlike those found in the GA accident data (NTSB/FAA). The first major factor is
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the method of recruitment. As mentioned earlier, the pilot participants had contacted ATC
for assistance when encountering problems in-flight. Therefore, it can be reasoned that
pilots who failed to contact ATC on that one occasion (which resulted in an
accident/incident) may demonstrate a pattern of certain behavior that typically lead to
weather and/or other types of adverse flight events. These pilots must also have agreed to
be interviewed for this study, resulting in a self-selection of pilots who were willing to
discuss the event with the authors. Additionally, the small sample sized results in a reduced
ability to generalize the results to the larger GA population.
Although no definitive answer as to the true number of motivation-related VFR into
IMC accidents exist, we do know that motivation does have an impact on VFR into IMC
and other types of weather-related incidents and accidents. Although these studies vary
widely in their estimation of the number of motivation-related accidents, even at the lower
figure, motivation still has a large impact on GA aviators. What is lacking is an insight into
the reasons why VFR into IMC, particularly motivation-based accidents, occurs. The
following sections explore some of the motivation-based theories that have been applied to
aviation situations to describe motivation in the cockpit, including sunk cost, prospect
theory, and plan continuation errors.

3.4.1: Sunk Cost
Sunk cost describes the psychological process where as more time and effort are
invested into achieving a goal, an individual will be more likely to expend additional
resources in an effort to try to meet that goal (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). This has been
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described as “throwing good money after bad,” meaning that any additional efforts an
individual makes to achieve the goal would not be taken had a prior investment not been
made. This change in behavior due to the initial investment has been shown by the authors
in several everyday situations, including theatre tickets, investment strategies, and vacation
and dinner plans. Examples of this theory are exemplified in everyday decisions, such as
choosing to go to a football game in bad weather because the ticket had already been
purchased, or continuing to put money into a rundown apartment that requires more money
to fix it up than it’s worth. Sunk cost has been implicated in more extreme situations, such
as Congress continuing to fund a project that is worth less than the additional investment it
will require to finish (e.g., the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway project, 1981; cited in Arkes
& Blumer, 1985, p. 124-125).
The theory of sunk cost has also been applied to aviation weather decision making.
In this context, a pilot who encounters weather 15 minutes into an hour-long flight will be
less likely to continue the flight than the same pilot who encounters weather after 45 minutes
into the flight. According to this theory, the pilot that had invested more time and money
into the hour flight (encountering weather after 45 minutes) would turn around less quickly
than the pilot who encountered weather earlier (after 15 minutes). The pilot would consider
the time and money expended for this flight a sunk cost, with the goal of minimizing
potential losses. Although this theory has been applied to other situations successfully, and
seems logical for the present problem, the findings indicate contradictory results from what
would be expected according to sunk cost.
One study in support of sunk cost theory was conducted by O’Hare, Owen &
Wiegmann (2001b). During the first part of their study, the authors analyzed a database of
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cross country GA flights to determine if there was a difference in crashes due to human
factors (termed “controllable exposure to risk” or CER) and those resulting primarily from
non-human related factors, or mechanical failures (termed “externally driven” or ED). The
authors found that there were two types of CER, or human driven accidents, weather-related
and those due to loss of control. The loss of control accidents typically occurred earlier on
in the flight (49.7 nm) than either the human or mechanical related. However, the
interesting difference is between the weather-related accidents, which are generally attributed
to the pilot entering adverse weather conditions, and the equipment-related factors, which
should occur randomly at unexpected points throughout the flight. The weather-related
accidents occurred much later in the flight (92.5 nm) than the ED (78.1 nm).
The second part of the study involved two simulated experimental flights on a
laptop computer, a “scud-running flight,” where visibility and cloud ceiling deteriorated over
the course of the flight, requiring the pilot to fly close to the ground to continue the flight.
The second, VFR on top, indicates a situation that required the pilot to fly above the clouds
in order to continue the flight. Weather in the ‘VFR on top’ flight deteriorated twice the
distance into the scenario than the scud-running scenario, resulting in a 44% continuance
rate versus a 17% continuance rate. The results from the first part of the study, the database
analyses, indicate that weather accidents occur further into a flight than would randomly
occur. These results are supported by the findings from the second part of the study which
indicate that when pilots enter deteriorated weather further into a flight, they continue more
frequently.
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An additional study by many of the same authors (Wiegmann, Goh & O’Hare,
2001a) tested the sunk cost hypothesis during a simulated flight using a flight simulator. For
this study, the authors tested this theory using two scenarios that were identical except for
the time into the flight the weather was encountered. In the first condition, the pilot
encountered the weather 15 minutes into a one-hour flight, as compared to 45 minutes into
the same flight. The authors found that those pilots who encountered the weather earlier
flew longer and farther into the weather than the pilots who encountered the weather later.
This finding contradicted previously studies, but was later followed by, and supported later
studies with similar results.
A study by Saxton (2008) investigated motivation as measured by financial incentive
(base payment plus the option of an additional “bonus” in external motivation condition),
and time into scenario before encountering deteriorating weather. The deteriorated weather
occurred at either 25% of the distance into the flight, or 75% of the distance into the flight
(12 vs. 30 minutes into a 42 minute flight). Irrespective of the financial incentive, Saxton
found that pilots who encountered weather later into the scenario continued further than
those who encountered the weather earlier. A suggested explanation for these results is that
the pilots who had received the deteriorated weather earlier decided to “take a look” in order
to explain the contradictory weather information that they had received in the pre-flight
briefing. The contradictory results of these three studies lead to the conclusion that sunk
cost theory is not supported in aviation VFR into IMC scenarios. This is particularly the
case for the more recent studies that used flight simulators to determine this effect on
aviators’ decision making.
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3.4.2: Prospect Theory
Prospect theory addresses the relationship between risk and outcome. Kahneman &
Tversky (1979; 1984) state that people do not think of a decision in terms of the final or
intended outcome, but rather in terms of prospective gains or losses from some reference
point. The authors summarize the human response to a decision in terms of a value
function. This function prescribes a steeper curve for losses than for gains, meaning that a
loss will have a greater impact than would a gain of the same magnitude. Therefore, this
theory implies that people are inherently risk averse when looking at a situation from a gains
perspective and risk seeking when looking at the situation from a loss perspective.
Both the reference point and the frame from which the situation is viewed affect the
decision outcome. The reference point is the starting point which the individual views the
situation, and can be affected or changed based on the framing, or the viewpoint of judging
the situation. A frame can be either positive or negative, the positive highlighting the
advantages and the negative highlighting the disadvantages for a set of options. For
example, a pilot on his way to meet friends for the weekend who encounters weather below
VFR minimums can frame the continue/divert decision in one of two ways. He may
emphasize the anticipated loss, such as wasted money (fuel, aircraft rental), and time lost
(negative frame), or he may emphasize the anticipated benefits, such as not jeopardizing his
life or his aircraft (positive frame).
This frame can be, and has been, experimentally manipulated. A pilot can be
assigned a frame that describes the information they are given in either a positive or negative
light, highlighting either the positive or negative aspects of a given situation. During an
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experiment by O’Hare & Smitheram (1995), pilots were asked to make a decision about
whether they would continue or divert during a hypothetical flight scenario. They received
the basic initial information about the flight scenario, either positive or negative information
concerning the flight (experimental frame), and were asked to make a decision about
whether they would choose to continue the flight. The authors found that the
experimentally manipulated frame (the positive or negative information given to the pilots)
was found to be effective in changing the pilots continue/divert decision. Therefore, the
pilots who received information about the flight that emphasized the positive aspects of
diverting chose to divert more frequently, and the pilot who received information
emphasizing the negative aspects diverted less frequently. These results do not remain
consistent when applied to a pilot’s natural decision frame in a real world setting. Therefore,
a pilot who was assigned the positive frame experimentally will be much more cautious in
weather situations than a pilot who would normally frame the decision using a positive
frame.

3.4.3: Other Theories
Plan Continuation Errors
Additional theories have been used to describe the motivational aspects of pilot
decision making. The investigation of what is now termed plan continuation errors (PCE’s)
resulted from a trend found in Part 121 (scheduled air carrier) aviation accidents first
examined by the NTSB (NTSB, 1994). Of the decision errors in the analysis, approximately
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65% of the flights were found to have similar characteristics. These flights could be
identified by the pilot’s decision to continue with an original course of action despite the
presence of information that would have resulted in the evaluation and selection of an
alternate course of action (Orasanu, Burian, Fischer, Martin, & McCoy, 2000). Later
analyses were performed to determine the accuracy of this trend and its incidence in other
types of aviation. Results showed that PCE’s occurred in approximately 63% of GA
accidents (Orasanu et al, 2001; cited in McCoy & Mickunas, 2000). Additionally, these
accidents were the result of an average of seven separate errors by the pilot.
Additional research into the cause of PCE’s detail a more accurate picture of the
pilot who commits this type of error. This pilot tends to fixate on the original course of
action, blinding them to the changing situation and the need for an update in their outdated
plan. This leads to the conclusion that PCE’s typically refer to an error of omission, a failure
to take a necessary action, rather than an error of commission, resulting from an improper
action. Therefore, PCE’s are predominantly found later into the flight, during the approach
and landing phases (Orasanu, Martin, & Davidson, 2001). These events are quite similar to,
and have commonalities between, incidents and accidents involving “get-there-it is” or
“pressing on,” indicating that the pilot continued past a point in the flight where it would
have been optimal to either divert or change their plan. This description of PCE’s is quite
applicable to VFR into IMC accidents, which results in the pilot failing to take action to
prevent flying into adverse weather, or failing to change course once adverse weather is
encountered.
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3.5: Risk Management
Although the definition of risk varies by source, risk can generally be defined as a
combination of the severity of outcome and the likelihood that an injury will result. One
field that studies how individuals manage risk is risk management, and is common to any
situation involving inherent risk. The literature on risk suggests there are two parts to any
decision involving risk, the perception of risk and the tolerance for that risk (Hunter, 2002).
During the first part of the process, risk perception (or hazard assessment), the individual
will perceive certain elements of the risk and correctly determine that a risk exists, or they
may fail to notice it entirely. The second part involves risk tolerance, which has been
described as a relatively stable level of risk that an individual will tolerate over time and
across different situations, potentially similar to a personality trait. A study looking to
understand the relationship between risk perception and risk tolerance found that the two
are related but separate constructs. Hunter (2000b) found that the pilot’s risk tolerance was
negatively related to risk perception. Therefore, the tolerance of higher levels of risk was
associated with a lower perception of risk.
During a VFR into IMC situation problems may arise during either the risk
perception or risk tolerance stages. During risk perception, the pilot may incorrectly
determine that the weather conditions have deteriorated. Or, it is possible that they have
correctly determined the weather condition during the first stage, and instead made an
unsafe decision when choosing to continue despite the adverse weather. The problems that
arise may result from any of a number of factors, such as a lack of experience during risk
perception, or an overconfidence in personal abilities, leading to risk tolerance that places the
pilot in unsafe situations. Although risk tolerance and risk perception seem to be quite
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similar, these two factors have been found to be only slightly related, suggesting separate
constructs (Hunter, 2002).

3.5.1: Risk Perception
Risk perception is “the subjective assessment of the probability of a specified type of
accident happening and how concerned we are with the consequences. [Including] … the
evaluations of the probability as well as the consequences of a negative outcome” (Sjoberg,
Moen, & Rundmo, 2004, p.13). Improper risk perception may be attributable to improper
risk and/or hazard perception. To differentiate the two, a hazard is the source of danger
and is classified according to severity of the outcome, and risk is the probability of suffering
a loss (O’Hare, 1990). An individual may properly understand the potential sources of
danger for a given situation (hazard), but fail to understand the level of risk involved for that
hazard.
Risk can be considered either objective or subjective. Objective risk is the actual risk
in a situation, as determined by experts in the field of interest. Subjective risk is the risk
perceived by the individual and consequently, may differ quite substantially from the
objective risk. This difference between what the individual perceives and the actual,
objective, level of risk can be due to a number of factors, either knowledge or motivatedrelated, and the result of either conscious or unconscious processes. Some researchers
believe that risk cannot be categorized using this sweeping generalization. They believe that
risk is inherently subjective and specific to the individual rather than a measure that can be
broadly applied to any situation, irrespective of the individual involved.
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O’Hare (1990) tested both risk and hazard assessment when developing and utilizing
a questionnaire tailored to the GA pilot population. The Aeronautical Risk Judgment
Questionnaire (ARJQ) measures hazard perception, risk awareness and pilots’ perception of
their abilities and risk-taking propensity (O’Hare, 1990). The hazard awareness measures
were used to determine if the pilot could correctly determine, and was aware of, the
likelihood of certain types of accidents and incidents (based on causal factors, phases of
flight, and fatality levels). Risk awareness measures were used to determine the pilots’
knowledge of the level of risk associated with a number of aviation and non-aviation related
activities. Additional measures were also explored using this questionnaire. Personal
invulnerability was tested by asking the likelihood of becoming involved in a number of
specific types of accidents, both for the individual pilot taking the test, and for any other GA
pilot. The difference between these two questions was computed to determine a measure of
personal invulnerability. A higher score, or greater difference, denoted a pilot who believes
they have a much less chance of becoming involved in an accident than other GA pilots.
Self-judgment was determined by the pilot rating their level of skill and judgment in
comparison to a pilot of similar experience. In addition to the questionnaires, a subsection
of the pilots completed a computerized one-hour simulated flight with three in-flight
decision points where the pilot was asked to rate their ability to handle the situation, and
their level of uncertainty, confidence, and the degree of risk involved in their decision.
The findings from this study indicate that pilots have a relatively low level of hazard
and risk awareness. The mean hazard estimate rating for the pilot error category was
significantly lower than the NTSB figures (57.4% vs. 79.9%), meaning that pilots
underestimated the involvement of human error in aviation accidents. However the
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accuracy of pilots improved when they were asked about the occurrence of weather-related
accidents and incidents.
The self-appraisal of abilities and judgment for pilots is generally optimistic, and the
most unrealistic in young, inexperienced pilots. This optimistic bias can be seen not only in
younger pilots, but pilots of any age who have just received their license. Younger pilots
rated their skill and ability as highly as did older pilots, and newly licensed pilots rate
themselves as highly as pilots who have had their license for much longer. Comparatively,
measures of personal invulnerability and risk were lowest in older pilots. Judgment and skill
were correlated, but not with pilot’s rating of their willingness to take risks during flying.
The author notes that this finding of individuals believing that they are better than the
average (in terms of both skill and safety) is common and paralleled in other fields, such as
driving.
The simulated flight revealed additional insights to the information gained from the
questionnaire. The flight consisted of deteriorating weather and several decision points
where the pilot was asked if they wanted to continue with the flight. Those pilots who
chose to continue with the simulated flight past the decision points were more likely to be
younger and had more flight hours than the pilots who diverted (in comparison to the lower
recent flight hours for questionnaire pilots). These pilots rated themselves as more willing to
take risks, had higher scores on measures of personal invulnerability, and had less knowledge
of the phases of flight when accidents occur. Overall, these results are disparaging. They
provide a look at GA pilots who often underestimate the risks in the aviation context and
overestimate their own ability, skill, and judgment in handling those risks.
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An additional study by O’Hare focusing on GA pilot risk taking found that pilots
who continued into adverse weather during a simulated flight differed in risk perception than
those who diverted (O’Hare & Wiegmann, 2003). The pilots who diverted from the adverse
weather rated the risk of continuing as higher than those pilots who chose to continue.
However, those pilots who chose to continue rated continuing as the more risky alternative
(compared to diverting), but still chose to continue. These findings are similar to the results
found by Hunter (2002) during the evaluation of a risk perception and risk tolerance
questionnaire. His results also concluded that pilots with a low perception of risk were
involved in more hazardous events, but the significance of this effect was low. This is
significant because his study involved a wide range of pilots (backgrounds, licenses, flight
hours) who visited the FAA homepage.
To understand why risks are not perceived accurately it is important to understand
the perception of risk. The inaccurate perception of risk, also considered the difference
between objective and subjective measures of the risk, can be considered due to a number
of factors, including characteristics of the activity and the method of processing the risk
(Fischhoff et al, 1978; Slovic & Weber, 2002). Fischhoff and colleagues (1978) explored the
relationship between the perceived benefit of various activities (nuclear power, bicycles,
general aviation, x-rays, etc) and risk. They asked participants to rate each activity on a
seven-point scale for each of the nine characteristics listed in figure 10 (Fischhoff et al,
1988). These characteristics include the voluntariness of the activity, the impact of an
adverse effect (chronic/catastrophic; severity), the emotional reaction of the individual to
the event (common/dread), the state of knowledge about the risk (to science), the
immediacy of the effect, the controllability of the result, and the newness of the activity.
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The figure below displays the average ratings for two of the 30 total items rated. On the left
(solid line) is the x-ray, a relatively well-known and acceptable risk that can be compared with
a technology considered to have an unacceptable level of risk, nuclear power (dashed line).

Figure 10: Characteristics of Perceived Risk for Nuclear Power and X-rays across Nine Risk
Characteristics

Results from rating the 30 activities/technologies indicate that perceived risk is
correlated with dread and severity. This was not true for the other seven characteristics,
including voluntariness, which was previously believed (although not experimentally proven)
to influence the perception of risk. Other studies have explored this factor and found
opposing results (Rotter, 1954, 1966, 1975).
The voluntariness of an activity has also been referred to as locus of control. There
is often a tendency for people who think that they are in control of a situation to perceive
less risk in a situation, and are therefore more likely to take more frequent and larger risks.
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The locus of control scale can be determined by the degree to which the individual believes
that the outcome of a situation is under their personal control (Rotter, 1966). The individual
can be either internally or externally oriented. This internal versus external orientation can
vary based on the individual and the specifics of the situation. On one end of the locus of
control scale is the internally oriented individual who believes that most situations are under
their personal control. This is in contrast to someone who is externally oriented and believes
that most situations in life are out of their control. Pilots typically fall into this first category,
and this type of individual who actively tries to manage their situation has higher scores on
measures of internal locus of control (Hunter, 2002a; Wichman & Ball, 1983). For example,
someone who is driving a car would perceive the risk of driving to be much smaller than if
they were a passenger in the same situation (McKenna, 1993). This illusion of control can
lead to taking additional risk and an unrealistic and overly optimistic viewpoint of the
situation.
An additional factor that influences risk is the overall benefit of the activity, which
decreased the perceived risk. Therefore, as the severity of an adverse effect and the dread
associated with that activity increased, the perception of risk associated with that activity
increased. The common-dread factor is defined as “a risk that people have learned to live
with and can think about reasonably calmly, or it is one that people have great dread for on
the level of a gut reaction.” This emotional aspect of the perception of risk is also
described by Slovic & Weber (2002) as a separate processing system that is used when
making decisions concerning risk.
Many authors suggest that there are two different ways that information is processed
when making decisions, an automatic, faster, unconscious route, and a rule-based, effortful
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route (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, &
MacGregor, 2003). The first, automatic route relies upon expertise and the associations for
those experiences, which are linked to the emotions and feelings about whether the choice is
a good or bad one. This system transforms uncertain information in the environment to
affective responses, termed risk as feeling, which can be seen in the fear, dread, happiness,
and any other emotion that an individual feels during a given situation (Loewenstein, Weber,
Hsee, & Welch, 2001). This is in comparison to the rule-based system, which relies upon
knowledge of algorithms and rules, requiring conscious processing of information (similar
to normative models of decision making). Holtgrave & Weber (1993) explored the impact
of the different decision making routes. Their findings indicate that a model that
incorporates both the affective mode (emotional aspect), and the knowledge of the
consequences (probabilistic information of outcomes) results in the best fit for predicting
health and financial information. This indicates that although the more rational, reasoningbased information provided the best fit for data from the health and financial fields, the
affective data from a model by Slovic et al (2003) that provided information similar to the
nine characteristics by Fischhoff et al (1988) was useful in explaining additional variance.
These results indicate that both processes are utilized during decision making involving some
aspect of risk.

3.5.2: Risk Tolerance
After the risk has been perceived by the pilot, the pilot will make a decision based on
the level of risk that he or she deems appropriate for the given situation, their level of risk
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tolerance (Hunter, 2002b). This acceptable level of risk varies depending on the situation,
the potential outcomes, and most importantly, differences in the individual and what they
deem acceptable. This level of risk has been described as a relatively stable level of risk that
the individual will tolerate over time and across different situations. Many have created
theories and explanations for why risk tolerance varies from person to person. Several
notable theories include implicit risk theory, risk homeostasis theory, zero risk theory, the
threat avoidance model, and hazardous thought patterns.
Risk attitudes are generally domain-specific, and the aversion and tolerance of risk is
limited to the area of interest (Hanoch, Johnson, & Wilke, 2006; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002).
Therefore, studies in the aviation field will provide more insight into pilot behavior due to
the specific nature of risk tolerance. Aviation studies have previous utilized questionnaires
(Hunter, 2002b, 2005; Lopes, 1987; Pauley, O’Hare, & Wiggins, 2008), and the implicit
anxiety test (IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Pauley & O’Hare, 2008; Pauley
et al, 2008) to understand risk tolerance.
The Hazard Assessment Scale (HAS) (Hunter, 1995) was commonly used among
these studies to determine pilots’ previous accident and incident involvement. Results from
Hunter (2002b, 2005) measuring risk tolerance did not find that hazardous event
involvement was related to risk tolerance. Instead, the cognitive skills and the individual
experiences determine risk tolerance and place pilots at risk for accident involvement.
Pauley, O’Hare, & Wiggins (2008) found promising results using a measure of risk tolerance
previously validated using incident and accident involvement, as captured using the HAS
questionnaire. The motivational theory of risk tolerance developed by Lopes (1987) was
based on individuals’ preference for either opportunity for gain or the threat of a loss. The
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opportunity for gain is defined as the opportunities associated with the beneficial aspects of
a situation, which can be compared to threat, which is defined as those negative aspects of a
situation representing losses to the individual. Pilots were considered risk tolerant if the
level of opportunity was a significant predictor of the decision to take off, rather than
potential gains. These two features were varied over a number of situations that the pilot
was then asked to rank. During the last phase, pilots were asked to fly a simulated flight.
Results from this study indicated that all pilots were significantly influenced by threat
and not opportunity, indicate risk aversion. The higher the level of threat, the less likely the
pilot would be to continue the flight. Of the 27 pilots who participated in the study, only
two were considered risk tolerant. These two pilots had been involved in significantly more
hazardous events than the risk aversive pilots, approximately double the number of incidents
(Figure 11; Pauley et al, 2008). For these two pilots, there was a weaker relationship between
threat and the decision to take off, meaning that threat was less of a factor influencing their
decision. The results did not show any differences between age and experience in risk
taking behavior. The small percentage of risk tolerant pilots limited the authors’ ability to
conduct statistical tests, however, the results still show quite large differences between the
two groups. They note that this small percentage of pilots in the current study that are risk
tolerant (7%) is similar to the percentage of risk tolerant pilots in other studies (4%) (O’Hare
& Chalamers, 1999; Hunter, 1995).
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Figure 11: Involvement in aviation incidents by risk tolerant and risk aversive pilots

A second set of studies by Pauley, O’Hare, and colleagues (Pauley & O’Hare, 2008;
Pauley, O’Hare, Mullen, & Wiggins, 2008) focused on understanding risk tolerance by
measuring implicit attitudes, or the “introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified)
traces of past experiences that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, or action toward
social objects” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; p.8). Implicit attitudes are important because an
individual may not be consciously aware of their true feelings toward a situation, and the
unconscious processes may be unknowingly influencing their behavior. Support for this
theory can be seen in RPDM, which focuses on pattern matching and recognition processes
that take place subconsciously, or implicitly (Klein, 1993), and physiological data (heart rate)
showing a relationship between anxiety and the decision to divert during an adverse weather
simulated flight (O’Hare & Wiegmann, 2003).
The Implicit Anxiety Test (IAT) measures implicit anxiety by using the association
between two target concepts and two attributes. The theory behind the test is that people
tend to pair attributes and concepts together faster when they are similar, for example,
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flowers and happiness, rather than opposing concepts, such as flowers and unhappiness. If
the combination produces a mismatch or anxiety between the two concepts, reaction time
will increase. Implicit anxiety is determined by the variable D. D is calculated by the
difference between the average reaction time of compatible and incompatible blocks, divided
by the standard deviation of all responses. In general, negative D scores indicate a stronger
implicit association.
For the studies by Pauley, O’Hare, and colleagues (Pauley & O’Hare, 2008; Pauley,
O’Hare, Mullen, & Wiggins, 2008), the IAT was used to measure the association between
afraid (scared, anxious, etc.) and unafraid (relaxed, calm, etc.) words, and their association
with ten pictures of VMC and IMC weather conditions. The authors created compatible
(IMC/afraid, VMC/unafraid) and incompatible (IMC/unafraid, VMC/afraid) blocks to
determine differences in response time, which were later used to compute a D value.
Negative D scores indicate that participants held a stronger implicit association between
IMC and being afraid and VMC and feeling unafraid. Therefore, a risk tolerant individual
would have a lower (potentially negative) D score than someone who is risk averse. Results
indicate that the majority of pilots implicitly associated adverse weather with feeling anxious
or worried. Implicit association decreased as individuals were involved in more weatherrelated hazardous events. Therefore, the individuals who had been involved in more
incidents or accidents felt less anxiety when encountering adverse weather conditions. The
authors conclude that these results indicate a relationship between implicit associations and
risk-taking behavior.
In addition to the emotional or implicit aspect of risk tolerance, other more stable
characteristics or traits are associated with risk tolerance. The thought patterns of aviators
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who possess specific qualities, termed hazardous attitudes, are expected to accept a higher
level of risk and/or more frequent risks when making decisions. The five main types of
hazardous attitudes that are associated with accidents are anti-authority, external control,
impulsivity, invulnerability, and macho (Buch & Diehl, 1984). Anti-authority represents an
attitude of resentment towards any authority that tries to dictate their activities or impose
rules and regulations. External control (also termed resignation) represents the feeling of a
lack of control over a situation or their own life. Impulsivity represents someone who acts
quickly, without the adequate forethought. Invulnerability represents an attitude where the
individual believes that nothing could ever happen to them. Macho represents an attitude of
superiority, with an emphasis on ego and proving their worth. Each of the five hazardous
attitudes was found to be distinctly different from one another, and was determined to be a
separate construct (Lester & Bombaci, 1974). Of these five hazardous attitudes,
invulnerability was the most frequently occurring hazardous thought that was associated with
risky decision making in the aviation context, it was the predominant attitude in 40% of the
pilot participants. Invulnerability was followed by impulsivity at 20%, and macho at 14%.
Anti-authority and resignation occurred infrequently.
Since these earlier studies, several researchers have found a sixth measure should be
added to the original five to capture the attitudes of pilots more precisely. The additional
hazardous attitude of deference was proposed by Telfer (1986, 1989). Deference occurs
when an individual relinquishes power to a peer, authority figure, or any other person,
resulting in a change in decision making. This factor can be traced back to early studies of
social psychology that experimentally explored the effects of deference in a group setting
(Asch, 1956; Milgram, 1964). A second, but similar, sixth hazardous attitude was proposed
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by Murray (1999) who suggested the addition of loss of face. Face is the individual’s
assessment of the way in which others view that person (Redding & Ng, 1982; cited in
Murray, 1999). When face is challenged, the individual is challenged with a negative
emotional response, including shame, worry, feelings of uneasiness, anxiety, embarrassment,
and tension (Goffman, 1967; Redding & Ng, 1982). In order to reduce these feelings, the
individual will perform certain actions to reduce this emotional discomfort, resulting in
potentially risky behavior and loss of face. Loss of face has been noted to be especially
prominent in the aviation community, which generally tends to attract individuals with
similar personality traits, particularly younger males with a propensity for risk-taking
behavior. The adverse effects of the presence and/or input of other people during the
decision making process can lead to riskier decisions. It therefore becomes important to
understand how decisions change and evolve with the presence and influence of others.
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CHAPTER 4: MULTI-PERSON/INTERACTION FACTORS

The personal characteristics of an individual and a situation shape behaviors,
decision making processes, and actions. When others are added to the situation, so too are
additional variables, influencing the individual decision making process, behaviors and
actions. The result of this influence is expressed in any number of ways, depending not only
on the individual factors, but the interaction with and influence of the additional parties
present. This change in behavior due to the presence and influence of others has been
confirmed by early social psychology research in group settings, accident statistics suggesting
its occurrence and prevalence in certain situations, and the more applied experimental
situations in real-world settings. Applied research on interpersonal interactions have
extended to applications in commercial aviation in the form of crew resource management
(CRM) and in programs for newly licensed teenagers learning to drive. A more recent focus,
particularly in GA, is the effect of a passenger in a GA cockpit. Although the impact of
interpersonal relationships in the GA cockpit have been explored by analyzing accident
reports, experimental research directed at these interactions has yet to be conducted.

4.1: Social Pressure and Influence
Influence has been primarily studied in group settings by social psychologists with a
focus on interpersonal interactions. These studies indicate the extent of influence on an
individual’s behavior in a group setting. Research on these interactions have been
supplemented by a focus on the effectiveness of specific methods used to induce behavioral
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change. Theories describing these methods include conformity, persuasion, and obedience,
which can occur in typical, everyday situations, or situations involving potentially extreme
outcomes. This potentially wide range of situations include anything from a group project at
work, a psychology experiment, the identification of a suspect in a witness lineup, or
interactions between pilot and co-pilot during a flight maneuver. The underlying theme in
these scenarios is the same, people’s behavior can, and typically is, swayed by their
interactions with others in some form. Given this wide breath of research and applications,
social pressure or social influence may also explain pilot flight into adverse weather. Social
pressure in GA can occur when a passenger encourages the pilot to continue flying to the
intended destination despite the weather conditions. The pilot may conform due to the
passenger’s insistence and/or pressure on arriving at the destination at the scheduled time.
Social influence can typically be categorized into one of two main types,
informational or normative social influence. Informational social influence occurs when
information from others results in a change in behavior. For example, pilot A see pilot B
take off in marginal conditions, leading to pilot A believing that flying in those marginal
conditions is safe because pilot B attempted it. However, pilot A may not have even
considered that pilot B may have made a poor decision or is more capable of handling those
conditions due to experience and/or training. In comparison, normative social influence
occurs when an individual modifies his or her behavior to fit with the social norms or
unwritten rules of social interactions. When the individual does not conform to the
established social rules, he or she may experience a sense of discomfort. In order to
minimize these unpleasant emotions, people often modify their behaviors and decisions to
adapt to the social norms.
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Influence may occur in either an indirect or direct format. Indirect social influence,
of any type, occurs when the presence or actions of another induces a change in behavior
without a request. This is in comparison to the direct form of influence, which occurs as
the result of a request to perform some action through any number of means. Indirect
methods range from social facilitation, the least intrusive form of social influence resulting
from merely the presence of others, to conformity, whereby a change in behavior occurs due
to the effects of differing viewpoints by group members. Direct methods range from
compliance, following orders generally due to a request from someone in authority, to
persuasion, which occurs as the result of encouragement or reasoning with the individual by
a separate party.

4.1.1: Indirect Methods
Social Facilitation
Merely the presence of others can result in changes to behavior. This effect is
termed social facilitation and was first described over 200 years ago (Zajonc, 1965). Social
facilitation can result in either positive or negative effects, depending on the situation, the
individual, and their task. In general, social facilitation leads to the enhancement of a
dominant response. This is beneficial for certain tasks, such as those involving memory,
vigilance, and even motor responses. The negative effects of social facilitation occur when
the individual is learning new material. Beneficial effects in a learning situation occur if
others are engaged in the same activity, and the individual can observe, and then mimic, the
correct behavior and actions.
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Some researchers disagree with the basic premise of social facilitation, that the mere
presence of an audience is sufficient for social facilitation to occur (Baxter et al, 1990).
Some have proposed that the presence of others increases arousal, which then leads to the
effects of social facilitation (Zajonc, 1965). Other authors have instead suggested that social
facilitation occurs when an individual believes that their behavior will be evaluated, resulting
in arousal and enhancing dominant responses (Cottrell, 1968, 1972). An additional
conclusion is that audiences are distracting, and the competition between the task and the
audience is arousing (Sanders & Baron, 1975). Irrespective of the reason behind social
facilitation, marked changes in behavior do occur as the result of solely the presence of
others. At the most basic level, social facilitation is the first step in understanding how
decision making is changed by the involvement of others, either those present in the same
room or those influencing the decision making process.

Conformity
Conformity is a change in behavior due to real or imagined pressure from another
person. A frequently cited study by Muzafer Sherif (1935) tested the autokinetic effect, a
visual phenomenon where a stationary point of light appears to move but does not. In this
study, the participant judged how far the light had moved, when in reality the light remained
stationary. Participants were placed in a group setting and each person gave their response
separately, but in front of all other group members. Sherif found that the responses of
individuals in the group setting eventually converge to a single rating, representing a midpoint or average for the group. The individuality of these group members disparate
responses were lost. Interestingly, after the group separated, individual participant ratings
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remained at this center point rather than reverting back to their original response pattern.
Although Sherif ’s group effect was impressive, the study was critiqued for the ambiguity of
the task, and the lack of a concrete “answer,” resulting in subsequent research with
outcomes that could be objectively measured.
The subjective studies of visual phenomena by Sherif led to studies with an objective
outcome by Solomon Asch (1951, 1955). The original studies by Asch involved a group of
eight people who were tasked with determining which of a set of three lines matched the
length of a fourth line (Figure 12). Although this may seem like a basic length discrimination
task, there was one participant who was unaware that he was faced with a group of seven
cohorts who were hired to consistently choose the same incorrect response as each other.
Therefore, the true goal of this study was to determine how often the subject chose the
incorrect answer, and instead conformed to the incorrect response of the group. This
landmark study was later revised to include different conditions with variations to the total
numbers of cohorts, the presence or absence of dissenting cohorts, and varying
discrepancies between the actual line length and the incorrect majority response.
Surprisingly, this simple task with a clear and obvious correct response resulted in
conformity for 32% of all trials. For these studies, 25% of the participants did not conform
for any trial, 75% conformed at least once, and 5% conformed for all trials. These results
were surprising to the researcher as well, who predicted a far lower conformity rate due to
the obvious correct response for the task.
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Figure 12: Solomon Asch Line Discrimination Task

The presence of dissenter(s), individual(s) who gave the correct answer, in the group
greatly reduced the influence of the other group members on the subject as it gave the
individual an “ally” within the group. This is seen in the error rate, which dropped from the
32% seen in the original study to 10% when an additional naïve subject was present in the
group and further to 5% if there was a dissenter who chose all correct answers. An
additional experimental manipulation was the number of dissenters in the experiment, which
varied from one to sixteen people. Asch found that larger majorities of four to sixteen
cohorts did not produce greater effects than a majority of three. This effect was dramatically
reduced when the number of other “subjects” was reduced from three to one. The mean
number of errors decreased from an average of 4.0 errors with three cohorts to 1.53 errors
with two cohorts, and .33 with one cohort, compared to a baseline error rate of .08. Even
with only one cohort present, the error rate was over four times as high as the baseline error
rate.
The presence of just one dissenter greatly decreased the probability that an individual
would conform to the group response. Asch found that a group of three unanimous cohorts
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was more effective in producing a conformity effect than a group of eight cohorts with one
dissenter. Different variations in the arrival and departure of the dissenter and the
correctness of their answer resulted in a change to the error rate of the subject. In all these
conditions, the presence of a dissenter or an “ally” greatly reduced the influence of the group
on the subject to conform. This finding is important because it shows that it is not the
number of people present, but rather if an “ally” is among them.
Additional conditions by Asch included variations between the length of the correct
line and the line chosen by the group. Asch found that the difference between the two,
whether large or small, produced the same rate of errors. However, the method of yielding
did change. As differences between the actual line length and the group answer increased,
more “compromise” errors occurred, which split the difference between the correct answer
and the response of the group, rather than the participant noting the incorrect response.

4.1.2: Direct Methods
Compliance
Compliance is a form of social influence that occurs when one alters his/her
behavior in response to a direct request. There are many techniques that are used to induce
compliance, the most common are the foot-in-the-door technique, door-in-the-face
technique, and the low-ball technique. The foot-in-the-door technique involves a small
initial request, followed by a second larger request, usually after some time has passed
(Freedman & Fraser, 1966). One theory used to explain the effectiveness of this technique
is self-perception theory, which asserts that after agreeing to an initial request, an individual
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attributes the commitment to internal factors about themselves, particularly the beneficial
attributes. The attempt to maintain the positive sense of self leads the individual to
continue to comply with future requests. The door-in-the-face-technique involves a very
large request, typically found to be unreasonable and subsequently rejected, followed by a
much smaller request. The large difference between the initial and subsequent request
results in the norm of reciprocity, and people typically feel obliged to make a concession to
match the concession made by the solicitor. The low-ball technique is seemingly the
opposite of the door-in-the-face technique. Using this technique, one initially commits to a
deal that seems too good to be true, but only after accepting does he or she learn of the
additional stipulations or costs. Due to the original commitment, the individual feels
obligated to uphold the bargain, and is therefore less likely to break the commitment than if
asked directly.
An article exploring the use of these various tactics in the aviation context used the
critical incident method to conduct interviews with pilots about a prior weather encounter
they had been involved with (Paletz, Bearman, Orasanu, & Holbrook, 2008). The Alaskan
pilots interviewed were asked to recount at least one weather-related incident of their
choosing that challenged their skills as a pilot in command. The themes of these interviews
were then grouped according to similar features. Of the 28 interviews conducted, 24
described a situation involving social pressure. Eight of the pilots described at least one case
of foot-in-the-door or normalization of deviance, and five described at least one pressure
related to self-consistency pressures/impression management.
Examples given by the interviewed pilots for informational social influence include a
situation in which they felt safe to fly because they had observed other pilots flying in the
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same area and/or under the same conditions. Foot-in-the-door examples include the
request by a manager to “go take a look” to determine actual weather conditions. Some of
these requests were innocent, as information concerning the weather can be inadequate,
however, it was noted that in other times this was used as a ploy to get the pilot to take off
and then continue through deteriorated weather conditions. The third type commonly seen
is the normalization of deviance, which is the incremental acceptance of lower levels of
safety. This acceptance of lower standards for weather conditions may eventually lead to
complacency, often resulting in dangerous situations. This may occur after pilots are faced
with deteriorated weather that persists for several days or weeks, leading the pilot to take off
in conditions that they would normally not deem acceptable.
Self-consistency, as related to self-perception theory, is the need to maintain the selfimage and beliefs consistent with the individuals’ perception of self. Similarly, impression
management is the pressure to avoid social disapproval and failure. These two taken
together may result in a passenger who wants to fly to their destination, a pilot who is aware
of this, and acts to fulfill their wishes. Even though the passenger might not state directly
the urgency of arriving at their destination, the pilot may still be aware of this, and responds
accordingly. The pilot might be faced with a potential loss of face if they had to tell the
passenger that they would not be able to conduct the flight.
These examples of influence methods depict the Alaskan pilot managing not only
adverse weather conditions, but also social pressures in the cockpit (Paletz et al, 2008). It is
interesting to note that when asked to describe a situation involving weather, the vast
majority of the pilots described some form of social influence. This fact speaks to the
importance and prevalence of social influence within an aviation environment.
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Persuasion
Persuasion, a form of normative social influence, uses reasoning for the purpose of
changing the attitudes and/or behavior of another person. One common persuasion theory,
the social judgment theory (SJT), states that a person judges a persuasive message based on
the difference between their own position on an issue and the communicator’s position. The
theory outlines three judgment categories: the latitude of acceptance, the latitude of
rejection, and the latitude of non-commitment. The latitude of acceptance and rejection
result in the immediate acceptance and dismissal of the action or request. The latitude of
non-commitment is the neutral zone, a “gray” area between the latitude of acceptance and
the latitude of rejection. In this zone, the situation highly influences the actions and
outcomes and what the individual is willing to accept. Therefore, if an individual receives a
request that falls into the latitude of rejection, it will be dismissed immediately. However, if
that same request for a different individual falls in the latitude of non-commitment,
situational variables and persuasive means may be used to convince the individual to agree to
the request. SJT makes practical sense because it describes how a persuasive argument is
received and explains the individual differences in the ability to be persuaded. Each pilot has
his or her own different experiences, capabilities, and acceptable levels of risk, all of which
can modify how the message is perceived and the “zone” in which the persuasive message
falls.
A study exploring the reasons why pilots would take off into bad weather conditions
indicated that pilots would be more willing to take risks if the proposed flight was for a
medical emergency (an angel flight), when going home for the holidays, or when performing
search and rescue flights (Driskill, et al, 1998). In comparison, the situations that the pilot
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would choose not to perform a risk (rated the lowest) were flying home after a day away,
visiting friends, or receiving an instrument flight check. These relatively unimportant
reasons for taking a risk were all rated as a 1.5 or less, as compared to the highly rated
reasons, which ranged from 75 to 88. These results indicate support for separate latitudes of
acceptance, with the higher rated risks indicating a neutral or “gray” zone where an
individual might accept additional risk due to differences in situational and/or other personal
factors.

Obedience
Obedience can be defined as the change in behavior due to a direct request from
someone in authority. One of the most widely recognized experiments on obedience is by
Milgram (1963, 1964). Milgram’s original study involves a subject brought in for a “memory
experiment” to determine the effect that punishment had on a memory task. In this
experiment the subject of interest is the learner, who is working with the experimenter to
dupe the true participant, the teacher. The goal is to determine the level of shock the
participant would be willing to administer when instructed by the experimenter. The shock
is considered the punishment, and is administered each time an incorrect answer is given by
the learner. The level of shock increases in intensity with each additional incorrect answer
by the confederate. To add to this situation, an experimenter is encouraging the subject to
continue to administer shocks to the confederate with a series of increasingly strongly
worded prompts that correspond to the increase in shock voltage. In this original study,
there is no visual or auditory input from the learner except when 300 and 315 volts are
reached, and a banging on the wall is heard. Once 330 volts was reached, there were no
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additional responses from the learner. At the maximum of 450 volts, the experiment was
concluded.
When commanded by the experimenter, all participants continued to shock the
“learner” until reaching 300 volts, at which point 17% refused to continue. In total, 65% of
the participants continued to shock the learner until reaching the maximum of 450 volts.
Additional conditions of the experiment were added to the original study. The proximity of
the subject to the learner and the proximity of the experimenter to the subject were
manipulated to determine its effect on conformity. The first variable of interest, the
proximity of the learner to the subject, was manipulated from the original condition with the
subject in a separate room from the learner, without auditory or visual information (no
A/V). Subsequent conditions include the added component of verbal protests by the learner
(A only), and an increased proximity (a few feet) of the learner to the subject, who could
both be seen and heard during the experiment (A+V). A fourth condition required the
subject to physically hold down the learners hand once the learner refused to participate in
the experiment after reaching 150 volts (A+V+touch). In each of these cases the subject’s
increasingly close proximity to the learner and increased awareness of the outcome makes
him more aware of the situation that he is responsible for causing. Milgram mentioned that
the subjects showed escalating unease with the increased proximity of the learner, and many
times were found to distance themselves from the situation by avoiding visual contact with
the subject in the later conditions. Even with these changed, the percentage of fully
obedient subjects, those who continued until the 450 voltage shock was given, decreased
over the conditions: 65% for no A/V, 62.5% for A only, 40% for A+V, and 30% for
A+V+touch.

92

The second type of relevant condition is the proximity of the experimenter to the
subject. There were only two conditions for this second type of experiment. The first is a
new “baseline” condition, where the location of the experiment was moved to a more
modest looking location in the basement of the same building. This condition was similar to
the voice feedback only condition, with the additional mention of a heart condition at certain
voltage levels by the learner. The result was a slight chance variation. This condition is in
comparison to the seventh experiment, where instead of the experimenter sitting just a few
feet away from the subject, the subject only had contact with the experimenter via telephone
during the experiment. In comparison to the baseline condition, where 26 subjects obeyed
completely, only nine of the subjects completely obeyed in the distanced experimenter
condition. What can be gained from the studies by Milgram is the large role of someone in
authority (the experimenter) on the individual’s decision to continue the ill-advised, and
potentially physically harmful, electrical shocks.
Another well known study is the Zimbardo prison study (Haney, Banks &
Zimbardo, 1973). This study placed normal college students in a prison environment, half
randomly assigned to the role of prisoner and half as guards. What was originally planned as
a two-week study had to be shortened to less than a week due to unexpected consequences.
The students assigned to the position of guard exhibited aggressive behavior towards the
prisoners, and the prisoners exhibited docile conformity to the wishes of the guards.
Although at first glance, the actions of the prison guards might seem to be the main finding
of interest, the actions of the prisoners exhibited a disturbing and fascinating look into an
extreme case of conformity. As the experiment progressed, the prisoners had stopped
requesting better conditions or responding to the unpredictable actions of the guards. The
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prisoners even went as far as turning on the one prisoner who was still standing up to the
guards after all others had complied completely. The prisoners instead failed to initiate any
action, wandering around in a zombie-like state, and complied with any request made by the
prison guards.
The willingness to comply with requests from an authority figure can be extended to
the multi-piloted aircraft cockpit. An NTSB study of aviation accidents from 1978 to 1990
determined that 80% of the accidents involved a monitoring/challenging error by the nonflying crew members, which in 81% of these cases was the first officer. Of these accidents,
Tarnow (2000a, 2000b) concluded that excessive obedience was implicated in as many as
25% of the civil aviation accidents. The determination of the monitoring/challenging error
versus the excessive obedience error was the impact of the error. Therefore, a first officer
who failed to warn the captain of a missed engine light that resulted in the primary cause of
an accident would be determined an excessive obedience error. However, in that same
example, if the engine light was only considered a secondary cause of the accident, and not
directly contributing, then the error would be considered a monitoring/challenging error.
The conclusions from the NTSB analyses by Tarnow (2000) concerning the high rate
of obedience and monitoring/challenging errors is supported by flight transcripts of
accidents involving social pressure. The flight recordings taken from two accidents resulting
in social pressures involved failures in managing interpersonal relationship in the cockpit
(NTSB 1979, 1980; cited in Kanki & Smith, 2001). In both accidents, the first officer was
uneasy about the decision the captain had made but failed to express his concerns strongly
enough to change the fatal outcome. One explanation for the reason why first officers may
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fail to speak up or adequately express their concerns when faced with a potentially life
threatening error by the captain is the trans-cockpit gradient.
The trans-cockpit gradient is the working relationship in a dual pilot cockpit, and
describes the difference in seniority and authority between the captain and the first officer
(Edwards, 1975). The captain’s designation as final authority over the aircraft is determined
by the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (Tarnow, 2000a). This position typically requires
seniority in the airline and a large number of accrued flight hours. This can be compared to
the first officer, who typically has a third to a quarter of the flight hours of the captain, and
far less time within the airline.
Many times this relationship between the first officer and captain is compounded by
personality factors and leadership styles. An overbearing captain can result in a timid first
officer not voicing their concerns adequately, or conversely, a captain can abstain from their
role of authority, resulting in confusion and lack of proper coordination in the cockpit.
Organizational norms also exacerbate this factor, as can be exemplified by an airline policy in
the 1950’s stating that the first officer may not correct errors by the captain. This thought
process, and the associated organizational norms, has changed over the years due in part to
aviation accidents that could be prevented by the first officer questioning the captain. This
body of research, and the associated preventable accidents, resulted in an NTSB
recommendation for assertiveness training to combat the problem of the trans-cockpit
gradient (NTSB, 1989). This recommendation marked the beginning of crew resource
management (CRM), which has evolved over the past 30 years, and is now a requirement for
all commercial pilots (Kanki & Smith, 2001).
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4.2: Communication in Teams
4.2.1: Crew Resource Management & Assertiveness Training
In some, the ability to speak up in difficult situations is a natural ability, but in others
it requires practice and concerted effort, which can occur through the use of social skills and
management training techniques (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). Crew or Cockpit Resource
Management (CRM) was created to address those issues, particularly for the aviators whose
skills were lacking. CRM has progressed over five evolutions to become an integral part in
commercial aviation training (Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001). As the focus has
changed over the years, there have been improvements in the communications of aviators
during hazardous situations, and a decline in accidents attributable to CRM.
The focus of the first evolution of CRM was on fixing individual problems. This
later evolved to the second phase, with a focus not only on the individual’s problems, but on
the dynamics within the cockpit. The third evolution expanded the scope to interactions
within an aviation context, not solely on the aviators. This evolution created the
understanding that CRM must include the interactions that aviators have with other
individuals, such as with ATC, maintenance personnel, and other support personnel. The
fourth evolution allowed for additional improvements, including tailoring and certifying
(now a requirement for airlines) the CRM program to the company, and providing the
aviator with the opportunity for review and feedback of their performance. The focus of the
fifth and final evolution is the inevitability of human error, and the methods used to mitigate
these errors. Error mitigation techniques include error avoidance, early detection of errors,
and minimizing the consequences of CRM errors. Additions to this phase include the
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recognition and management of threats. This most recent evolution of CRM training built
upon previous evolutions to create a pragmatic look at the way errors occur. Instead of
trying to prevent errors completely, the goal is to minimize their impact. Therefore, when
errors inevitably occur, they can be managed effectively, reducing their impact on safety and
ensuring a safer flying experience.
Many studies have supported the contention that CRM training does improve
teamwork in the cockpit (Fowlkes, Lane, Salas, Franz & Oser, 1994; Leedom & Simon,
1995; Smith-Jentsch, Jentsch, Payne, & Salas, 1999; Smith-Jentsch, Salas & Baker, 1996;
Stout, Salas, & Fowlkes, 1997; cited in Salas, Fowlkes, Stout, Milanovich, Prince, 1999). A
study by Prince & Salas (1993) identified seven key teamwork skills for aviators:
communication, decision making, leadership, situation awareness, mission analysis,
adaptability/flexibility, and assertiveness. One key area of interest due to its applicability to
the trans-cockpit gradient and passenger pressure is assertiveness.

Assertiveness
Assertiveness is the ability to communicate ideas, feelings, concerns, and needs
clearly and directly without being demanding or infringing upon the rights of others (Jentsch,
& Smith-Jentsch, 2001). The attributes of a communication message exist on a continuum.
On one end of the continuum are passive, indirect, statements that may only hint at the true
purpose of the communication. At the opposite end of the continuum is an aggressive
statement that provides a succinct and direct version of the communication, but does so in a
negative manner, typically involving a degree of defensiveness, hostility, or imposition on
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others actions or point of view. Therefore, to be effective, assertiveness should fall in the
middle of the continuum, providing the necessary information, but in a positive manner,
without defensiveness or hostility.
Lorr & More (1980) propose that assertiveness as it is generally defined is too broad
in scope, and instead should be conceptualized as a multidimensional variable with four parts
or sub-sets, including directiveness, social assertiveness, defense of rights and interests, and
independence. Directiveness is the ability to lead and influence others in tense personal
statements that require action, initiative, and assumption of responsibility. Social
assertiveness is the ability to maintain and engage with others successfully in social
interactions. Defense of rights is the ability to stand up for one’s rights and refusal to accept
unreasonable requests. Independence represents the ability to actively resist conformity
from themselves or others, and instead act on their own beliefs without the influence of
others. The authors mention that each category of assertive behavior can be classified as
both a skill and as a disposition, resulting in expected changes to behavior based on the
situation and stimuli. Others (Gupta, 2004; Smith-Jentsch, Salas, & Baker, 1996) support the
conclusion that team performance is a skill, and unlike disposition, should be trainable.
The authors researched a variety of CRM programs and found that assertiveness
training is most effective when a behavioral role-modeling format is followed. This format
includes the use of lectures and demonstration, with an emphasis on practice and
performance feedback. The combination of practice and timely performance feedback
during a simulated flight scenario are particularly effective at building interpersonal skills.
The concept of assertiveness has been incorporated as a module into nearly every CRM
training program in the last 30 years (Jentsch, & Smith-Jentsch, 2001). The requirement of
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recurrent training for commercial pilots includes a simulated flight addressing specific skills,
that is taped and later reviewed for performance feedback (Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Jentsch &
Smith-Jentsch, 2001).
CRM training has been applied extensively in the aviation field, with generally
beneficial results. Salas et al (2001) conducted a literature review to determine the
effectiveness of CRM training. Of the 58 articles reviewed, the authors noted a general lack
of systematic investigation for the effects of training. The vast majority of the studies
reviewed in this article evaluated the training based on some, but not all, of the training
evaluation methods (reactions, learning, behavior, and results) described by Kirkpatrick’s
learning framework (Kirkpatrick, 1976). The authors concluded that if all four of these
evaluation methods are not addressed, a comprehensive view of the effect of training is not
possible to determine. Taking into consideration this caveat, and the results from a few
studies finding that CRM training had no effect, the authors conclude that there is adequate
evidence to support the effectiveness of CRM training. This is particularly significant given
the current state of evaluation methods used by the reviewed articles. The results from the
reviewed articles can be summarized into a few key findings: CRM training produces positive
reactions, attitudinal change, and the desired behavioral change in the cockpit.

4.2.2: Communication Patterns & Coding
Communication measurement and analysis have provided researchers with an
additional way to study performance in the cockpit. Two methods of analyzing
communication content created by Bales and colleagues (Bales, 1950; Bales & Cohen, 1979)
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were used extensively to study group communication. The Interaction Process Analysis
(IPA) and the System for the Multiple Level Observation of Groups (SYMLOG) have been
widely used to classify the content of behavior, providing insights into the factors involved
with and influencing group processes. Both IPA and SYMLOG have been used as a basis
for several studies investigating the role of communication in a commercial aviation cockpit.
The adapted communication coding methods have shown how differences in performance,
error type, and rank influence communication patterns.
IPA is a communication coding method that can be used to determine the relevance
and importance of each statement in relation to the problem-solving process (Bales, 1950).
In order to determine the importance of each communication, the statement is classified
according to a set of categories. The twelve categories are arranged as six complementary
pairs that can be used to describe any interaction. These categories address problems of
orientation, evaluation, control, decision-making, tension management, and integration using
two diametrically opposing statements. In figure 13 (Bales, 1950), six and seven (a) both
represent problems of orientation, but do so differently. Item six gives information that can
be used for orienting, or understanding the problem or situation. Item seven, in
comparison, asks for additional information to increase understanding. These opposite
statements allow for a wide variety of actions.
When using IPA to code a conversation, each sentence will be coded as a separate
entity, one of the twelve categories. For example, the phrase “Has anyone checked on the
order status?” would be coded as category seven because it is asking for orientation, rather
than giving information to orient others to the problem. If this statement is made in a group
of more than two people, the statement will also be coded according to the direction of the
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statement. Therefore, the coding might be coded as category 7, with attendee 1 addressing
attendee 3. The code that precedes and follows the code of interest will also be used to
determine communication patterns. Over the course of a conversation or interaction, the
amount and types of codes by person, their frequencies, and the codes that precede and
follow it, all give insights into the interaction. Additionally, IPA provides information on the
relationship between the communicators, the progression of the conversation, and the type
of communication that occurs.

Figure 13: IPA Communication Categories

SYMLOG is similar to IPA in that it uses categories of opposing actions to capture
communication within a group. In comparison to IPA, which categorizes information based
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on actions, SYMLOG uses descriptive terms to detail the underlying themes behind the
action. Therefore, instead of using actions (ie: gives opinion, asks for suggestion),
SYMLOG focuses on the qualities of the person and their communication, which may be
either verbal or nonverbal. The behavior may be classified as one of a number of adjectives.
P, or positive, can be used to describe as friendly statement/action; N, is negative and
represents unfriendly; U, or upward, is also known as dominant; F, or forward, can be
described as instrumentally controlled; and B, or backward, can be described as emotionally
expressive. SYMLOG is a more recent coding mechanism, and has not yet achieved the
level of interest of IPA.
Although many of the examples given by Bales (1950; 1979) describe a meeting or
other type of group setting, SYMLOG, and IPA in particular, have been used in many
aviation-related studies as the basis for understanding communication within a team. These
communication coding techniques have been modified to better understand the cockpit
dynamics in a commercial aviation setting. Variants of IPA and SYMLOG have been used
by several researchers to code, and understand, the communications in a multi-piloted
aircraft (Fischer & Orasanu, 1999; Foushee, Lauber, Baetge, & Acomb; 1986; Foushee &
Manos, 1981; Straus & Cooper, 1989).
Straus & Cooper (1989) focused on communication patterns to determine how the
differences in rank structure affect group communication. Communications by the crews
(homogeneous and heterogeneous ranks) were coded into one of the three main groups of
communication: task information statements (procedural information, opinions,
acknowledgements), directive communications (commands, corrections, formal
acknowledgements), and tension release (expressions of frustrations, embarrassment, task
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irrelevant comments). The communications revealed the task structure for performing
certain actions by the pilot and co-pilot. The pilot gave more directives to the co-pilot, and
the co-pilot gave procedural information, opinions about the task, and other types of
information to the pilot. Non-task communications were higher for the pilot, possibly
relieving tension through the use of nervous laughter, encouragements, and statements of
frustration. The authors note one surprising finding, the expected effects of crew
composition were not significant. The communications between homogenous crews (similar
rank/status) were higher than heterogeneous crews (different rank/status), but the results
were not significant.
An additional study focusing on the effect of role and status on pilot communication
strategies utilized eight categories of communication; two classes were speaker-centered
communications and six were types of requests (Fischer & Orasanu, 1999). The requests
included commands, crew obligation statements, crew suggestions, queries, preferences, and
hints. The two speaker-centered communications include permission-seeking questions and
self-directives, indicating future actions. These communications vary according to the
directness and explicitness of the statement and the action to be taken. Results from the
study mirrored the findings from Straus & Cooper (1989) and indicated a different
communication pattern between captains and first officers. Captains typically used
commands, in comparison to the less direct method used by first officers (i.e., hints), which
expresses the problem but suggest no solution. The communication patterns also differed
based on risk and face threat (embarrassment) errors. In high-risk situations,
communication becomes more direct, captains increase their use of commands, and first
officers increase their use of crew obligation statements. High face threats by first officers
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often elicit an increase in hints by the captains, rather than their preferred communication
method, commands. An evaluation of the effectiveness (rating based on both success and
appropriateness) of the communications found that both the captains and first officers rated
crew obligation statements as more effective than commands. Similar to the first part of the
study, direct statements were rated as more effective in high-risk situations.
A similar study by Foushee & Manos (1981) coded communications into one of the
following statements: crewmember observation, commands, inquiries, response uncertainty,
agreement, acknowledgement, tension release, frustration or anger, embarrassment, and
pushes (repetition of previously stated information). Results from the study shows that the
low error crews communicated more overall. More specifically, crewmember observations,
acknowledgements, and commands resulted in less errors, including flying (altitude errors,
engine handling), operational (misreading instruments, mishandling of engines), and tactical
decision (flap settings, braking) errors. In contrast, higher rates of errors are associated with
an increase in response uncertainty, frustration/anger, and embarrassment statements. The
increase in command statements associated with low error crews may indicate the
effectiveness of commands, up to a certain point. If these statements indicate a behavioral
style, then this behavioral style may lead to a submissive first officer failing to inform the
captain of critical information.
Communication patterns are also dependent on a number of additional factors,
including crew familiarity, similarity of speech patterns, and situational factors. Crew
familiarity had a positive impact on performance and led to performance superior to that of
unfamiliar crews, even with the highest levels of fatigue (Kanki & Foushee, 1989). This
positive effect of performance on familiar crews can be at least partially attributable to
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speech patterns. The crews with homogeneity of speech patterns were characterized by a
low occurrence of errors, as compared to high error crews that were marked by
heterogeneous speech patterns (Kanki, Lozito, & Foushee, 1981). The homogeneity of
speech was characterized by a predictability of the speech patterns that indicated a standard
form of communicating. The authors concluded that the predictability of homogeneous
speech patterns by crew members resulted in benefits to performance.
The findings from the studies of speech and content coding can be combined into a
few general conclusions. First, the differences in communication patterns of captains and
first officers support the trans-cockpit gradient theory. Second, high performing crews
exhibit certain patterns and types of communication that differ from low performing crews.
Third, the first two findings lead to the conclusion that communication coding is a valid
means of understanding pilot behavior in the cockpit. Therefore, communication coding
may be used to increase understanding in other sectors of aviation, or in other domains.

4.3: Passengers
4.3.1: Driving
A large percentage of the research addressing passenger influence in driving has
focused on drivers younger than 25 due to their increased crash risk (Ulmer, Williams, &
Preusser, 1997). This elevated crash risk is further increased when the young driver is
accompanied by passengers who are peers (Drummond & Healy, 1986). This increased risk
has been attributed not only to inexperience, but also to driver risk taking and peer influence
(Mayhew & Simpson, 1990; Williams, Ferguson, & McCart, 2007). Williams et al (2007)
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mentions that young drivers are more susceptible to peer influence than older drivers
because they are highly attuned to the behaviors of others, have a high need for social
acceptance, and have underdeveloped self-regulation capabilities. These characteristics that
lead them to be more risk-taking with peers also leads them to be risk-averse with other
types of passengers. Drivers mentioned that they are more careful under certain
circumstances, such as when they drive with parents and adults, and for males, when driving
with a significant other (Arnett, Offer, & Fine, 1997; Preusser, Ferguson, & Williams, 1998;
Rolls & Ingham, 1992; Ulleberg, 2005). An additional protective influence of older
passengers, particularly older females, has been found, leading to a decrease in crash risk.
Due to the large influence of passengers on driving behavior, a number of research
studies have focused on interventions that target teens faced with social situations and social
pressure in driving situations. Before any behavioral change can occur, drivers should be
made aware of how passengers can influence their behavior, whether it is the passenger
persuading the driver to race their friend’s vehicle, or if it is simply the presence of the
passenger that results in a change of behavior (Williams et al, 2007). One training method,
assertiveness training, has also been utilized in the driving sector where it has been
recommended for use for passengers faced with an unsafe driving situation. Regan &
Mitsopoulos (2001) adopted assertiveness principles by implementing a training program
that uses a hierarchy of verbal statements to bring up the passengers safety concerns to the
driver. This hierarchy of statements increases the strength of the wording to communicate
an increased importance with each additional communication. Therefore, with each
additional statement, the urgency of the demand is increased. The authors mention that the
use of a hierarchy of communication will result in a desired effect more often than an initial
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blunt demand. This framework could also be applied in a reverse situation, when a
passenger is pressuring the driver to perform some risky behavior, and the driver needs to be
assertive enough to take a stand.

4.3.2: General Aviation
In comparison to other types of GA accidents, VFR into IMC accidents had
significantly more passengers onboard (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). The authors found that
passengers were present in 54% of VFR-IMC accidents, which was significantly more than
the 45% present in non-VFR into IMC accidents. Data analyses from a 14-year period by
Detwiler et al (2008) confirmed this increase in passengers for VFR into IMC accidents. The
authors found the fatality rates were significantly greater for VFR into IMC flight (1.57
fatalities per accident), as compared to non-VFR into IMC accidents (.33 fatalities per
accident).
The motivation of the individuals in these samples is however, limited. These
studies used accident reports from the NTSB/FAA database, resulting in a limited view to
only the information that could be captured after the accident had occurred. Often, VFR to
IMC accidents result in the death of the pilot, and no survivors or voice recordings can aid
the accident investigation. Unfortunately, this is a common issue for GA accident
investigations due to the smaller, lower-technology airplanes flown in GA that do not
typically come equipped with a ‘black box’ (as compared to commercial aviation for
example). Determining the cause of these accidents is extremely challenging, if even
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possible. Key information is typically scarce regarding pilot reactions in these demanding
and stressful situations.
The results from Goh & Wiegmann (2001) & Detwiler et al (2008) suggest that the
presence of a passenger does influence the decision making process in VFR into IMC
accidents. These results are confirmed by the role of passengers in other domains, such as
driving, which has found that both the presence and type of passenger influences the driver’s
risk taking behavior. Although many studies have experimentally explored driving risk
taking behavior in relation to the passenger, similar studies in general aviation have yet to be
conducted. Therefore, in order to increase our understanding of pilot behavior when faced
with passenger influence and/or pressure, the problem must be explored experimentally. As
such, the proposed study aims to provide a look at the role of social pressure and influence
in the motivations and decision factors faced by pilots involved in VFR into IMC situations.
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CHAPTER 5: METHODS
5.1: Participants
Participants for this study were recruited for both the role of the pilot and the
passenger. A total of forty-five pilots were recruited to fill the role of the pilot, each
participating in one of the three persuasion conditions. These pilots were recruited from
Clemson University, flight clubs in the area, and local airports. There were two non-pilots
recruited for the role of passengers who were present during the experiment (explained
below). The non-pilots were chosen based on their expected effectiveness and availability.
The pilot demographic information for each of the three conditions is included
below (Table 5). Age and measures of experience represent a wide variety of pilots. Age
ranged from 18 to 77 years, and time since the pilot received their private pilot’s license
ranged from a pilot a month shy of his formal license to a retired military pilot who had
received his license 52 years earlier. Due to this wide range of experiences, both the range
and medians are given. The participants in the ‘non-incentive’ condition are older with more
flying time than the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ incentive conditions. These higher values can be
attributed to two participants who had been flying for over forty years. Although the values
of the ‘baseline/non-incentive’ condition are slightly higher than the other incentive
conditions, the pilots from the positive and negative incentive condition are comparable to
one another in both age and flight experience variables.
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Table 5: Pilot Demographic Information
Time since
Age

received PPL

41

6

(26-62)

(0-40)

Non-incentive/Baseline

47.5

12.5

Condition

(19-77)

(1-52)

Positive Incentive

42

4

(18-66)

(0-25)

Negative Incentive

Total
% PPL

53.8%

62.5%

60.0%

% IR

46.2%

62.5%

33.3%

VFR Hrs.

IFR Hrs.

555

46

(142-22,000)

(10-4000)

1200

175.5

(0-13,4000)

(0-15,198)

218

15

(9-8,000)

(0-1600)

5.2: Equipment and Weather Simulation
All data for the present study were collected in the Human Factors laboratory in
Freeman Hall on the Clemson University campus. The laboratory was complete with a Dell
Optiplex 745 with 2.4 GHz Intel dual-core processor and 3072 MB RAM. The desktop
computer was connected to a 17’’ monitor and a projector. The projector was used to
present the image of the out of cockpit view in front of the pilot and the monitor was used
as a separate view of the instrument panel (Figure 14). The addition of extra RAM and an
updated video card, the GeForce 8500, were added to the computer to support the high
realism settings used in X-Plane. X-Plane is a flight simulation program that has different
versions (home vs. FAA-approved) and add-ons that can be adapted for either home use for
the PC-gamer or as a high-tech training tool used for pilot certification. For the present
study, the home version was used with the addition of a yoke equipped with throttle and
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mixture switches and rudder pedals. The Cessna 172 Skyhawk was equipped with a Garmin
430 GPS device in the cockpit that assisted the pilot with navigation throughout the flight
with the use of the ‘direct-to’ function. This function allowed the pilot to view the route
from the departure to the destination which was depicted by a pink line in addition to their
location along that route. Pilots who had deviated significantly from this route were asked
by passengers about their location along the route in order to non-directly advise the pilot to
regain proper course in order to ensure that all pilots received a similar weather encounter.

Figure 14: Weather Simulator Laboratory

A weather plug-in was added to X-Plane to ensure that the weather specifications of
the scenario were enacted as designed, and the weather gradually deteriorated during the
flight (plug-in created by Chris Johnson, University of Wisconsin-Madison; not currently
licensed). The specifications used in the weather scenario were created with the assistance of
meteorologists from an aviation-focused university. The scenario consists of a route with
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five measurable points where weather deteriorated. The deterioration in weather included
decreased cloud ceiling and visibility, and terrain that crossed over several points of high
elevation. As can be seen in the sectional charts in figure 15 (fltplan.com), and indicated
with the beige mountains in contrast to the green relatively flat land, the rising terrain occurs
early into the flight and continues until marginal conditions are encountered approximately
halfway into the flight. The visibility and cloud ceiling specifications are located in table 6,
which detail the clear progression from visual to instrument conditions. The weather
conditions around KCKB, the departing airport, indicate high visibility and cloud ceiling, in
contrast to the area around KOFP, the destination airport, which indicates severely
deteriorated visibility and vastly lowered cloud ceiling.

Figure 15: Sectional Charts KCKB-KOFP
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Table 6: Airport and Weather information
Airport ID

Location

Airport Name

Classification

Airport
Distance
ETA*
---------

Weather
Distance ETA*
---------

KCKB

Clarksburg, WV

North Central West Virginia

VFR

KSHD

Stauton, VA

Shenandoah Valley Regional

MVFR

89 nm

1:02

74 nm

:51

KCHO

Charlottesville, VA

Charlottesville-Albemarle

IFR

109 nm

1:13

99 nm

1:09

KLKU

Louisa, VA

Louisa County/Freeman Field

LIFR

132 nm

1:25

122 nm

1:25

Richmond/Ashland, VA

Hanover County Municipal

LIFR

163 nm

1:42

153 nm

1:47

KOFP

*= Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA): based on calculation from fltplan.com, an online flight planning software (7500 ft, 112 mph)

This weather scenario included approximately thirty minutes of visually clear
conditions until the pilot was expected to reach deteriorating weather. This time period in
the scenario allowed for ample time for the pilot to become accustomed to the aircraft prior
to experiencing any adverse weather. This period is also advantageous to the passenger who
was able to create a rapport with the pilot, leading to an increased familiarity and bonding
with the pilot during this first part of the flight.
The weather at the departure airport (KCKB) was mostly clear and sunny. This
weather continued until KSHD, where MVFR conditions will began approximately halfway,
or 90 miles, into the simulation. The weather deteriorated as the pilot encounters IFR
weather around KCHO, or approximately 110 miles into the simulation. It continued to
deteriorate to LIFR conditions approximately 132 miles into the simulation around KLKU,
and remain LIFR until reaching the destination airport.

Weather Factors
The focus of the weather simulation is on two main weather factors of interest,
cloud ceiling and visibility. These two factors are the main variables used to determine
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weather categorizations for flight type (VFR, MVFR, IFR, LIFR), and have been found to be
of utmost importance in pilot weather decision making. During the development of
Weatherwise, a cue-based training program, Wiggins & O’Hare (2003) interviewed expert
pilots and identified ten important weather cues that pilots utilize to make decisions
concerning the weather. Of these ten cues, visibility and cloud ceiling received the highest
ratings of importance and were rated as significantly more important by experts than by
novices. An additional study by Knecht et al (2005) also focused on these two variables of
interest when experimentally manipulating financial incentive. The authors concluded that
visibility and ceiling were key components during the pilot’s decision to take off into
marginal weather conditions. These weather factors interacted with the financial incentive
(the motivation), resulting in a decreased sensitivity to the weather conditions due to the
bonus. The authors concluded from this study that for the pilots who were influenced by
the bonus (“bonus susceptible pilots”), their normal baseline for weather conditions was
lowered, and they were more likely to attempt a flight into bad weather.
These two studies show both the effect and importance of the two main weather
factors of interest, ceiling and visibility, in a pilot decision making task involving motivation.
Although these factors are quite important in any scenario involving aviation weather, many
other weather factors play a role as well. These other factors have been addressed by the
meteorologists during the creation of the weather scenario, and have been manipulated in
order to create a weather environment with a full range of weather features. For the present
study the additional variable of terrain was added to ensure that the pilot would not continue
to descend as the cloud ceiling deteriorated. The addition of light wind was added to create
realism to the scenario.
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Adverse Weather Simulations
Given that this study involved a VFR into IMC scenario with the addition of a
passenger, it is neither possible nor ethical to duplicate the same weather scenario over
multiple conditions in a real flight environment. Therefore, the only option for studying this
problem experimentally is to use a simulated environment. Simulation has been used
successfully in the past to explore pilot decision making in adverse weather scenarios similar
to the present one (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001b; O’Hare & Owen, 1999; O’Hare &
Smitheram, 1995; Saxton, 2008; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). These studies show that adverse
weather simulations provide physiological responses with similar patterns to those found
during actual flight (Magnusson, 2002; Veltman, 2002), providing further support for their
use.
The complexity of the technology used in these adverse weather studies varied
considerably, ranging from a laptop computer (O’Hare & Smitheram, 1995) to an Elite flight
simulator with a cockpit body (Saxton, 2008). Given the variety of advanced capabilities of
the simulators used in these studies, it is interesting to note that widely available programs
such as Microsoft Flight Simulator and X-Plane were frequently the method of choice for
portraying weather scenarios. Their widespread availability and ease of use makes them the
optimal choice for weather scenarios. X-Plane was chosen for the current study based on its
advanced capabilities to design and manipulate weather during flight scenarios, its graphical
realism, and widespread use by aviator and throughout the aviation simulation community.
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5.3: Questionnaires
Pilots
Questionnaires will be administered both pre- and post-flight for pilots using an
online survey tool, surveymonkey.com. Questionnaires were chosen to represent a wide
range of factors that can affect the pilot, including demographic information and flight
experience (Appendix A), and knowledge of weather conditions, previous accident
involvement, risk taking behavior, decision making during flight scenarios, and assertiveness
(Appendix B). A debriefing was conducted once the experiment and experimental
questionnaires had be finished, and included questions pertaining to the effectiveness of the
scenario, including both the simulator and passenger (Appendix C).
The first pre-flight questionnaire for the pilots, the demographic questionnaire,
contained questions to determine the age, sex, and flight experience of the pilot. The flight
experience variables include total flight hours, cross-country hours, instrument hours, recent
flight hours, and certificates and ratings. Post-experimental questionnaires included
questions pertaining to pilots’ knowledge of weather conditions, determined through the use
of ten weather photographs that represent a wide range of weather conditions, and had been
used during previous research on the use of weather cues in an adverse weather scenario
(Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003a).
Risk taking behavior was measured using two scales. The first measured risk by
previous risk taking behavior, and the second and third measured the pilots’ agreement with
hazardous thought patterns characteristic of risky behavior, and their opinion of their own
likelihood of being involved in an accident. The Study of Accidents and Incidents measured
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previous incident and accident involvement (O’Hare, obtained by request). This
questionnaire asks the pilot questions concerning their previous involvement in a wide range
of risky situations, from how many times they have been forced to make a precautionary
landing to how many times they have flown into IMC without an IFR flight plan. The
Aviation Safety Attitude Scale (Hunter, 1995 & 2005) consists of a total of 27 questions.
This scale assessed the pilots’ level of risk taking using statements such as “I like to practice
stalls,” and “If I had an accident, it would be the result of bad luck.” This questionnaire
consists of simple declarative statements that utilize a Likert scale to indicate agreement with
the statement on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale. Ten of the questions
focused on the hazardous attitudes of pilots, and the remaining focused on the risks of
aviation, the probability of being involved in an accident, and the pilot’s perception of their
own skill level.
Decision making was evaluated through the use of the Federal Aeronautical Decision
Making/Judgment Questionnaire (Driskill, Weismuller, Quebe, Hand, & Hunter, 1998).
This questionnaire consists of 51 short scenario descriptions, with four options that the pilot
ranked from the best to worst case outcomes. This study tested “expert” versus “novice”
pilots (less than 500 hours), but only found significant differences between the two groups
on seven of the questions. Saxton (2008) implemented the same questionnaire in her study
that experimentally explored financial incentive and pilot investment in the flight (i.e., sunk
cost theory). She found significance in two of the four questions that were analyzed for
differences. Due to the large number of items in the original study, only those questions that
showed significant results in the previously mentioned studies were included in the current
study.
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The assertiveness scale by Lorr & More (1980) was the result of a review of a
number of the most widely used and respected assertiveness scales to determine any
commonalities that might exist between their methods of measuring assertiveness. The
authors correlated a number of statements, such as “it’s easy for me to make small talk with
people I’ve just met,” or “If I’ve been shortchanged, I go back and complain,” with other
statements and a number of constructs, or types of assertiveness. From these results, the
authors concluded that there were four main types of assertiveness: directiveness, social
assertiveness, defense of rights and interests, and independence. The final questionnaire
included a total of 24 questions, which represent the eight highest correlated statements on
each of the four main types of assertiveness.
Once the simulation is stopped and the accurate consent form is given, the pilots will
be given a debriefing based in part on the debriefing used in Knecht et al (2008). This study
focused on the importance of financial incentive during a pilots’ pre-flight go/no go
decision, and asked the pilot questions regarding the impact of the scenario, the different
weather conditions, and the financial incentive. The questionnaire was updated to reflect the
effect of social pressure on the pilot rather than financial incentive. Additional questions
were added to determine the pilots’ experience with simulation in general, with Microsoft
Flight Simulator X, and with video games.

Passengers
Passengers will be given the same assertiveness scale by Lorr & More (1980) prior to
the beginning of the experiment. Additionally, passengers will be given a passenger debrief
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at the conclusion of each trial. The majority of the questionnaire will pertain to the 30 trials
where persuasion is being investigated, but will also contain general questions that relate to
the two non-persuasion conditions. The questions will focus on the effectiveness of their
persuasive message, and their performance in comparison to previous trials. This participant
debriefing can be used in part to determine any differences that might occur due to the
passengers’ increased familiarity with both the experiment and the persuasion condition.

5.4: Design
The present study consisted of three experimental conditions. The pilots are told
that the primary purpose of the experiment is to understand the role of pilot experience
during a simulated VFR cross-country flight. The secondary goal is to determine how a
passenger gains information about aviation during a simulated flight (in order to describe the
presence of the passenger). The first condition will consist of a pilot with a non-incentivized
passenger in the cockpit (baseline/non-incentive condition). This condition will consist of a
passenger who will not attempt to persuade the pilot to either continue or divert from the
planned route. This condition will be used to determine the percentage of time that pilots
will typically enter IMC in this particular adverse weather scenario, and can be used as a
comparison for the additional two conditions. The second condition will consist of a pilot
with a passenger who encourages the pilot continues through the weather past the optimal
decision point (positive incentive condition). This condition will consist of a scenario
whereby the pilot has to fly the passenger to a job interview that afternoon in Richmond,
VA. This incentive condition will create a plausible explanation for the reason for the
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passenger to pressure the pilot to continue through the weather. The third condition will
consist of a passenger who encourages the pilot to deviate from the planned route to a safer
course of action, either to an alternate airport or to the departure airport (negative incentive
condition). The scenario for this condition is the same as the baseline condition, with the
addition of a nervous passenger without prior experience in a small GA plane. This
incentive condition will create a scenario that places pressure on the pilot in order to
encourage them to divert from the adverse weather.

5.5: Procedure
The procedure for the experiment is depicted visually in figure 16. There is a
different scenario for the pilot and passenger. Both of the scenarios are described below by
participant type.
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Pilots

Passengers

Pre-experiment:
• Consent form: modified purpose of experiment
• Pre-flight planning: Weather briefing, Sectional
charts, C172 and G430 Manuals
• Introduction to flight simulator

Pre-experiment:
• Demographic information*
• Assertiveness scale*
• Instructions about experimental condition

Experiment
• Experimental flight

Experiment
• Experimental flight

Post-experiment:
• Consent form: true purpose of experiment
• Debriefing and post-experimental questionnaires
• Payment reimbursement forms
• Payment Options

Post-experiment:
• Debriefing Questionnaire

* Completed only once

Figure 16: Experimental Protocol

Pilots
During the pilot’s scheduled appointment, the pilot will arrive at the Human Factors
Laboratory and read over the consent form, which describes the purpose of the study,
including risks or discomforts, potential benefits, and contact information for the
experimenters and the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The experimenter will discuss the
informed consent with the pilot to ensure that the pilot understands and agrees with all the
information and requirements of the study. The description of the study in the consent
form will differ from the true purpose of the study. During this stage in the experiment, the
pilot will receive the first consent form (Appendix F) detailing an experiment with a fictional
purpose.
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Once the pilot understands the consent form and any questions concerning the
experiment are answered, the pilot will begin the pre-flight process. The pilot will be given
the weather briefing (Appendix H), the applicable sectional charts, the manual that includes
the operating instructions for the Cessna 172 Skyhawk (Cessna, 1971), and the applicable
sections for the Garmin 430 GPS manual (Garmin, 2009; Introduction, Navigation, and
Direct-to Navigation sections). The Cessna 172 was chosen due to its widespread use by
GA pilots, during GA training, and because many of the pilots in the study may not be
familiar with more technologically advanced aircraft. Similarly, the Garmin 430 is a basic
GPS model that allows the pilot basic navigational functions without the added complexity
of more advanced models.
After the pilot has familiarized himself with the pre-flight information, they will be
given an overview of the weather briefing and operating conditions for the Cessna 172.
They will be introduced to the flight simulator and given a brief explanation on both the use
of the simulator, and the Cessna 172 and its equipment. They will be instructed that even
though a passenger is present during the flight, that they should treat the flight as their first
priority, as they would any other flight.
Once the pilot has indicated they are ready to begin, the pilot will start their flight on
the runway at North Central West Virginia Airport (KCKB). As previously described, the
scenario will consist of lowering ceilings, reduced visibility and rising terrain. Rising terrain
is found at two location during the flight, between the first and second airports, and again
(but slightly less so) between the second and third airports where MVFR is encountered.
The pilot will then be exposed to one of the three experimental conditions (5.5: Design).
The flight will be concluded by one of a few potential outcomes. The optimal decision is for
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the pilot to perform a change in direction in order to land at the departure airport or to
divert to an alternate airport. The other undesirable outcome, from a flight safety
standpoint, includes continuing into adverse weather, which may lead the pilot to crash the
aircraft. The optimal decision point for the pilot to divert is prior to the pilot entering IFR
conditions, sometime either before or shortly after marginal conditions (MVFR) are
encountered. The pilot will be allowed to continue through the flight scenario until they
either divert from the flight plan or crash the aircraft.
At the conclusion of the experiment, the pilot will be told the true purpose of the
study and given the accurate consent form (Appendix F). At this point the pilot may wish to
exclude their data from the study (as required by Clemson’s IRB). If the pilot chooses to
continue with the study, the pilot will complete the debriefing form and is asked to provide
any feedback regarding the experiment and flight simulation. They will then be given the
debriefing and experimental questionnaires using an online survey tool, surveymonkey.com.
The pilot will complete the paperwork to financially compensate them for participating in
the study.

Passengers
Passengers will be given the pre-experimental questionnaire (Appendix C) prior to
any experimental involvement. These forms will be kept on file for all future trials. Their
version of the pre-experimental questionnaire will consist of questions concerning the
passengers demographic information in addition to the assertiveness scale by Lorr & More
(1980), as previously discussed in section 5.3. The passenger will be introduced to the pilot
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once the pilot has completed their pre-flight briefing and has been introduced to the flight
simulator. During the flight, the passenger will converse with the pilot, and additionally will
remain silent concerning the flight and the weather conditions, or will persuade the pilot to
continue or divert from the adverse weather (Section 5.4). Either the passenger will be given
instructions to remain silent concerning the weather conditions (baseline/ non-incentive
condition), to encourage the pilot to continue through the weather (positive incentive
condition), or to encourage the pilot to remain safe and divert from the flight plan (negative
incentive condition). The passenger will participate in the baseline condition prior to
participating in any of the incentive conditions in order to become familiar with both the
weather simulation and their expected role in the weather simulation. The participant will
complete the incentive conditions only once they have expressed their comfort with the
baseline condition and their understanding of what is expected during the incentive
conditions. Both passengers will be given suggestions and examples for how to persuade the
pilot during each of the incentive conditions, but no script will be given for exact phrasing of
the persuasive message. After each experimental trial, the passenger will complete an online
debriefing using surveymonkey.com to determine their comfort with the simulation program
and condition, their perceived effectiveness, and any additional comments that they feel
would be helpful when interpreting the data.

5.6 Analysis of Data
A visual representation of the variables of interest for the current study are located in
figure 17. This diagram shows the primary focus of the present study, the effect of different
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types of persuasion on the pilot in an adverse weather simulation. A secondary focus of the
study is the interaction between expertise and persuasion. These two main variables of
interest will be investigated to determine their effect on an adverse weather simulation by
looking at the continue/divert decision using distance into the weather. Supplementary
variables of interest that are predicted to contribute to this decision will be investigated using
questionnaires (risk taking, assertiveness, experience). These variables of interest are listed
in. The method of analysis used to determine the significance of each variable of interest is
given below, with a significance value of .05 used as the cutoff value for significance in the
current study.

Experience

Persuasion

Total Flight Time
Cross Country Flight Hrs.
Instrument Time/Rating
Other Certificates and
Ratings

Time-pressured passenger
Safety-oriented passenger
Silent passenger

Risk perception
& tolerance

Decision Making

Continue/Divert Decision
Assertiveness

• Distance into weather

Knowledge of
weather cues

Figure 17: Visual Pictoral of Variables of Interest
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Table 7: Listing of Variables of Interest

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

Persuasion

Continue/Divert Decision

Baseline/non-incentive

Distance into weather

Positive incentive
Negative incentive

Questionnaires
Pilot knowledge of weather

Experience

Weather Photographs

Total hours

Risk Perception/Tolerance

Cross-country hours

Study of accidents and incidents

Instrument hours

New Hazard Assessment Scale

Instrument rating

Aviation Safety Attitude Scale

Certificates and Rating
Recent flight hours

Decision Making
Federal Aeronautical Decision Making/Judgment
Assertiveness
Debriefing
Effectiveness of study

Variables of Interest
The main focus of the study is the effect of persuasion on the pilot in a weather
decision making task. Therefore, the independent variable is the persuasion condition (nonincentive, positive incentive, negative incentive), and the dependent variable is the distance
into the weather before diverting. Secondary variables of interest are the measures of pilot
experience, (total flight hours, cross country flight hours, certificates and ratings, etcetera),
pilot knowledge of weather conditions (photographs), previous accident involvement, hazard
assessment, decision making, and assertiveness.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS

Data from 45 participants were collected for the three incentive conditions: negative
incentive (N=14), baseline or non-incentive (N=16), and the positive incentive (N=15)
conditions. This data was analyzed using SPSS statistical software in three ways. First, the
three incentive conditions were compared to determine if differences existed for time into
the weather prior to either diverting or crashing. Second, distance into the weather was used
to determine if differences existed between pilots who flew further versus diverted early.
Third, pilot experience in the form of both VFR and IFR flight hours was used to determine
differences for secondary measures of interest.

6.1 Incentive Condition
The average distance into the weather prior to turning around or diverting differed
by incentive category. As was predicted, the ‘negative incentive’ condition continued an
average of 32.3 statute miles (median=29.3), the ‘baseline’ condition an average of 46.8
statute miles (median=41.2), and the ‘positive incentive’ condition an average of 67.5 statute
miles (median=72.7). Tests to determine if these values were significantly different typically
require both the equality of variances and normality of the data. To determine the equality
of variances between the three incentive conditions, Levene’s test was performed. This test
indicated that the variances were not significantly different (p<.05). The Shapiro-Wilk test
was used to determine if the data represented a normal distribution, and if outliers were
present in the data. This statistical test was chosen due to the smaller sample size
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requirements for the test. Results from both this test (using p<.05 for significance) and the
box plot below, indicate that there was one outlier in the ‘negative incentive’ condition,
which can be seen in the top left side of the graph in Figure 18. This outlier was then
excluded from the data set and no additional outliers were found.

Figure 18: Boxplot to test for Outliers

As can be noted from Figure 18, the upper range for the baseline condition is large,
mainly due to the presence of two pilots who had flown significantly farther than the other
pilots in the group (Figure 19; see Appendix J for sectional map with final distance noted).
The differences between the spread of the data by incentive condition, particularly in the
baseline condition, indicate a potentially non-normal distribution. Therefore, a
nonparametric statistic, the Kruskal-Wallis will be used to test for significance. Rather than
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using means to test for significance, this test uses ranked data to determine significance
between groups.

Figure 19: Incentive Condition by Distance into the Weather Distribution

Although the results from the Shapiro-Wilk test indicate no additional outliers in the
data set after the outlier had been excluded, the data still did not appear to be normal. As a
general rule, tests for normality are generally more reliable with larger sample sizes.
Therefore, histograms for each incentive were created to us a visual, and additional, measure
of normality. The histograms have an overlay of the normality curve (Figure 20) to show the
difference between a normal distribution and the distribution of the current dataset.
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Histogram for Negative Incentive Condition

Histogram for Non-Incentive Condition

Histogram for Positive Incentive Condition

Figure 20: Incentive Condition by Distance into the Weather: Histogram with Normality Curve (In
order from left to right: Negative Incentive, Non Incentive, Positive Incentive)

With the outlier excluded, the differences between the three incentive conditions
remained consistent with the trend previously mentioned. An updated version of the data
can be seen in figure 21 below. This graph shows that the average distance the pilots
continued into the weather varied by incentive condition. The pilots in the ‘negative
incentive’ condition were generally among the first to divert (as previously noted with the
full sample), on average, 27.9 miles (median=26.6). This number can be compared to the
‘non-incentive’ and ‘positive incentive’ conditions, who diverted at an average of 46.7
(median=41.2) and 67.5 miles (median=72.7), respectively. The differences between the
three incentive conditions were statistically significant. Post-hoc tests indicated that the
differences between the ‘negative incentive’ and ‘positive incentive’ conditions were
statistically significant (p<.05), and the ‘baseline’ and ‘positive incentive’ conditions were
statistically significant (p<.05). The difference between the negative and positive incentive
conditions was not statistically significant, but approached significance (p<.10).
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Figure 21: Incentive Condition Average Distance into the Weather (outlier excluded)

Weather Sources Usage
On average, pilots use 4.5 sources of pre-flight weather information. Most
frequently these sources include Flight Service Station (FSS, 80%), the Weather Channel
(68%), Direct User Access Terminal (DUATS, 64%), and the National Oceanic &
Atmospheric Administration (NWS, 61%). Least frequently used are Pilots Automated
Telephone Weather Service (PATWS, 15%), other pilots (18%), and commercial vendors
(19%). Pilots also varied widely in their categorizations of weather conditions. As can be
seen in table 8, in several of the photographs the estimations varied widely based on
category, and all but one photograph was represented by each weather classification type.
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Table 8: Weather Photograph Responses

Photograph 1
Photograph 2
Photograph 3
Photograph 4
Photograph 5
Photograph 6
Photograph 7
Photograph 8
Photograph 9
Photograph 10

VFR
39%
44%
20%
35%
45%
0%
41%
84%
32%
18%

MVFR
52%
49%
48%
12%
9%
41%
45%
14%
52%
63%

IFR
9%
7%
32%
53%
45%
59%
14%
3%
16%
19%

Involvement in Accidents and Incidents
Pilots had been involved in an average of .15 accidents (range: 0-3), had flown into
IMC when not on an instrument plan an average of .8 times (range: 0-6), and turned back or
diverted due to weather an average of 2.5 times (range: 0-6).
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6.2 Distance into the Weather
In order to determine if there were differences between pilots who diverted either
early versus late, Spearman’s rho correlation was used to determine if pilot differed based on
their distance into the weather. Spearman’s is similar to other nonparametric tests and uses
ranked data rather than means, accounting for non-normal data distributions. Correlation
analyses were performed for all demographic, flight experience, and questionnaire data.
Additionally, Chi squared was used to test nominal data.

Demographic and Flight Experience
The basic demographic information, including age, gender (all males), and location of
flight training were all non-significant based on the correlation analyses. Data split based on
distance into the weather (bottom 33%, average/middle 33%, and high/top 33% for each
incentive category) indicated a trend for several measures. The private pilot’s license was
found in increasing numbers as pilots continued into the weather further, denoting the
absence of more advanced licensure (see Table 9). The measures for VFR, cross country,
and pilot in command hours did not exhibit any noticeable trend. No trends could be found
for measures of recent flight time, the 90 days VFR flight hours were included in the table
for general reference. The instrument rating was highest for the pilots who continued the
furthest into the weather, and instrument time, including actual, simulated, and total
increased over the three conditions.
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Table 9: Median Instrument Flight Hours and Licensure for Three Distance Conditions
Shortest

Average

Furthest

VFR hours

890

236

530

Private Pilots License

47%

57%

73%

VFR hours: past 90 days

14 hr.

8.7 hr.

18 hr.

Instrument Rating

40%

36%

67%

IFR actual hours

3 hr.

5 hr.

20 hr.

IFR simulated hours

30 hr.

33.5 hr.

55 hr.

IFR total hours

33 hr.

48 hr.

84 hr.

Distance into weather

21.9 sm

42.8 sm

73.6 sm

Flying Information
No differences were found between the type of aircraft typically flown
(primary/secondary aircraft) and how far the pilot continued into the weather. The aircraft
were then categorized according to type (recreational: Cessna 172 and similar varieties,
technically advanced aircraft, experimental, homebuilt, cargo/passenger), but no significant
differences or tends were noted. Experience with the Cessna 172 was also not significant.
The type of flying the pilot did (recreational, training, commercial, self transport, etcetera)
only found one significant difference, self transport flying increased with time into the
weather (r=.461).

Weather Sources Usage and Knowledge
Pilots were asked to indicate which pre-flight sources of weather information they
used regularly. A significant negative correlation was found for the use of TWB (r=-.271)
and the number of weather vendors used (r=-.289) for distance into weather, indicating a
decreased usage of TWB and less weather sources overall as distance into the weather

134

increased. The visibility and cloud ceiling personal minimums, and the variation in these
minimums were found to be non-significant and without any trends.
Pilots were asked to indicate a weather classification and comfort rating for a series
of ten photographs of varying weather conditions. Comfort ratings for all but photograph 1
were non significant, indicating an increase in comfort with photograph 1 associated with an
increase in distance into weather (r=.299). Upon completion of the study, pilots were asked
to estimate their distance from the destination and give a comfort rating at the time the
simulation was stopped. These values were not significant nor displayed any trends.

Simulator Usage and Comfort
Measures for prior use of X-Plane or other simulation software did not differ based
on distance condition. The pilot’s familiarity with the area and/or route was not significant.
The willingness of the pilot to continue through the weather due to it being a simulation and
not reality was positively correlated with distance into the weather (r=.362). This finding
indicates that the effect of the simulation was correlated with distance into the scenario.

Passenger Influence and Experience
Each pilot was asked to denote their total time spent flying with passengers, and the
percentage of time spent with each of a number of different types of passengers. Both the
total number of hours spent with passengers and the type of passenger did not exhibit
significance or trends. Questions asking the pilot to indicate the influence of the promptings
from the passenger were also not significant.
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Questionnaires
The questionnaires used to determine pilots attitudes toward themselves and risk
taking found two statistically significant differences. The first statement, “Aviation weather
forecasts are usually accurate” was negatively correlated with a decreased distance into the
weather (r=-.353). A second statement, “I know how to get help from ATC if I get into
trouble,” was also negatively correlated with distance into the weather (r= -.392). This
indicates that as distance into the weather increases, agreements with these statements
decrease.
The Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) Questionnaire found a number of
significant differences between the rankings of options for the scenarios. The first question
reaching significance (Table 11) is related to the rankings from the scenario involving ATC.
Significance was found for the correlation between the first option, “You are cutting it too
close and elect to proceed to your alternate,” as the first and fourth ratings. Therefore, as
distance into the weather increased, this option was rated more frequently as either the first
or fourth (last) option by pilots. Additional scenarios that were significantly correlated with
distance into the weather include engine problems, health problems prior to flight, safe plane
characteristics, and ground fog forming during a flight. Measures of assertiveness were
found to be nonsignificant for all questions except, “I’ll take a drink (or smoke tobacco or
pot) when out with a group even though I really don’t want to,” (r=.333). Agreement with
this statement was correlated with increased distance into the weather scenario prior to
diverting.
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Table 10: Correlations for Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) Questions for Distance into the Weather
r=
Scenario and Option (Significant numbered ranking is noted)
After holding for 15 minutes you elect to proceed to your alternate, which is 45 minutes away and is reporting VMC. You receive a
clearance and depart that hold. ATC calls you 15 minutes after you leave the hold to tell you that Approach has an open slot and
could take you now if you would like to return.
You are cutting it too close and elect to proceed to your alternate -1 / 4
0.332 / 0.345
You ask for vectors to a closer airport - 1
0.323
You ask ATC to stand-by while you review the situation and your status before making a final decision – 1 / 4
-0.364/0.338
You are cruising at 4500 feet on top of a thin haze layer with the outside air temperature at 65 degrees. It has been twenty-five hours
since the engine was overhauled and the run-up check was well within limits. The engine slowly loses RPM with no indications of oil
or fuel problems. You suspect carburetor icing and pull on the carb heat. The engine backfires, vibrates and loses RPM fast. You
decide to:
Pull out the mixture, stop the engine and check the fuel selector valve, mag switch settings and declare an emergency. - 2
-0.371
Push in the carb heat, keep the engine running and divert to the closest airfield. – 2 / 3
-0.31/0.311
Keep the carb heat on and see what happens. - 2
0.314
Push in the carb heat, keep the engine at idle, declare an emergency and ask for advice. - 4
0.313
You have paid for and been planning this flight to the Lodge Resort at the Lake for six months. The weather is forecast good VFR
with a summer haze under 3000 feet and broken scattered clouds along the route of flight. The only problem is you know you have a
minor summer cold. You can clear your ears and only feel a little achy with no headache. You decide to:
Stick a menthol inhaler in your pocket, take no other medication and go. - 2
-0.484
You are looking for 172s to rent. You have decided the most important thing to look for in a rental plane is:
A clean engine with clean oil. - 3

-0.332

Smooth skin, no dents or dings. – 2 / 3
-.366 /-0.348
It had rained all day, but the font pushed south of you and cleared the skies. You are out with two friends on a sight seeing trip to the
hills 40 miles away and plan to be back before dark. With sunset still an hour away you notice ground fog beginning to form. You
decide to:
Call Flight Watch and cruise back home. - 3
0.384
Call on your home airfield’s CATF to see if anyone is there and can tell you what the weather is doing. - 4
-0.333
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6.3 Experience Factors
To determine the effect of experience, two main measures of experience were
correlated with the data, VFR and IFR hours. VFR flight hours were used rather than time
since receiving pilot license due to several pilots who had received their pilot’s license
decades earlier without a large number of total or recent flight hours. Therefore, VFR hours
were more representative of experience. These measures were then correlated with the data
using Spearman’s rho. Nominal data was analyzed using Chi-squared.

Demographics and Flight Experience
As would be expected, flight experience variables were highly correlated with the
majority of other flight experience variables. More specifically, VFR and IFR hours were
positively correlated with one another, as were VFR and IFR hours with Pilot in Command
hours, IFR hours (actual, simulated, total), cross-country hours, and a commercial pilot’s
license. VFR hours were positively correlated with recent VFR time (30, 60, 90 days), as was
IFR hours and recent IFR time (30, 60, 90). Interestingly, having a PPL was negatively
correlated with both VFR and IFR hours. Additionally, an instrument rating was not
significantly correlated, either positively or negatively, with either VFR or IFR flight hours.

Flying Information
Flight type (self-transport, recreation, etcetera) was correlated with both VFR and
IFR flight hours (Table 11). More specifically, VFR hours were negatively correlated with
self transport (r=-.268) and recreational activities (r=-.279), and positively correlated with
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agricultural/aerial work (r=.305). IFR hours were negatively correlated with self-transport
(r=-.356), and positively correlated with agricultural/aerial work (r=.372). Interestingly,
negative correlations were associated with both VFR and IFR hours with self-transport and
positively associated with agricultural/aerial work.

Table 11: Correlations for Flight Type and VFR and IFR Hours

VFR hours
Check which of the following categories best describe your current flying activities: SelfTransport
Check which of the following categories best describe your current flying activities:
Recreational Activities
Check which of the following categories best describe your current flying activities:
Agricultural/Aerial Work
IFR hours
Check which of the following categories best describe your current flying activities: SelfTransport
Check which of the following categories best describe your current flying activities:
Agricultural/Aerial Work

r=
-0.268
-0.279
0.305

-0.356
0.372

Weather Sources Usage and Knowledge
For VFR flight hours, the use of both TWB (r= .0351) and EFAS (r=.331) were
correlated with increased VFR flight hours. Correlations between IFR flight hours and the
use of DUATS (r=-.301) and PATWAS (r=.329) was significant. DUATS usage decreased
with an increase in flight hours and PAWAS usage increased with IFR flight hours.
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Table 12: Correlations for Weather Providers and VFR and IFR Hours

VFR hours
What weather providers do you typically use? Transcribed Weather Broadcast (TWB)
What weather providers do you typically use? Pilots Automated Telephone Weather
Answering Service (PATWAS)
What weather providers do you typically use? Enroute Flight Advisory Service (EFAS)
IFR hours
What weather providers do you typically use? Direct User Access Terminal (DUATS)
What weather providers do you typically use? Pilots Automated Telephone Weather
Answering Service (PATWAS)

r=
0.351
0.325
0.331
-0.301
0.329

The personal minimums for visibility and cloud ceiling were only significant for IFR
visibility conditions (r=-.355), indicating that visibility minimums decreased as IFR hours
increased. The categorizations for weather type were nonsignificant. The comfort ratings
(1-10 scale) for the weather photographs showed one significant finding for photograph 8
for IFR flight hours (r=-.394), indicating that comfort decreased as IFR hours increased.

Passenger Influence and Experience
Pilots were asked to indicate if they had interactions with passengers when they flew,
and if so, with what type of passenger(s). As can be seen in table 13, significant correlations
for VFR flight hours were percentage of time spent with a family member (r=-.311), and
percentage of time spent with a flight instructor (r=-.404). The correlations indicate that as
VFR flight hours increase, time spent with passengers who are family members or flight
instructors decrease. Significant correlations with IFR flight hours are percentage of time
with passengers who are friends (r=-.299), flight instructors (r=-.307), or none of the
categories (r=.372). This correlation indicates that as IFR flight hours increase, percentage
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of time with passengers who are friends or flight instructors decreases, and time spent with
“other” passengers increase.

Table 13: Correlations for Passenger Type and VFR and IFR Hours

VFR hours
What percentage of time spent with passengers onboard is with a family member
who is not a spouse?
What percentage of time spent with passengers onboard is with flight instructors?
IFR hours
What percentage of time spent with passengers onboard is with friends?
What percentage of time spent with passengers onboard is with flight instructors?
What percentage of time spent with passengers onboard is with none of the
previous categories?

r=
-0.311
-0.404
-0.299
-0.307
0.372

The questionnaire asking if behavior would change due to the presence of different
types of passengers found two significant differences. Less experienced pilots noted that if
the passenger had been a family member this would have resulted in a decrease in their
willingness to continue through the weather, as compared to more experienced pilots who
would not have changed their behavior. A similar trend was found for the same type of
question involving a significant other or spouse, the less experience pilots said that their
presence would result in a decreased willingness to continue, as compared to the more
experienced pilots who stated it would not make a difference.
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Table 14: Correlations for Questionnaire: Type of Passenger and VFR and IFR Hours

VFR hours
If your passenger had been a family member, would that have changed your willingness
to continue through the weather? (Increase/Decrease/No change)
If your passenger had been a significant other or spouse, would that have changed your
willingness to continue through the weather? (Increase/Decrease/No change)

r=
0.362

Did the fact that this was a simulation (and not reality) affect your willingness to continue
through the weather? (Increase/Decrease/No change)
IFR hours
If your passenger had been a significant other or spouse, would that have changed your
willingness to continue through the weather? (Increase/Decrease/No change)

-0.49

If your flight mission had been critical (for example, delivering a human heart for
surgery), would that change your willingness to continue through the weather?
(Increase/Decrease/No change)
Did the fact that this was a simulation (and not reality) affect your willingness to continue
through the weather? (Increase/Decrease/No change)

0.406

0.308
-0.309

-0.438

Simulator Usage and Comfort
A negative correlation was found for previous use of X-Plane and/or other
simulation technologies for both VFR (r=-.34) and IFR (r=-.328) flight hours. Pilots with
less flight hours used simulation more frequently. No significant differences were found in
the percentage of pilots familiar with the route or area. The self-assessment of the impact of
the simulator on technology was negatively correlated to both VFR (r=-.49) and IFR (r=.438) flight hours. This indicates that pilots with more flight experience were less impacted
by the use of the technology. The explanation of not being able to get injured was agreed
with more frequently by those pilots with less experience, than those pilots with higher levels
of experience.
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Questionnaires
Questions pertaining to previous accident/incident involvement found a significant
difference for several questions for both VFR and IFR hours. All statements were
associated with positive correlations, indicating an increase in VFR and/or IFR hours with
an increase in the number of incidents and/or accidents (Table 15).

Table 15: Correlations for Accident and Incident Involvement for VFR and IFR Hours

VFR hours
How many times have you run so low on fuel that you were seriously concerned about
making it to an airport before you ran out?
How many times have you made a precautionary or forced landing at an airport other than
your original destination?
How many times have you made a precautionary or forced landing away from an airport?
How many times have you had a mechanical failure which jeopardized the safety of your
flight?
How many times have you flown into areas of instrument meteorological conditions, when
you were not on an instrument flight plan?
How many times have you turned back or diverted to another airport because of bad weather
while on a VFR flight?
IFR hours
How many aircraft accidents have you been in (as a flight crew member)?
How many times have you run so low on fuel that you were seriously concerned about
making it to an airport before you ran out?
How many times have you made a precautionary or forced landing at an airport other than
your original destination?
How many times have you had a mechanical failure which jeopardized the safety of your
flight?
How many times have you turned back or diverted to another airport because of bad weather
while on a VFR flight?

r=
0.439
0.684
0.329
0.605
0.314
0.569

0.303
0.392
0.557
0.533
0.462

Questions pertaining to the agreement with aviation statements indicate that as pilots
gain VFR and IFR flight hours, experience can be found in the assessment of their ability to
deal with stress, maintain proficiency, knowledge of aircraft, and of being cautious, capable,
and careful (Table 16).
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Table 16: Correlations for Aviation Safety Attitude Scale for VFR and IFR Hours

VFR hours
I would duck below minimums to get home
I am capable of instrument flight
I am a very careful pilot
I am a very capable pilot
I am very skillful on controls.
I know aviation procedures very well.
I deal with stress very well.
I have a thorough knowledge of my aircraft.
I am a very cautious pilot.
I find it easy to understand the weather information I get before flights.
I fly enough to maintain my proficiency.
I know how to get help from ATC if I get into trouble.
There are very few situations I couldn’t get out of.
I often feel stressed when flying in/near weather.
IFR hours
I am capable of instrument flight
I am a very capable pilot
I am very skillful on controls.
I know aviation procedures very well.
I deal with stress very well.
I have a thorough knowledge of my aircraft.
I find it easy to understand the weather information I get before flights.
I fly enough to maintain my proficiency.
I know how to get help from ATC if I get into trouble.
There are very few situations I couldn’t get out of.
I often feel stressed when flying in/near weather.

-0.311
0.753
0.389
0.626
0.709
0.814
0.647
0.327
0.382
0.47
0.336
0.317
0.399
-0.453
0.8
0.582
0.709
0.814
0.647
0.325
0.401
0.367
0.307
0.475
-0.369

Significant decision scenarios include examples of engine problems, taxiing
passengers around the runway, and holding for a vector approach. The decision scenarios
and ratings of options are given in Table 17. The assertiveness questionnaire was used to
determine if differences in assertiveness exist between pilots of different experience levels.
Only one statement was significant for either VFR or IFR flight hours. The statement,
“When a friend borrows something of value to me and returns it damaged I don’t say
anything,” was positively correlated (r=.523) with IFR flight hours.
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Table 17: Correlations for Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) Questions for VFR and IFR Hours

VFR hours
r=
You are cruising at 4500 feet on top of a thin haze layer with the outside air temperature at 65 degrees. It has been twenty-five hours
since the engine was overhauled and the run-up check was well within limits. The engine slowly loses RPM with no indications of oil
or fuel problems. You suspect carburetor icing and pull on the carb heat. The engine backfires, vibrates and loses RPM fast. You
decide to:
Push in the carb heat, keep the engine at idle, declare an emergency and ask for advice. – 3
0.425
Push in the carb heat, keep the engine at idle, declare an emergency and ask for advice. - 4
-0.365
Bad weather forced you to cancel flying your boss into another city where he is to address a convention. There are openings
on a flight going to the same city departing from the airline terminal on the other side of the airport in 15 minutes. It will take
too long to call a taxi so he asks you to run him over to the terminal in the 172. You decide to:
Say you’re sorry but it is illegal for you to deliver passengers to the back side of the terminal and help find a ride through the FBO. - 2
-0.315
En route weather to the fuel stop. - 3
0.342
Weather at the final destination. - 1
0.362
IFR hours
After holding for 15 minutes you elect to proceed to your alternate, which is 45 minutes away and is reporting VMC. You receive a
clearance and depart that hold. ATC calls you 15 minutes after you leave the hold to tell you that Approach has an open slot and could
take you now if you would like to return.
You accept the offer and are given a vector for the approach - 2
-0.341
You accept the offer and are given a vector for the approach - 4
0.348
Keep the carb heat on and see what happens. - 1
0.306
Push in the carb heat, keep the engine at idle, declare an emergency and ask for advice. - 3
0.401
Bad weather forced you to cancel flying your boss into another city where he is to address a convention. There are openings on a flight
going to the same city departing from the airline terminal on the other side of the airport in 15 minutes. It will take too long to call a
taxi so he asks you to run him over to the terminal in the 172. You decide to:
Say you’re sorry but it is illegal for you to deliver passengers to the back side of the terminal and help find a ride through the FBO. - 2
-0.39
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of passenger influence during a
VFR into IMC scenario. Previous research in social psychology, flight crew interactions, and
analyses of accident statistics have suggested that passenger influence does play a role in pilot
decision making. This study extended those theories and findings to an experimental setting
where the impact of passenger influence on the pilot’s distance into the weather was
measured. Results conclude that the distance the pilot continued into the weather for
positively motivated pilots (persuaded to continue) increased, and decreased for the pilots
who were negatively motivated (persuaded to divert). What is key is that these findings
occurred in a low-tech desktop simulator, without many of the features present during real
flight, including motion, high-fidelity graphics, or the threats to safety. Due to, and
particularly given the presence of these limitations, these results provide additional support
for the conclusion that passenger influence does impact pilot decision making during a VFR
into IMC scenario.
In order to gain additional insight into why certain individuals might be more
susceptible to passenger influence than others, a series of questionnaires and surveys were
used to measure a wide range of factors previously thought to influence pilots during VFR
into IMC situations. Differences in pilot skill, licensure, flight time, and age were used to
determine their impact on pilot behavior. Although not significant, a clear increase in
instrument time and instrument ratings were found for pilots who had continued further
into the weather. Additionally, the percentage of pilots with a private pilots license
increased, and the number of more advanced licenses (e.g., commercial and ATP) decreased.
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These findings can be summarized into two findings. First, private pilots with instrument
ratings are continuing further than either the low time VFR pilots or the high time
commercial and/or ATP pilots. Second, these findings are compounded by the lack of
significance based on experience for the weather photographs, leading to the conclusion that
lack of knowledge of weather conditions was not an issue for the pilots in the current study.
These results are contrary to what had previously been found in VFR into IMC accident
analyses and simulator studies, that the pilots involved in these accidents are mainly low time
VFR pilots with no instrument rating, and an inadequate knowledge of weather conditions.
Therefore, unlike the previously discussed studies that supported lack of expertise as the
cause of these accidents (e.g., situation assessment), results from the current study show
support for a motivationally based theory of passenger influence. Questionnaires intended
to determine support for this conclusion were generally nonsignificant, non-predictive, and
inadequate for determining differences in pilot decision making. These findings are
unfortunately consistent with previous studies measuring motivation in aviators (e.g.,
Knecht, Harris, & Shappell, 2003).
One nonsignificant finding that was particularly revealing was the finding from a
question used to determine the impact of the experimental condition on the pilot. The
nonsignificant responses and a lack of data trend for the distance into the weather indicates
that the pilots were unaware of the impact of the passenger on their decision to either
continue or divert during the experimental scenario. The lack of awareness of the influence
of the passenger pressure, the significant differences between the incentive conditions, and
the experimental setting lacking the consequences of actual flight, leads to a problematic
situation worthy of future investigations.
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Anecdotal evidence from interactions with and observation of the pilots during the
study lead to several additional conclusions. First, pilot’s acceptance of weather conditions
are incredibly different. The original pre-flight briefing suggesting the potential for marginal
weather conditions had to be modified after several participants stated that they would not
file a VFR flight plan, particularly given the mountainous conditions they would be facing
en-route. Second, as participants varied widely in both skills and abilities, this wide range
continued in regards to both comfort and experience with the flight simulator. This effect
was magnified by the touchiness of the simulator in comparison to a real aircraft (or more
realistic flight controls). Several pilots required additional time to adjust to the simulator
before they were comfortable to take part in the experimental simulation. Third, the
response of the pilots to the study, including both the weather briefing and the simulated
flight, varied widely. Some pilots studied the briefing materials for 30 minutes or more (and
had to be asked to finalize their pre-flight briefing), and other pilots only required 5-10
minutes to become familiar with the materials. This was also evident during the simulated
flight, as some pilots did not take the simulated flight as seriously as others. These
differences were not evident in the questionnaire data.
Several of these points are consistent with the limitations of this study, and could be
points for future improvements. It is a given that for any experiment using a flight simulator
certain aspects of realism are sacrificed, which ensures the safety and repeatability of the
study. That being said, one of the main difficulties for the pilots in this study was being able
to adjust to the touchiness of the controls. Although several re-workings of the controls
were necessary for calibration, a realistic handling of the aircraft was never fully achieved.
Although the pilots were given an explanation of this limitation prior to takeoff, several
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pilots, particularly those without previous simulator experience, had difficulties. Therefore,
an improved handling through the use of more advanced controls would be helpful for
future studies. An additional improvement that could be made for similar studies is the use
of a more realistic weather briefing. Several of the pilots commented that they do not
typically receive a weather briefing in the format it was given. Therefore, the use of an
abbreviated briefing via the computer would allows the pilot to interact with the information
in a format more similar to what they typically use.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

It is impressive that even in a simulated setting (albeit low-fidelity), a clear and
distinctive trend could be found for the impact of passenger influence on pilot behavior
during an adverse weather scenario. The additional information gathered from pilots
tentatively suggests that the less experienced pilots may be more cautious, and the more
experienced pilots more able to handle a variety of flight conditions. This leaves the pilots
with a moderate level of experience (500-1000 VFR hours) as the ones most vulnerable.
This conclusion is supported by other authors (eg, Craig, 2001), who suggest that there is a
period of increased vulnerability when a pilot is no longer under the supervision of a flight
instructor, but has enough experience to believe that they are capable to handle any situation,
without the additional experience to know otherwise. Findings from other questionnaires
were not as helpful as would be expected in understanding the thought processes behind
pilot behavior.
Even though no significant differences were found between the distance prior to
diverting for the two individuals tasked with the role of the passenger, it would be interesting
to determine what characteristics of these individuals contributed to the pilot’s decision to
continue further into the weather. Is this inability to resist persuasion a trait consistent
among a variety of flight conditions and operations? Due to the lack of significant findings
for the questionnaires in the current study, the creation of a tool to determine which pilots
are most at risk for passenger influence would be particularly useful for future research in
this field. The second part of the process, the ability to decrease potentially harmful and
dangerous motivational behavior, is quite complex and may be very difficult to answer.
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Although additional knowledge would be useful to helping solve this portion of the
problem, from what we now know, one of several potential solutions can be explored for
effectiveness.
One potential solution is the new driver regulations that restrict driving with peers
for newly licensed teen drivers. Although this solution has found success for young drivers,
both the population (teen versus adult), and the results from this study showing
nonsignificant findings for both age and VFR hours, indicates that this solution would not
be a feasible option. An additional potential solution might be the use of training to make
pilots more aware of this potentially dangerous situation, which has been used successfully
for ADM/judgment training for GA pilots, and during CRM and assertiveness training for
commercial pilots. This solution may be particularly effective due to the results indicating
that pilots were not aware that the passenger was influencing them during the simulation,
contrary to the significant findings. A third potential solution would be the use of pre-flight
briefings for passengers. The pilot would be able to explain to the passenger the limitations
of both the aircraft and their personal minimums regarding weather in order to educate the
pilot on aviation safety. Conversely, the pilot could inform the passenger to alert them if
they feel uncomfortable with any flight conditions. A final potential solution would be the
use of weather technology, such as GPS, NextGen, or any other technology to measure
current weather information. This, or similar technology, could provide an updating
recommendation for the pilot in-flight based on the minimums he or she has previously
chosen. Therefore, the pilot would be alerted when a change in plans is necessary, and no
subjective judgment would be included in the decision process.
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This research should be considered a first step in a multi-step effort to understand,
mitigate, and prevent VFR into IMC accidents. It is hoped that the knowledge gained
through this research contribute to a body of work that can impact aviation safety for VFR
into IMC accidents and incidents.
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APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A: Pre-Experimental Questionnaires for Pilots

Pilot Pre-Experiment Questionnaire: Part 1: Demographic and Flight Information

1. Your Age: ______

2. Sex: Male ______

Female ______

3. Place you learned to fly: City, State: _______________________

4. Years since received license ___________

5. Current license held:

Private Pilots License ____

Commercial Pilots License _____

Instrument Rating ____

Air Transport Private License ____

Flight Instructor ____

6. Please list your total flight hours:

VFR _________
IFR: actual _________
IFR: simulated _________
IFR: total _________
Cross country (>50nm) _________
Pilot in command _________
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7. Please list your recent flight hours:

Past 30 days VFR: _________

Past 30 days IFR: _________

Past 60 days VFR: _________

Past 60 days IFR: _________

Past 90 days VFR: _________

Past 90 days IFR: _________

8. Hours as Pilot in Command: ________

9. What percentage of your time do you spend with passengers? ________

10. What percentage of the time you spend with passengers is spent with the following type of
passengers (responses should sum to 100%):

Friend ________

Family member ________

Spouse/significant other ________

Flight instructor ________

Other ________

11. Date of Last Medical certificate ___________

Class of Medical Certificate ____________

Waivers? ______________

12. Date of last instructor training ______________

13. Aircraft type usually flown:
Primary Make/ Model: ________________________ Percentage of time in aircraft: ______
Secondary Make/ Model: ______________________ Percentage of time in aircraft:_______
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14. Do you have any experience with flying a Cessna 172? Please list an approximate amount of time spent
flying, and indicate if it was recent._________________________________________

15. Check one of the following categories which best described your current flying activities:

Training ______
Recreational ______

Self-Transport _____

Agriculture/Aerial work ______

Commercial Transport ______

Flights for hire ______

Other (please specify) ___________________________

16. Do you participate in the WINGS program (or any similar program? If so, how often?:
_________________________

17. What weather providers do you usually use?

Flight Service _____ Direct User Access Terminal (DUATS) _____ Weather Channel _____
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NWS) ______
Transcribed Weather Broadcast (TWB) ______
Hazardous Inflight Weather Advisory Service (HIWAS) ______
Enroute Flight Advisory Service (EFAS) ______
Pilots Automated Telephone Weather Answering Service (PATWAS) ______ Other pilots______
Commercial vendors ______ if so, please specify: __________________
Other ______
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APPENDIX B: Post-Experimental Questionnaires for Pilots

For the 10 photographs:
1. Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition by choosing Visual Flight Rules (VFR), Marginal
VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR).
2. Please indicate your comfort rating in continuing through the weather conditions on a scale from 1-10 (1=
the least comfortable, 10= most comfortable)

Photograph 1:

Photograph 1: Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition as Visual Flight Rules (VFR),
Marginal VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): VFR

MVFR

IFR

Photograph 1: Please estimate the following:
Comfort rating (1= most, 10= least): _____
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Photograph 2:

Photograph 2: Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition as Visual Flight Rules (VFR),
Marginal VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): VFR

MVFR

IFR

Photograph 2: Please estimate the following:
Comfort rating (1= most, 10= least): _____

Photograph 3:

Photograph 3: Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition as Visual Flight Rules (VFR),
Marginal VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): VFR

MVFR

IFR

Photograph 3: Please estimate the following:
Comfort rating (1= most, 10= least): _____
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Photograph 4:

Photograph 4: Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition as Visual Flight Rules (VFR),
Marginal VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): VFR

MVFR

IFR

Photograph 4: Please estimate the following:
Comfort rating (1= most, 10= least): _____
Photograph 5:

Photograph 5: Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition as Visual Flight Rules (VFR),
Marginal VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): VFR

MVFR

IFR

Photograph 5: Please estimate the following:
Comfort rating (1= most, 10= least): _____
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Photograph 6:

Photograph 6: Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition as Visual Flight Rules (VFR),
Marginal VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): VFR

MVFR

IFR

Photograph 6: Please estimate the following:
Comfort rating (1= most, 10= least): _____

Photograph 7:

Photograph 7: Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition as Visual Flight Rules (VFR),
Marginal VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): VFR

MVFR

IFR

Photograph 7: Please estimate the following:
Comfort rating (1= most, 10= least): ____
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Photograph 8:

Photograph 8: Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition as Visual Flight Rules (VFR),
Marginal VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): VFR

MVFR

IFR

Photograph 8: Please estimate the following:
Comfort rating (1= most, 10= least): _____

Photograph 9:

Photograph 9: Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition as Visual Flight Rules (VFR),
Marginal VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): VFR

MVFR

IFR

Photograph 9: Please estimate the following:
Comfort rating (1= most, 10= least): _____
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Photograph 10:

Photograph 10: Please indicate if you would classify the weather condition as Visual Flight Rules (VFR),
Marginal VFR (MVFR), or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): VFR

MVFR

IFR

Photograph 10: Please estimate the following:
Comfort rating (1= most, 10= least): _____
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The definition of an accident is as follows: an event involving fatal or serious injury (requiring more than 48
hours hospitalization or involving fractures, burns, or internal injury) to any person in an aircraft or around an
aircraft, or damage or structural failure to an aircraft requiring major repair or replacement of a component or
complete hull loss.
How many aircraft accidents have you been in (as a flight crew
member)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6+

How many times have you run so low on fuel that you were
seriously concerned about making it to an airport before you ran out?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6+

How many times have you made a precautionary or forced landing
at an airport other than your original destination?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6+

How many times have you made a precautionary or forced landing
away from an airport?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6+

How many times have you inadvertently stalled an aircraft?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6+

How many times have you become so disoriented that you had to
land or call ATC for assistance in determining your location?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6+

How many times have you had a mechanical failure which
jeopardized the safety of your flight?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6+

How many times have you had an engine quit because of fuel
starvation, either because you ran out of fuel or because of an
improper pump or fuel tank selection?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6+

How many times have you flown into areas of instrument
meteorological conditions, when you were not on an instrument flight plan?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6+

How many times have you turned back or diverted to another
airport because of bad weather while on a VFR flight?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6+
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Rate the following statements from on a 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree) scale.

I would duck below minimums to get home. ______
I am capable of instrument flight. ______
I am a very careful pilot. ______
I never feel stressed when flying. ______
The rules controlling flying are much too strict. ______
I am a very capable pilot. ______
I am so careful that I will never have an accident. ______
I am very skillful on controls. ______
I know aviation procedures very well. ______
I deal with stress very well. ______
It is riskier to fly at night than during the day. ______
Most of the time accidents are caused by things beyond the pilot’s control. ______
I have a thorough knowledge of my aircraft. ______
Aviation weather forecasts are usually accurate. ______
I am a very cautious pilot. ______
The pilot should have more control over how he/she flies. ______
Usually your first response is the best response. ______
I find it easy to understand the weather information I get before flights. ______
You should decide quickly and then make adjustments later. ______
It is very unlikely that a pilot of my ability would have an accident. ______
I fly enough to maintain my proficiency. ______
I know how to get help from ATC if I get into trouble. ______
There are very few situations I couldn’t get out of. ______
If you don’t push yourself and the aircraft a little, you’ll never know what you could do. ______
I often feel stressed when flying in/near weather. ______
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Sometimes you just have to depend on luck to get you through. ______
Speed is more important than accuracy during an emergency. ______
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First, carefully read the scenario and the four listed Alternative responses. Assume you have leased a Cessna 172 in good condition.
Based on your experience, decide which of the alternatives you would most likely select as your course of action, what would be your
first, second, third and fourth choices, as if you were in the pilot scenario.
1. After holding for 15 minutes you elect to proceed to your alternate, which is 45 minutes away and is
reporting VMC. You receive a clearance and depart that hold. ATC calls you 15 minutes after you leave the
hold to tell you that Approach has an open slot and could take you now if you would like to return.
1

2

3

4 a. You accept the offer and are given a vector for the approach

1

2

3

4 b. You are cutting it too close and elect to proceed to your alternate

1

2

3

4 c. You ask for vectors to a closer airport

1

2

3

4 d. You ask ATC to stand-by while you review the situation and your status
before making a final decision.

2. Three of your closest friends have bought you a choice ticket and are paying for you to rent this airplane and
fly the four of you the 180 miles up to the university in the morning for the ”BIG” early afternoon football
game, then back in the early evening. Another friend will meet you at the college Airport and drive all of you to
the game and back. Departure weather was overcast 3000 ft ceiling with 5 miles and light haze with
temperatures in the 60s. Pilots flying the same route reported en-route weather as occasional 1500 ft ceilings
with 3 miles visibility and scattered showers. The College Airport is clear with bright sunshine. Forty- five
miles from the College Airport you have descended to 1000 feet staying just below the ceilings and encounter
rain dropping visibility to under 3 miles. The terrain is flat farmland with no published obstacles above 250 ft
tall. You decide to:
College Airport: Runway 5000x100 and 4099x100, tower 24 hrs, ARSA none, lighted runway, telephone, and
24 hr maintenance
Madison County Airport: Runway 3800x75, no tower, no ARSA, lighted runway, telephone available, no
maintenance.
1

2

3

4 a. Remain under the clouds, keep visual contact with the ground and scoot
through.

1

2

3

4 b. Do a 180 and return home.

1

2

3

4 c. Divert to the Madison County Airport located at 7 o’clock 50 NM and wait
for the worst weather to pass.

1

2

3

4 d. Put it to a vote.
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3. You are cruising at 4500 feet on top of a thin haze layer with the outside air temperature at 65 degrees. It
has been twenty-five hours since the engine was overhauled and the run-up cheek was well within limits. The
engine slowly loses RPM with no indications of oil or fuel problems. You suspect carburetor icing and pull on
the carb heat. The engine backfires, vibrates and loses RPM fast. You decide to:
1

2

3

4 a. Pull out the mixture, stop the engine and check the fuel selector valve, mag
switch settings and declare an emergency.

1

2

3

4 b. Push in the carb heat, keep the engine running and divert to the closest
airfield.

1

2

3

4 c. Keep the carb heat on and see what happens.

1

2

3

4 d. Push in the carb heat, keep the engine at idle, declare an emergency and ask
for advice.

4. Bad weather forced you to cancel flying your boss into another city where he is to address a convention.
There are openings on a flight going to the same city departing from the airline terminal on the other side of
the airport in 15 minutes. It will take too long to call a taxi so he asks you to run him over to the terminal in
the 172. You decide to:
1

2

3

4 a. Start the engine and ask ground control for permission to taxi to the back of
the terminal, drop off a passenger and taxi back to the FBO ramp.

1

2

3

4 b. Start and ask ground control for permission to taxi around the airport for a
maintenance check and conveniently drop the boss off near the terminal.

1

2

3

4 c. Say you’re sorry but it is illegal for you to deliver passengers to the back side
of the terminal and help find a ride through the FBO.

1

2

3

4 d. Ask ground control if there is any way a representative from the airline could
meet you at a door to the ramp and escort the boss into the terminal.

5. You have paid for and been planning this flight to the Lodge Resort at the Lake for six months.
The
weather is forecast good VFR with a summer haze under 3000 feet and broken scattered clouds along the route
of flight. The only problem is you know you have a minor summer cold. You can clear your ears and only feel
a little achy with no headache. You decide to:
1

2

3

4 a. Take the minimal dosage of cold tablets and go.

1

2

3

4 b. Cancel the flight.

1

2

3

4 c. Call your doctor and ask for a prescription for medication.

1

2

3

4 d Stick a menthol inhaler in your pocket, take no other medication and go.
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6. You are looking for 172s to rent. You have decided the most important thing to look for in a rental plane is:
1

2

3

4 a The overall appearance, is it neat and does it look cared for

1

2

3

4 b. A clean engine with clean oil.

1

2

3

4 c. New COM/NAV radios.

1

2

3

4 d. Smooth skin, no dents or dings.

7. When you get your weather briefing for a cross country flight requiring at least one fuel stop, which part of
the forecast do you consider the most critical:
1

2

3

4 a. The weather at the departure point.

1

2

3

4 b. En route weather to the fuel stop.

1

2

3

4 c. The weather at the fuel stop.

1

2

3

4 d Weather at the final destination.

8. It had rained all day, but the font pushed south of you and cleared the skies. You are out with two friends on
a sight seeing trip to the hills 40 miles away and plan to be back before dark. With sunset still an hour away you
notice ground fog beginning to form. You decide to:
1

2

3

4 a. Apply full power and race back to the home Airport.

1

2

3

4 b. Call Flight Watch and cruise back home.

1

2

3

4 c. Call on your home airfield’s CATF to see if anyone is there and can tell you
what the weather is doing.

1

2

3

4 d. Go directly to an Airport you know is closer than your home Airport, land
and find out what the weather is doing.
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Please indicate how characteristics or descriptive of you each of the following statements is by using a rating
scale from 1-6:
1: very uncharacteristic of me, extremely nondescriptive
2: rather uncharacteristic of me, quite nondescriptive
3: somewhat uncharacteristic of me, slightly nondescriptive
4: somewhat characteristic of me, slightly descriptive
5: rather characteristic of me, quite descriptive
6: very characteristic of me, extremely descriptive
1.

I have no particular desire to be the leader of a group. ________

2.

It is difficult for me to start a conversation with a stranger. ________

3.

When someone repeatedly kicks the back of my chair in a movie or on an airplane I don’t say
anything. ________

4.

In discussions I go along with the will of the group. ________

5.

I shy away from situations where I might be asked to take charge. ________

6.

When I meet new people I usually have little to say. ________

7.

It is uncomfortable for me to exchange a purchase I’ve found to be defective. ________

8.

I try to dress like the other people I work or go to school with. ________

9.

I let others take the lead when I’m on a committee. ________

10. I feel uncomfortable around people I don’t know. ________
11. When a friend borrows something of value to me and returns it damaged I don’t say anything.
________
12. I’ll take a drink (or smoke tobacco or pot) when out with a group even though I really don’t want to.
________
13. I would avoid a job which required me to supervise other people. ________
14. I find it difficult to make new friends. ________
15. When someone interrupts me in a serious conversation, I find it hard to ask him/her to wait a minute.
________
16. When there is disagreement I accept the decision of the majority. ________
17. I work best in a group when I’m the person in charge. ________
18. At a party I find it easy to introduce myself and join a group conversation. ________
19. If I have been “short-changed” I go back and complain. ________
20. My opinions are not easily changed by those around me. ________
21. I seek positions where I can influence others. ________
22. It’s easy for me to make “small talk” with people I’ve just met. ________
23. If the food I am served in a restaurant is unsatisfactory I complain to the waiter. ________
24. I defend my point of view even though someone in authority disagrees with me. ________
25. I am usually the one who initiates activities in my group. ________
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26. I find it easy to talk with all kinds of people. ________
27. If a friend betrays a confidence I express my annoyance to him/her. ________
28. I nearly always argue for my viewpoint if I think I’m right. ________
29. In an emergency I get people organized and take charge. ________
30. When I am attracted to a person I’ve not met I actively try to get acquainted. ________
31. When an acquaintance takes advantage of me I confront him/her. ________
32. I follow my own ideas even when pressured by a group to change them. ________
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APPENDIX C: Pilot Debriefing
How long had the flight been going on before it ended (approximate in minutes)? _________

How far do you estimate you were from the destination when the program ended (approximate in sm)? _____

What do you think the weather conditions were when the program ended? Estimate the following:

Weather condition:

VFR

MVFR

IFR

LIFR

Comfort rating (1= least, 10= most): _______
What is your own normal personal minimum for VFR visibility? ________
What is your normal personal minimum for VFR cloud ceiling? ________
Are these minimums rock-solid, or do you adjust them a little, depending on the circumstances?________
Have you ever flown this particular route before (or in this area)? ________
Have you used Microsoft Flight simulator X or an earlier version previously?
Y
N
If you have used another flight simulator list here and answer the questions below:_______________

If yes, for what purpose did you use Microsoft Flight Simulator?

Recreation

Training

If for another reason, please explain: ________________________

If yes, how much experience do you have using Microsoft Flight Simulator? Estimated hours used: _______

If yes, did you use flight controls with Microsoft Flight Simulator? __________________________________
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Do you have video game experience? If so, what types of games do you play, and how much experience for
each? Types of games: action, adventure, role playing, strategy, vehicle simulators, etc.; list hour/ how often you play each
_______________________________________________________________

How often do you fly with passengers? Usually ______

Sometimes _____

Rarely ______ Never ______

Who is your typical passenger? What is their relationship to you? ___________________________________
Did the addition of passengers affect your willingness to continue through the weather? (increase it ____,
no change____, decrease it ____)
Did the promptings from passengers affect your willingness to continue through the weather? (increase it ____,
no change____, decrease it ____)
If you had more flight hours, would that have changed your willingness to continue through the weather?
(increase it ____, no change____, decrease it ____)
If your passenger had been a family member, would that have changed your willingness to continue through
the weather? (increase it ____, no change____, decrease it ____)
If your passenger had been a significant other or spouse, would that have changed your willingness to continue
through the weather? (increase it ____, no change____, decrease it ____)
If your passenger had been a friend, would that have changed your willingness to continue through the
weather? (increase it ____, no change____, decrease it ____)
If your passenger had been an attractive member of the opposite sex, would that have changed your willingness
to continue through the weather? (increase it ____, no change____, decrease it ____)
If your flight mission had been critical (for example, delivering a human heart for surgery), would that change
your willingness to continue through the weather? (increase it ____, no change____, decrease it ____)
If your flight had been a for-hire paid flight, would that change your willingness to continue through the
weather? (increase it ____, no change____, decrease it ____)
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Did the fact that this was a simulation (and not reality) affect your willingness to continue through the weather?
• It increased willingness because:

•

•

(a) I wanted to fly the sim___ and/or ____,
(b) I knew I couldn’t really get injured in it___,
No, it had no effect because:
(a) it didn’t matter to me one way or the other___
(b) there were positives and negatives but they cancelled each other out___
It decreased willingness because:
(a) I was unfamiliar with this particular simulator___
(b) I didn’t want to make any mistakes in front of the experimenter___

How economically significant was the incentive money to you?
1__not at all
2__a little
3__fairly significant
4__significant
If you were to crash in the simulator, how embarrassed would you be?
1__not at all
2__a little
3__fairly

5__very significant

4__significantly

5__extremely

Have you ever had a bad flight experience related to weather? If so, please describe briefly.

Have you been in a situation where you received pressure from a passenger or co-pilot? If so, please describe
briefly.

Do your actions in this situation differ from what you thought you would do in a similar situation? If so, please
describe briefly.
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APPENDIX D: Pre-Experimental Questionnaires for Passengers
Please indicate how characteristics or descriptive of you each of the following statements is by using a rating
scale from 1-6:
1: very uncharacteristic of me, extremely nondescriptive
2: rather uncharacteristic of me, quite nondescriptive
3: somewhat uncharacteristic of me, slightly nondescriptive
4: somewhat characteristic of me, slightly descriptive
5: rather characteristic of me, quite descriptive
6: very characteristic of me, extremely descriptive
1.

I have no particular desire to be the leader of a group. ________

2.

It is difficult for me to start a conversation with a stranger. ________

3.

When someone repeatedly kicks the back of my chair in a movie or on an airplane I don’t say
anything. ________

4.

In discussions I go along with the will of the group. ________

5.

I shy away from situations where I might be asked to take charge. ________

6.

When I meet new people I usually have little to say. ________

7.

It is uncomfortable for me to exchange a purchase I’ve found to be defective. ________

8.

I try to dress like the other people I work or go to school with. ________

9.

I let others take the lead when I’m on a committee. ________

10. I feel uncomfortable around people I don’t know. ________
11. When a friend borrows something of value to me and returns it damaged I don’t say anything.
________
12. I’ll take a drink (or smoke tobacco or pot) when out with a group even though I really don’t want to.
________
13. I would avoid a job which required me to supervise other people. ________
14. I find it difficult to make new friends. ________
15. When someone interrupts me in a serious conversation, I find it hard to ask him/her to wait a minute.
________
16. When there is disagreement I accept the decision of the majority. ________
17. I work best in a group when I’m the person in charge. ________
18. At a party I find it easy to introduce myself and join a group conversation. ________
19. If I have been “short-changed” I go back and complain. ________
20. My opinions are not easily changed by those around me. ________
21. I seek positions where I can influence others. ________
22. It’s easy for me to make “small talk” with people I’ve just met. ________
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23. If the food I am served in a restaurant is unsatisfactory I complain to the waiter. ________
24. I defend my point of view even though someone in authority disagrees with me. ________
25. I am usually the one who initiates activities in my group. ________
26. I find it easy to talk with all kinds of people. ________
27. If a friend betrays a confidence I express my annoyance to him/her. ________
28. I nearly always argue for my viewpoint if I think I’m right. ________
29. In an emergency I get people organized and take charge. ________
30. When I am attracted to a person I’ve not met I actively try to get acquainted. ________
31. When an acquaintance takes advantage of me I confront him/her. ________
32. I follow my own ideas even when pressured by a group to change them. ________
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APPENDIX E: Passenger Debriefing
What incentive condition did you participate in?
 Baseline
 Risky (Continue through weather to destination)
 Safe (Land safely at any airport)

How many times have you participated in this incentive condition? _________

How many times have you participated in this experiment (all incentive conditions)? _________

How familiar are you with how the experiment runs? 1 (not familiar at all) – 5 (very familiar) _______

How confident do you feel with the role playing exercise? 1 (not familiar at all) – 5 (very familiar) _______

How effective do you think you were in convincing the pilot to continue/divert from the weather?
Rate on a 1-5 scale: 5 (definite change) to 1 (no change). _______

How does your performance compare to previous experimental runs? Rate on a 1-5 scale:
1 (Excellent improvement) - 2 (Somewhat better) - 3 (same as previous) - 4 (Somewhat worse) - 5 (Huge
deterioration)

How does the outcome compare to previous experimental runs? Rate on a 1-5 scale:
1 (Excellent improvement) - 2 (Somewhat better) - 3 (same as previous) - 4 (Somewhat worse) - 5 (Huge
deterioration)

How would you rate the pilot’s ability to resist your persuasion?
1 (not at all able) – 5 (completely able) _______
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How did the pilot respond to persuasion? Give a brief description below:

How do you think your presence influenced the pilot?

Please provide any comments about the pilot, the flight, or anything that you think might be useful, random
thoughts, etc:
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APPENDIX F: Informed Consent for Pilots (Modified)
Information Concerning Participation in a Research Study
Clemson University
Utilization of weather information and pilot experience on pilot performance

Description of the research and your participation
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Dr. Scott Shappell, and Jaclyn Baron, MS. The
purpose of the study is to understand how pilots with different levels of experience utilize weather information
during a simulated flight scenario. A secondary goal of the study is to determine how much information an
untrained passenger can learn about flying through their presence in a simulated general aviation flight scenario.
Your participation will involve a simulated flight scenario, followed by questionnaires.

The amount of time required for your participation will be approximately 2 to 2 ½ for which you will receive
$50.00 compensation.

Voice Recording
This research project includes voice recording during the study. This tape will only be heard by the researchers
listed above. The tapes will be kept locked up, and you will only be identified on the tape using an assigned
identification number. The tapes will be kept for a minimum of three years, according to federal guidelines,
and then destroyed.

Risks and discomforts
Any risks or discomforts will be minor, resulting from the repetitive use of the flight simulator.
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Potential benefits
Your participation in this study will result in an increased knowledge of this topic that can be incorporated into
design of weather systems. In addition, the participant will receive financial compensation for their
participation.

Protection of confidentiality
All information from each participant will be coded with an identification number that will be used for future
identification and analyses.

Voluntary participation
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate and you may withdraw
your consent to participate at any time. You will not be penalized in any way should you decide not to
participate or to withdraw from this study.

As a requirement of participation in this study, you must agree that you will not discuss the methods or
conditions you experience with other pilots who might themselves become participants as this could influence
their performance.

Contact information
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or if any problems arise, please contact Dr. Scott
Shappell at Clemson University at 864.656.4662. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a
research participant, please contact the Clemson University Office of Research Compliance at 864.656.6460.
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APPENDIX G: Informed Consent for Pilots (Accurate)
Information Concerning Participation in a Research Study
Clemson University
Pilot weather decision making and the influence of passenger pressure

Description of the research and your participation

You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Dr. Scott Shappell, and Jaclyn Baron, MS. The
purpose of the study is to understand how pilots respond to passenger influence during a simulated flight
scenario. Your participation will involve a simulated flight scenario, followed by questionnaires.

The amount of time required for your participation will be approximately 2 to 2 ½ for which you will receive
$50.00 compensation.

Voice Recording
This research project includes voice recording during the study. This tape will only be heard by the researchers
listed above. The tapes will be kept locked up, and you will only be identified on the tape using an assigned
identification number. The tapes will be kept for a minimum of three years, according to federal guidelines,
and then destroyed.

Risks and discomforts
There are no known risks associated with this research.

Potential benefits
Your participation in this study will result in an increased knowledge of this topic that can be incorporated into
design of weather systems. In addition, the participant will receive financial compensation for their
participation.
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Protection of confidentiality
All information from each participant will be coded with an identification number that will be used for future
identification and analyses.

Voluntary participation
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate and you may withdraw
your consent to participate at any time. You will not be penalized in any way should you decide not to
participate or to withdraw from this study.

As a requirement of participation in this study, you must agree that you will not discuss the methods or
conditions you experience with other pilots or participants who might themselves become participants as this
could influence their performance.

Contact information
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or if any problems arise, please contact Dr. Scott
Shappell at Clemson University at 864.656.4662. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a
research participant, please contact the Clemson University Office of Research Compliance at 864.656.6460.
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APPENDIX H: Weather Scenario
Airport ID

Airport Name

KCKB

North Central West Virginia

Altitude
MSL
1217 ft.

Nearest high Wind Speed Dewpoint
pt.
2600 ft.
10
-10

KSHD

Shenandoah Valley Regional

1201 ft.

4000 ft.

20

KCHO

Charlottesville-Albemarle

639 ft.

4200 ft.

KLKU

Louisa County/Freeman Field

493 ft.

KOFP

Hanover County Municipal

207 ft.

Temp

Cloud Ceiling AGL Cloud Type Cloud Coverage

Visibility

5

10000

Cumulus

Broken

12.0

-1

-1

2500

Cumulus

Broken

4.0

15

-2

-2

800

Stratus

Overcast

2.0

1700 ft.

15

-3

-3

400

Stratus

Overcast

0.5

1700 ft.

15

-4

-4

400

Stratus

Overcast

0.5

* Maximum elevation is indicated on the sectional charts as 5200 ft. between KSKB and KSHD, with second highest point between
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APPENDIX I: Pre-Flight Weather Briefing
Flight Weather Briefing
Flight Path: KCKB- KOFP
ETD: 1:00EDT/ 1700Z
ETA: 3:00EDT/ 1900Z
Adverse Conditions:
No current SIGMET/AIRMETs, PIREPs
Synopsis:
Surface Map 1:00EDT/1700Z

Current Conditions:
KCKB 081653Z 18010KT 10SM BKN100 05/M10 A2991 RMK AO2
SLP120 T00540101
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Area Forecast (FA)
000
FAUS41 KKCI 081653
FA1W
BOSC FA 081653
SYNOPSIS AND VFR CLDS/WX
SYNOPSIS VALID UNTIL 091200
CLDS/WX VALID UNTIL 090600...OTLK VALID 090600-091200
.
SYNOPSIS...LOW PRES SYSTEM CNTRD OVR CNTRL CANADA COLD FRNT MVG TWD OH
VLY. HIGH PRES SYSTEM DOMNATG ESTRN SBRD. COLD FRNT FRCST ARV 09/12Z.
.
MD DE DC WV VA
APLCNS WWD...
NRN HLF.. SCT050-070. WND S 10KT. 02Z BKN040. TOPS 120. WND S
10G15KT. OTLK...VFR.
SRN.. BKN090. TOPS 100. WND S 10G15KT. 02Z SCT-BKN090. TOPS 150.
OTLK...VFR.
E OF APLCNS...
CSTL PLAINS..
NRN HLF..SKC. WND S 7KT. OTLK...VFR.
SRN HLF..SCT-BKN090. TOPS 100. SCT -RA. WND S 10G20KT. OTLK...VFR.

Visible Satellite Image: 12:30EDT/1630Z

Destination Forecast:
KOFP 081653Z 0816/0912 18020KT P6SM BKN031
TEMPO 0818/0820 6SM -RA OVC031
FM091100 22025G20KT 6SM BKN035
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Winds Aloft:
850 mb Chart:

No current NOTAMS/TFRs
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APPENDIX J: Sectional Chart with Incentive Condition Results

* Negative Incentive: Blue dots

*Non incentive/Baseline: Black dots

*Positive Incentive: Green dots
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